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Executive summary 
The future potential of LNG as a bunker fuel in the Southeast Asian market is huge, although it is still 
an immature technology. An emerging market for propulsion based on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
in the region creates a business opportunity for Norwegian companies delivering relevant products 
and services. This is a summary of the strategy that will yield the highest return on a foreign market 
entry with focus on export of LNG-technology in the Southeast Asian region.  
This thesis has assessed the gas producing and consuming countries, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
The Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam, hereby referred to as the ASEAN-countries. 
Successful internationalization demands resource commitment and good timing, and therefore we 
recommend entering two countries with the purpose of exporting LNG-propulsion technology: 
Singapore and Indonesia. All countries can potentially adapt technology for using LNG as a marine 
fuel, but Singapore and Indonesia are most likely to develop small-scale LNG first. 
Singapore has one of the busiest ports in the world with a 20 % global market share for bunkering. It 
is a technological frontrunner in the region, and the government has taken initiatives towards 
establishing standards for bunkering and operations with LNG as a bunker fuel. Companies are 
invited to attend Joint Industry Projects on technical and commercial aspects concerning LNG-
propulsion, and this is an opportunity to change the context and affect how the market will evolve. 
Moreover, Singapore has one of the best business environments in the world and it is easy, but 
expensive to establish with an entity in the country. In total, Singapore is most likely to adapt LNG as 
a bunker fuel and consequently LNG-sponsors should be present in the country.  
Indonesia is the Southeast Asian region’s largest country in terms of population, area and economy. 
Combined with an ideal topography for small-scale LNG, Indonesia is the potentially largest market 
for LNG-technology in the region. LNG as marine fuel can become a reality, especially in Eastern 
parts of Indonesia, quite fast. The challenge in Indonesia is a complicated business environment with 
poor property rights as foreigners cannot have a majority share post in a local company, the red tape 
is extensive and corruption is a problem. However, it is possible to do ethical business in the country 
and at the same time succeed, but it takes adaption of strategy. Traditional Western-style strategy 
will not work. Long-term relations, trust and efficient alliances with local companies are required to 
capitalize from the Indonesian market for LNG-technology and other products and services. 
The figure at the right demonstrates the two 
most decisive variables that will determine the 
evolvement of the LNG bunker fuel market in 
Southeast Asia:  
 The oil-gas differential: If the price 
difference increase in favor of LNG, it is 
very stimulating  
 Degree of standard agreements in the 
LNG-technology: Ship owners rely on 
standards for bunkering and operations 
for LNG  
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The internationalization strategy 
Singapore:  
Population: 4.7 millions 
GDP: $315 billion (PPP) 
Economic growth: 5.30 % 
Indonesia: 
Population: 247 millions 
GDP: $1121 billion (PPP) 
Economic growth: 6.40 % 
Singapore is opening a LNG receiving terminal on 
Jurong Island during 2013. The purpose is to 
increase energy security and introduce LNG to 
the energy mix. To exploit the terminal in the 
best manner the government has started to look 
into export opportunities and distribution of 
small-scale LNG. Accordingly, it is realistic to see 
retail availability of LNG as a marine fuel during 
2014.  
Entry mode: Singapore has an open business 
environment and a strong protection of property 
rights which allow foreign market firms to adapt 
all types of entry modes. If the entering firm 
requires a strong institutional framework which 
Singapore possess and at the same time 
demands high level of local resources, 
acquisition is recommended to access the 
market fast.  
Alliances: Alliances are an effective tool to share 
risk and gain complementary capabilities. No 
particular alliance agreement is recommended 
for Singapore, however long-term relations and 
trust is key success factors with both partners 
and customers. 
Partner selection: Potential partners may have 
conflicting interests, which can be more costly 
than the benefits associated. Innovation Norway 
can assist in selecting partners, which we 
recommend to employ. 
Timing: Timing is an important variable in 
determining market success and profitability. 
Early entry is required to establish the necessary 
relations needed to get customers.  
Indonesia has an extensive production and 
consumption of natural gas. Especially the 
Eastern parts of the country have an ideal 
topography with many islands, which makes LNG 
the most realistic alternative. Höegh LNG is a 
Norwegian company who has signed a deal to 
deliver a FSRU to Indonesia, implying a growing 
interest for LNG. Small-scale distribution is likely 
to arise during 2014.  
Entry mode: As Indonesia does not allow foreign 
companies to hold the majority share post; Joint 
Ventures are required as an entry mode. Joint 
Ventures are a demanding entry mode, but silent 
partners may allow you to control the firm.  
Alliances: Alliances are not a question of choice, 
but a necessity in Indonesia. The country has 
extensive red tape and a local partner can offer 
local market knowledge and market access that 
can be very beneficial to have. Long-term 
relations and trust is key ingredients in 
successful alliances. 
Partner selection: As the partner has extremely 
high importance, partner selection is a key 
strategic process in Indonesia. It is important to 
avoid corruption, and to ensure that the partner 
is serious. Innovation Norway has recently 
opened an office in Jakarta and can assist 
Norwegian firms in selecting partners. 
Timing: As in Singapore, timing is a crucial 
strategic decision. Long-term relations and trust 
takes time to establish, and consequently an 
early entry is recommended. 
Government trade initiatives: In countries where politics and business are more intertwined than in 
Western countries, government agencies such as Innovation Norway has a more important function 
as they can function as door openers and relational builders. We recommend Innovation Norway to 
organize delegations travelling to Norway to experience LNG-propulsion to share knowledge and to 
help Norwegian companies building long-term relations with government officials and local firms. 
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1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 presents the problem statement, the goals and the structure of the paper and the solution 
of the research question. Innovation Norway and Maritim21 have outlined Southeast Asia to be an 
attractive future market for technology ensuring distribution and application of LNG as an energy 
source. High economic growth and scarcity of energy in combination with extensive discoveries of 
stranded gas make LNG very suitable for the region (DNV Clean Technology Centre, 2010). The 
topography makes pipeline infrastructure challenging, and several minor fields can only be economic 
viable with LNG-transportation. In total, Southeast Asia appears to be an important market for 
producers of LNG-technology. 
Singapore will complete the region’s first receiving terminal for LNG in 2013, and this is expected to 
boost the market opportunities (DNV Clean Technology Centre, 2011). Stranded gas fields become 
economic profitable with production based on FSRU-units. Infrastructure for bunkering of LNG as 
marine bunker fuel can be realized. But the primary use of LNG will be as energy source in land 
based power plants. Consequently, Southeast Asia will be a target market for refiners, distributors, 
engine manufacturers and sub suppliers. As Norway have production and large and small-scale 
distribution and application of LNG, Norwegian manufacturers of LNG-technology can benefit from 
exporting technology to the Southeast Asian market. 
During the fall 2011 we completed our project thesis that assessed the future potential of LNG as a 
bunker fuel (Løset & Tveten, 2011). The conclusion stated that LNG is the most likely future bunker 
fuel, given the scenario that the IMO-regulations regarding maximum sulphur emissions are put into 
force. Norway contains a leading position on use of small-scale LNG, with extensive distributor 
experience through GASNOR, and with leading LNG-engine manufacturers such as Rolls-Royce. If the 
South-East Asian region starts to apply LNG as a marine bunker fuel, this represents a great market 
opportunity for Norwegian companies.   
1.1 Problem definition 
Maritim21 has established a goal to create bigger LNG-markets, and one of the measures will be to 
stimulate international markets to adopt LNG as a marine bunker fuel (Maritim21, 2011). This 
strategy was followed by a workshop held by Innovation Norway 18th January 2012 where several 
Norwegian enterprises with business in LNG-markets participated. The focus of the workshop was to 
identify which of the Southeast Asian markets that where most attractive, and how they could be 
targeted. Significant interest for export of LNG-solutions to this region is a strong motivation for 
writing a thesis on this subject. We have formulated the following research question:  
 How can the Norwegian maritime sector succeed in internationalizing LNG-technology in 
South-East Asia?  
There are two assumptions that are fundamental to our research question. Firstly the Southeast 
Asian market is chosen with reference to its focus from Innovation Norway and Maritim21. We 
assume it will be most fruitful to explore internationalization to these markets since the maritime 
sector already has directed efforts to this region. Secondly we assume that the Southeast Asian 
market will demand LNG-technology. Given that the Norwegian maritime cluster has chosen the 
emerging economies in Asia Pacific we expect these markets to be attractive. We will of course 
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explore the latter more closely in our thesis, but we rely on the analysis carried out by DNV and 
Innovation Norway when we define these markets as a great market opportunity. 
To answer the research question, Rolls-Royce Marine is chosen as a single case study company. 
Norway is producing technology along the entire LNG value chain, while we have chosen to focus on 
engine manufacturing and ship design. This is because of the resources Rolls-Royce Marine has 
proposed to assist us with in our research. During the discussion of theoretical propositions, the 
degree of the focus on Rolls-Royce will vary. In general, the analysis starts at an industry level before 
we pay closer attention to Rolls-Royce where it is relevant. 
1.2 Goals 
To solve the research question properly, we have a series of goals that we seek to achieve: 
 Present an comprehensive analysis of the Southeast Asian countries and the market 
opportunities in the chosen region, and an updated analysis of the LNG-market based on our 
project thesis (Løset & Tveten, 2011) 
 Suggest theoretical propositions based on a thorough literature review of relevant strategic 
theory within entry strategies, barriers to internationalization, performance and alliances 
 Gather data through expert interviews to identify export strategies that suits the capabilities 
of Norwegian enterprises, demands from the Asian buyers and the theoretical propositions 
 Offer implications for managers, policy makers and researchers with specific actions that will 
increase the possibility of establishing successful trade of LNG-technology with the 
Southeast Asian region 
By working through our objectives in their given order we have the ambition of answering the 
research question based on a case study methodology, with a high degree of validity and reliability 
(Yin, 2009). The first goal motivates the authors to offer an updated analysis of Southeast Asia 
regarding economic development, geography and their energy demand. Moreover, we present the 
latest analysis of the LNG-market. Secondly we review relevant strategic management literature. An 
extensive search for relevant theory has given us a valuable discussion of rival explanations 
concerning internationalization phenomenon, followed by theoretical propositions. Thirdly we 
develop an expert interview guide and conduct data from interviewees as a foundation for 
discussion analysis of the propositions. In conclusion we offer implications for managers, policy 
makers and researchers based on an assessment of findings. We hope we are able to offer the 
reader new insight and specific actions to undertake in order to reach the Southeast Asian LNG-
market.  
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
To make it easier for the reader to collect relevant information we have structured the thesis into 
nine chapters. Each chapter serves different purposes: 
 Chapter 1: Introduction to the research question, the goals of the thesis, its structure and its 
case company 
 Chapter 2: A review of the Southeast Asian countries and its gas markets 
 Chapter 3: Presentation of the global natural gas market and the bunker fuel market, 
specifically directed towards Southeast Asia 
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 Chapter 4: A literature review of relevant internationalization theory and belonging 
theoretical propositions 
 Chapter 5: A summary of theoretical propositions and the method of analyzing them 
 Chapter 6: The research design and methodology of the thesis 
 Chapter 7: Presentation of highlights from the interviews 
 Chapter 8: Analysis of theoretical propositions 
 Chapter 9: A chapter where implications for managers, policy makers and future research is 
put together alongside with our concluding remarks 
1.4 Limitations 
The scope of this master thesis is limited to internationalization of Norwegian LNG-technology to the 
Southeast Asian market. The chosen focus is related to time and resource constraints. Nevertheless, 
the Norwegian market for small-scale LNG shipping and distribution is by far the most mature across 
the globe, and one of the most relevant exporters of LNG-technology. Furthermore, Southeast Asia 
has several properties which make LNG especially suitable as an energy source. Consequently, to 
analyze the trade of LNG-technology between Norway and Southeast Asia appears to be a logic unit 
of analysis.  
1.5 The case company: Rolls-Royce Marine  
Rolls-Royce is a Multinational Company, MNC, 
providing power solutions for customers in civil 
and defense aerospace, marine and energy 
markets. They have a worldwide presence, with 
offices, manufacturing and service facilities in 
more than 50 countries. Rolls-Royce has 
established a strong brand name, delivering 
highly technological products since the 
foundation in 1906. Today Rolls-Royce is listed 
on the London stock Exchange, and as of March 
2012 it had a market capitalization of £15.3 billion. The announced order book of 2011 was £62.2 
billion, an annual increase by 5 %.  
The company started as an engine manufacturer in UK, but through several acquisitions the 
company now delivers products and services worldwide in four different segments: Civil aerospace, 
defense aerospace, marine and energy. Rolls-Royce has total 39000 employees. This thesis will focus 
on the marine unit, but still emphasize possible synergies from the other divisions and the presence 
in Southeast Asia.  
Structure   
Rolls-Royce has a comprehensive tradition of mergers and acquisitions, and only in 1999 the 
company spent £1.063billion on different acquisitions. In the same year, Rolls-Royce increased its 
involvement in marine activities, with purchase of Vickers plc. Vickers had earlier acquired different 
subsidiaries with a broad experience from producing marine waterjets, steering gear and stabilizers, 
including the Norwegian company Ulstein, a major marine propulsion and engineering company.  
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Figure 1: The organizational structure of Rolls-Royce and the Marine division’s role  
As of today the group is governed by President John Rishton in London, while the Marine unit is 
headquartered in Ålesund, Norway. The Marine activities resulted in £2,271 million, with a share of 
20.1% of the total revenue in 2011. Organic growth alone has been the main strategy the past 
decade, alongside with a massive R&D program. Rolls-Royce has a range of capabilities in the marine 
market, encompassing vessel design, the integration of complex systems and the supply and support 
of power and propulsion equipment (Rolls-Royce Marine, 2012). The marine division is serving 
customer worldwide with 9000 employees in 39 countries and only in Norway the division counts 
3400 employees. 
Business 
Rolls-Royce Marine delivers products 
and service for merchant vessels, 
naval surface ships, submarine and 
offshore vessels. The merchant sector 
includes tugs, workboats, cargo lines 
and cruise ships as well as car and 
passenger ferries. 
Rolls-Royce has experience with LNG 
engines; they have now delivered 19 
ships with LNG engines. In January 
2012 they signed a contract to deliver 
the world’s first gas powered system 
for tugs, ordered by Bukser and Berging in Norway. Rolls Royce has by a proven strategy chosen not 
to deliver Smoke Scrubber, Dual-Fuel engines, and only some SCR-solutions. Currently they try to 
establish a strong position in the global LNG market (Stensaker, 2012).    
With a strong focus on research and development, Rolls-Royce has become a pioneer of many 
important marine technologies that includes aero derivative marine gas turbines, controllable pitch 
propellers and waterjets (Rolls-Royce, 2012). 
Figure 2: A map showing the locations of Rolls-Royce Marine 
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Internationalization 
The head quarter in Southeast Asia is at the central hub in Singapore. Regional sales offices are 
present in Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The Singapore office is the main hub for all operational 
activities in Asia, and the port is of particular importance due to its central geographic position 
(Stensaker, 2012). 
 
 
 
Market and Competitors 
As the LNG market is currently emerging globally, many motor producers are competing to get 
market share. In order to comply with the IMO Tier III restriction of 2016, an environmental solution 
is necessary. A technological battle between Smoke scrubbers and LNG-engines as the preferred 
future solution in the maritime sector has arisen, and the engine manufacturers are competing with 
different LNG-propulsion solutions (Løset & Tveten, 2011).  It is a complex market, with the major 
engine designers, Mitsubishi, Wärtsila, MAN Diesel & Turbo and Rolls-Royce, are all engaged in the 
technical development of LNG-fueled engines. Today, Rolls-Royce has its main LNG-propulsion sales 
in the Norwegian market. 
  
“A global support network underpins all activities and ensures contracts can be undertaken, and 
Rolls-Royce support is at hand anywhere in the world” - (Rolls-Royce Marine, 2012) 
 
6 
 
2. Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia is a sub-region of Asia, consisting of the ten countries that are geographically south of 
China, east of India, west of New Guinea and north of Australia. A more precise definition of the 
consisting countries is not evident, but in a political context Southeast Asia is defined as the 
countries with ASEAN membership. The ASEAN, the Associations of Southeast Asian Nations, is a 
geo-political and economic organization consisting of ten countries. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Singapore and The Philippines founded the organization in 1967, with the purpose to accelerate the 
economic growth, social progress and cultural development among the members. Today ASEAN-
countries, also includes Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (ASEAN, 2012). The 
region Southeast Asia has traditional been a gas-supplying region for North Asia’s LNG markets, but 
encouraged by the regions rapid economic growth; the region is expected to be a significant 
consumer of natural gas (Hashimoto, 2011). In the further investigation in the master thesis we will 
draw attention to the gas supplying and maritime countries, the ASEAN-six plus Vietnam as shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: A map of Southeast Asia with the ASEAN six plus Vietnam marked in red (Scand, 2011) 
2.1 Economy 
Agriculture has been Southeast Asia’s primary industry for a long time, but the region’s economy 
now depends more on manufacturing and services. The region has huge gas reserves, and with a 
decline in the oil extraction, gas is predicted to play a central role for the growth and development in 
the region. Over the last decades the energy consumption and the economy in the ASEAN region 
have seen an incredible growth, and the trend is expected to continue.  
With many different countries with its own strengths and vulnerabilities, each country is positioned 
differently. Indonesia, still considered as an emerging market, is the largest economy in the region, 
has a high growth, low government and external debt burdens and is the only member of G-20 
major economies. Together with Brunei, Singapore is ranked as a highly developed country and has 
one of the best business environments in the world. Singapore has a stable political system, and is 
one of the least corrupt countries in Asia. Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines have seen a strong 
economic growth the last decade, and are considered as newly industrialized countries (CIA, 2012).  
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Table 1: Real GDP growth (Annual Percentage [%] change) in ASEAN countries (Masson & Mimura, 2011)  
 2010 2011 2016 Average 2012-16 
Indonesia 6.1 6.3 6.9 6.6 
Malaysia 7.2 4.6 5.6 5.3 
Philippines 7.3 4.5 5.1 4.9 
Singapore 14.5 5.6 4.8 4.6 
Thailand 7.8 2.5 4.9 4.5 
Vietnam 6.8 5.9 6.7 6.3 
Average of six 
countries 
7.6 5.0 5.9 5.6 
After a struggling period with global uncertainties and natural disasters, Southeast Asia will have a 
solid growth performance till 2016, and the growth is projected to be 5.6 % during 2012-2016 
(Masson & Mimura, 2011). External trade and foreign direct investment, FDI, have traditionally 
played a major part of the growth, although the global recession has declined the growth in exports. 
ASEAN economies are now turning towards domestic drivers of growth in the medium term. Large-
scale investment in infrastructure and private consumption will play a more important role in 
Southeast Asian economies. The region is also beginning to explore “green growth” as an alternative 
strategy for long-term sustainable development. The ASEAN-six account for approximately 85 % of 
region’s gross domestic product (OECD, 2012).     
AFTA, ASEAN Free Trade Area, is a trade bloc agreement by the ASEAN countries. The purpose of the 
agreement is to increase economic growth within the ASEAN, through reduction in tariff barriers and 
attracting more FDI. The free trade area covers all manufactured and agricultural products, and has 
provided more efficiency in production and long-term competitiveness (ASEAN, 2012).   
2.2 Energy mix 
Over the last decade, the energy mix is about to change in the ASEAN region. The current energy mix 
in the region is still dominated by oil, but the role of coal and gas is increasing. With a massive 
growth in energy demand, declining oil reserves is a challenge for the region. Governments are 
currently working to secure future energy demand through regional cooperation, increased 
participation of foreign companies in extraction and production activities, and investing in Oil & Gas 
infrastructure.  
Natural gas will probably play a substantial part of the energy mix in the future, with an increasing 
role in power generation, environmental advantages, combined with huge gas resources in the 
region. More than 60% capacity of the power generation in Thailand and Malaysia is now gas based 
(Shirodkar & Kunal Rana, 2009). Low prices of coal will still make the energy source essential in the 
energy mix in the future, though environmental regulations will force adaption of clean coal 
technologies. Without major policy interventions, renewable energy, like wind and solar, are not 
expected to be cost effective in the region. As of today, there are no nuclear power facilities in 
ASEAN countries, and the Fukushima Daiichi disaster will probably limit the development in the area 
with seismic risk like Thailand and Indonesia.   
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Figure 4: Upper left corner shows gas production, upper right shows gas reserves, and the pie chart shows energy mix in 
the region  (Shirodkar & Kunal Rana, 2009) 
Still, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines are known to have plans for nuclear 
power generation. In total, LNG will increase its share in the energy mix. 
2.3 Regulations, policy and environmental demands  
The region, Southeast Asia, enforces various energy policy- and regulatory framework, but much 
work still remains to stimulate green growth in the region. To balance short-term economic needs 
and long-term environmental obligations is a big challenge, especially for the lower-income ASEAN 
countries (Masson & Mimura, 2011). Regulations, monitoring and supervision are compiled 
differently in the region; Malaysia provides tax exemption and allowances for companies providing 
energy conservation, while the Philippines do not provide any financial subsidies for efficient 
improvements (DNV Clean Technology Centre, 2010).  
Compared to OECD-countries, the CO2-emissions in ASEAN countries are still smaller, but the 
emissions are growing fast, by 5.5 % a year between 1990 and 2010 compared to 0.7 % in the OECD 
(Masson & Mimura, 2011). As a fast growing and developing economic region, ASEAN-countries will 
definitely make a certain contribution to global CO2-emissions (Shirodkar & Kunal Rana, 2009).  
Despite the region’s increased environmental focus, measures are still essential to meet global 
requirements. Better use of environmental tax instruments, access to green technologies, more 
public-private partnerships in energy conservation and taking part in the global carbon market, will 
all be determining tools, a recent OECD-study concludes (Masson & Mimura, 2011). 
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2.4 Elections and disputes 
With a total of 124 conflicts, the region of Asia and Oceania accounted for nearly a third of the 
world’s conflicts. Southeast Asia is considered a semi stable region, but some conflicts have arisen 
concerning sub-national predominance, followed by resources, national power, autonomy and 
secession. The shortage of oil in the region has also provoked some territorial disputes, which have 
inhabited the development of high potential oil and gas reserves. As of today, most tension is 
related to South China Sea territories. China claims most of the South China Sea, which is believed to 
contain huge oil reserves, but The Philippines insist the territory belongs to them. Up to now, the 
conflict has been diplomatic and threat-oriented between Beijing and Manila, but worries are 
growing about the possibility of greater conflicts as China asserts its power and influence to claim 
resources (Asia Pacific News, 2012). Another border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia 
escalated to highly violent level in the start of 2011, but after the election in Thailand their 
relationship has improved (Heidelberg, 2011). Other recent, unsolved conflicts are in the Gulf of 
Thailand (Cambodia, Thailand), Baram Delta (Brunei, Malaysia) and East Kalimantan (Indonesia, 
Malaysia) (Shirodkar & Kunal Rana, 2009). The International Court of Justice has at some occasions 
taken imitative and actions to solve the disputes. This is a step in the right direction, but years of 
negotiation remain to fully resolve the disputes (Strachan, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 5: Ongoing conflicts in Southeast Asia in 2011  (Heidelberg, 2011) 
2.5 Country Risk Assessment 
A country risk assessment is a tool to map a country’s context (Cavusgil, et al., 2008). In this section 
we have compared different data regarding population, economy and politics to get a picture of the 
countries in the ASEAN gas consuming countries. The background information presented will be 
used in the discussion and analysis part, when we are going to identify which countries Norwegian 
companies could launch LNG-technology in. 
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Table 2: Country Risk Assessment with facts from CIA World Fact Book 
 Singapore 
 
Indonesia
 
Philippines
 
Malaysia  
 
Vietnam
 
Thailand
 
Brunei
 
Population 4.7 246.6 101.8 28.7 90.5 66.7 0.4 
GDP per capita 
(PPP), $ 
59900 4700 4100 15600x 3300 9700 49400 
Total GDP, billion $ 
(PPP) 
314,5 1121 393,4 447 229,2 609,8 21,1 
Economic growth, 
real growth rate 
2011 
5.30 % 6.40 % 4.70 % 5.20 % 5.80 % 1.50 % 2.80 % 
Table 2 clearly shows how the ASEAN countries are dissimilar in terms of size of population and 
economy. Singapore has almost 15 times the GDP per capita compared to The Philippines. And The 
Philippines have more than 20 times the population of Singapore. Accordingly, it is useful to 
investigate the distribution of GDP across the ASEAN gas consuming countries as in Figure 6. As we 
can see Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia are the three largest economies. However, a decision of 
foreign market entry cannot be made based on market size alone; we must investigate other factors 
such as political structure, stability and labor markets. 
 
Figure 6: The distribution of GDP across the ASEAN gas consuming countries (CIA, 2012) 
Table 3 summarizes different factors concerning governance structure, political structure and 
Corruption Perception Index rank. This assessment extends the analysis of the ASEAN countries. 
Singapore is an extremely modern country, also in a Western perspective. It is a stable country with 
a good legal system and protection of property rights. Indonesia, which is the largest market, has 
poor protection of property rights and a weak legal system. Accordingly, a foreign entry into 
Indonesia might yield higher profits, but for sure involves a larger risk. It is necessary to map the 
country’s context even deeper throughout our data collection in order to recommend appropriate 
countries to enter. 
Singapore 
10 % 
Indonesia 
36 % 
Philippines 
13 % 
Malaysia 
14 % 
Vietnam 
7 % 
Thailand 
19 % 
Brunei 
1 % 
Distribution of GDP, Southeast Asia 
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Table 3: Political structure and safety for property rights in ASEAN-countries  
 Government type Political structure (CIA, DNV) Corruption 
Perception 
Index
1
  
Singapore Parliamentary 
republic 
Singapore has a stable political system, and is one of the 
least corrupt countries in Asia. The law system has its 
foundation in the English common law system. 
5 
Indonesia Republic Indonesia is a republic, with an elected legislature and 
president. Indonesia is a member of AFTA, ASEAN's free 
trade area, and thereby committed to lower tariff and non-
tariff barriers. 
100 
The 
Philippines 
Republic The Philippines is a constitutional republic with a president 
that is elected. The membership in AFTA, ASEAN free trade 
area, has resulted in increased flow of FDI from North 
America and Western Europe. 
129 
Malaysia Constitutional 
monarchy 
Malaysia is a federal constitutional elective monarchy. The 
head of the state is elected every five year. Malaysia's legal 
system is based on English Common Law. 
60 
Vietnam Communist state Vietnam is a single-party state. With the Communist Party 
controlling key administrative and executive functions, the 
political structure is considered stable. 
112 
Thailand Constitutional 
monarchy 
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy. The Prime Ministry is 
the head of the government and a hereditary monarch is 
head of the state. 
80 
Brunei Constitutional 
Sultanate (locally 
known as Malay 
Islamic Monarchy) 
The political system in Brunei is governed by the 
constitution and the tradition of the Malay Islamic 
Monarchy. The same family has ruled Brunei for over six 
centuries. Brunei became a British protectorate in 1888, and 
still the legal system is based on English common law. 
44 
Chapter 4 will present additional literature on how to map a country’s context. The purpose will be 
to combine the risk assessment in this section with literature to make a thorough analysis of the 
most ideal countries to target for export of LNG-technology. It is necessary to investigate specific 
systems for supporting environmental friendly technology, infrastructure for LNG and similar factors 
in order to get a sufficient overview. When this analysis is carried through, we will recommend 
countries to enter in Section 8.1. 
In the next chapter, we will present the market of natural gas and the bunker fuel market. Chapter 3 
will start by introducing the natural gas market before it is focusing on Southeast Asia. It will 
continue by focusing on the worldwide bunker fuel market, and narrow towards the Southeast Asian 
region. The purpose will to understand the potential of LNG in the region as a foundation for further 
analysis.   
                                                          
1
 Measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 183 countries (Transparency International, 2012) 
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3 Fundamentals of Natural gas and the bunker fuel market2 
Natural gas is an energy source that is expected to grow substantially in the future, because it is 
widely available and offers many advantages compared to petroleum and coal. Environmental 
footprint is a key driver in Western countries, while scarcity of energy is the main driver in Southeast 
Asia (Kidnay, et al., 2011). In this chapter we give a brief introduction to natural gas and LNG, 
presenting the characteristics, the market, available resources and outlooks for future demand. 
Furthermore, we put emphasis on the bunker fuel market and the shipping market in Southeast Asia 
to get an overview of the market.  
3.1 Natural gas definitions and chemical compositions 
The natural gas composition varies from field to field, but consists mainly of 80-90 % methane (CH4), 
and heavier hydrocarbons such as ethane (C2H6), propane (C3H8) and butane (C4H10) (Rojey & Jaffret, 
1997). The value of natural gas is determined by the combustion properties of methane, which is a 
colorless, odorless, non-toxic and non-corrosive gas. Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel, 
producing mostly just water vapor and carbon dioxide (Chandra, 2006). The primary use of natural 
gas is to supply gas-fired power plants and residential use such as heating and stoves. It is also used 
as a cleaner alternative to gasoil and diesel in the transportation industry, as compressed natural 
gas, CNG. Natural gas is an important available source of hydrocarbons for petrochemical feedstock 
and a major source of elemental sulfur (Kidnay, et al., 2011). 
3.1.1 Natural gas reserves 
Natural gas appeared for decades as a form of energy that was difficult to exploit, particularly due to 
high investment and transportation costs towards the end user. This resulted in a slow development 
throughout the world, and a lot of gas was flared as a bi-product of oil production. Today gas 
discoveries have been made at all continents, making natural gas more available. Six countries, 
Russia, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, USA and Abu Dhabi possess approximately two-thirds of the 
world’s gas reserves, with 50% of the reserves are located in Iran, Qatar and Russia. According to 
geological data, the world has 187.5 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of proven conventional reserves, 
which are sufficient to meet 58.6 years of global production (BP, 2011). It is impossible to know 
exactly how much natural gas resources that are left in the ground, and estimates vary among 
different sources. In recent years improvement in exploration and the discovery of unconventional 
resources, have increased the total reserves. It is estimated that the recoverable unconventional gas 
resources are over 400 tcm, and that half of them are shale. With the discovery of shale-gas, United 
States has almost doubled its proven resources, and now their total reserves amount to 7.7 tcm (BP, 
2011).  
The US shale gas revolution will influence the LNG-market (Ito, 2011). More LNG will be available for 
Europe and Asia, and it will change the investment pattern in the US from import to export. At the 
same time it is important to notice that the shale gas revolution in the US has not yet been 
quantified. There are uncertainties on how much of the gas that is actually recoverable, and if it the 
process is easily repeated elsewhere. Critical success factors have been ideal geology, interested 
companies, support amongst politicians, environmental issues and the pricing of gas. 
                                                          
2
 Major parts of Chapter 3 are replicated with permission from Løset & Tveten (2011). Løset & Tveten (2011) 
carried out an extensive analysis of the natural gas and bunker fuel market which is relevant to this thesis, 
during the autumn 2011. 
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Unconventional gas reservoirs are without a doubt a game changer, and contribute to cover the 
growing demand for natural gas.  
 
Figure 7: Proven reserves of natural gas by the end of 2009 in trillion cubic meters (BP, 2011) 
3.1.2 Natural gas production and consumption 
In 2010 the global demand for natural gas increased by 7.4 % to 3284 bcm. The main drivers of the 
development of natural gas are lower emissions of greenhouse gases, as OECD is enforcing stricter 
regulations regarding energy sources. Natural gas offers half the carbon emissions for the same 
amount of energy produced as coal, which is the main alternative as a power feedstock in many 
regions. The global gas resources are also vast and widely dispersed geographically, making natural 
gas available and affordable for many countries.  
 
Figure 8: Production of natural gas to the left, consumption to the right, by region in billion cubic meters (BP, 2011) 
China’s gas consumption in 2010 reached 107 bcm, more than any European or other Asian country. 
They are now investing in domestic shale and tight gas projects, as well as securing supply with new 
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long-term LNG contracts and new pipelines from 
Turkmenistan (Ito, 2011). Japan’s demand for LNG is 
expected to increase, to meet their energy demand 
after the Fukushima nuclear disaster (Thorvaldsen, et 
al., 2011). In November 2011, only 13 out of Japan’s 
existing 54 nuclear reactors where operating and the 
number are expected to decrease (Global LNG Argus 
monthly, 2011). Before the Fukushima disaster, 30 % 
of the energy came from nuclear power, implying a 
large demand for alternative energy supply (BBC Asia, 
2012). As a consequence of the disaster the German 
government announced a shutdown of their nuclear 
power plants within 2022. Germany had 140 TWh of 
nuclear power, representing 23 % of their total supply, 
which will now be supplemented by other types of energy. 
Consequently, the demand for natural gas will increase, and by 2030 IEA predict it will have the 
same market share as coal and oil (Rühl, 2011). Production of gas depends on both gas prices and 
development in exploration and production. An increased gas price will incline the production even 
in economical marginal fields. 
3.2 The fundamental principles of LNG 
Natural gas fields are generally located far from residential and industrial consumers, so-called 
stranded areas. The most efficient way to transport natural gas in circumstances where the gas 
market is far from the reserves is in the form of LNG. It is estimated that approximately 60 % of the 
world’s gas resources are considered stranded, and which makes LNG-technology attractive (Huber, 
2011). LNG is natural gas that has been cooled and condensed to liquid. At atmospheric pressure 
LNG has a temperature of about -162 C, and only takes 1/600th-part of the volume natural gas has in 
gaseous state. The liquefaction process involves removal of oxygen, carbon dioxide, sulfur and water 
from the natural gas, and thus LNG is almost pure methane (Pettersen, 2008).  
LNG supply chain and relative costs 
In the early years of LNG-trading, the business was characterized by self-contained projects of large-
scale facilities. They required huge capital investments, and complex long-term contracts between 
suppliers and buyers to share the large up-front investment risk. A certain volume of LNG from a 
given production site was transported to a fixed market location at a known price. As gas price rose 
and production cost fell, LNG became more economically feasible, even in small-scale. The LNG-
market has become more dynamic, flexible and adjustable in respect to demand fluctuations, 
delivering location and shipping arrangement. Today the LNG supply chain consists typically of an 
upstream sector that develops the natural gas resources and liquefies the gas, a midstream sector 
that transport and store the LNG, and a downstream sector that re-gasifies and distributes the gas to 
the end-user. A trend is that companies involved in the LNG-trade have opted to own more of the 
value chain from upstream production of gas, till downstream towards the market place (Kidnay, et 
al., 2011). 
Figure 9: The world’s energy demand dispersed by 
energy source (Rühl, 2011) 
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Figure 10: The economic viability of natural gas relative to distance (Gudmundsson, 2011) 
Depending on where the natural gas is found, its composition, distance to the market and size of the 
field will determine if the gas is transported in its gaseous state in a pipeline, or if it shipped as LNG. 
The large investment in production facilities, ships and receiving terminals gives high initial cost for 
LNG, but when the transportation distances increase, transportation by LNG become beneficial. 
When building liquefaction and transport facilities one also need to consider the size of the reserves 
justifies the capital investment of a base load LNG-plant (Kidnay, et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 11: The value chain of LNG production upstream and downstream with % of total costs (Pettersen, 2008)  
As Figure 11 illustrates, the LNG supply chain involves a number of steps: 
1. First, energy companies do exploration and production. This stage involves the supply of gas 
and condensate from the well, either in offshore or onshore facilities, through a pipeline into 
the processing facilities.  
2. The second step is production of LNG from the raw product. This involves gas treating, 
liquefaction, and removal of mercury, CO2, H2S and heavy hydrocarbons. Liquefaction is done 
to increase the energy density of the gas for storage or transportation. At the plant heavy 
hydrocarbons are removed by purification and separation techniques for safety reasons, in 
compliance with environmental regulations and product specification. 
3. After LNG is made, it can be transported. Shipping is the most profitable solution when 
distances increase, but also transport of LNG by rail or trucks are possible.  Due to 
economies of scale the LNG carriers are increasing their capacity and the largest carriers in 
use hold 266 000 m3. The LNG is kept cooled during transportation by utilizing a fraction of 
the evaporated LNG. 
4. The LNG is sent to receiving facilities, which include unloading, storage, re-gasification and 
distribution. The LNG is re-heated and vaporized to its original gaseous state. 
5.  At the last stage the LNG is sent to gas fired power plants, the domestic gas grid or the final 
customers. 
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The steps and processes in the supply chain will depend on the specific case, and may differ. When 
LNG is used as fuel, it is directly delivered from the liquefaction facility to the end-user and no re-
gasification takes place. The supply chain is criticized for being costly and that 2.5-10 % of the energy 
is lost during the production and re-gasification of LNG (Hovland, 2011).   
Natural gas trade grew by 10.1 % in 
2010, driven by a 22.6 % growth in 
LNG shipments (Ito, 2011). Qatar, 
the world’s largest LNG-supplier, 
increased its export with 53.2 %, 
representing 25 % of global LNG-
supplies alone (BP, 2011).  
The major trade movements came 
from Indonesia, Malaysia, Qatar, 
Algeria and Nigeria, which 
accounted for 66 % of the world’s 
export. Asia, led by Japan and South 
Korea, accounted for 66 % of the 
world’s imports. LNG now accounts 
for 30.5 % of global gas trade. The 
utilization of stranded reserves is 
increasing, with several projects 
under construction or in the 
planning stage. Australia will pass 
Qatar as the leading exporter of LNG, 
if they manage to complete and 
materialize the projects with the 
estimated capacity (Kidnay, et al., 
2011).   
 
3.3 Natural gas and LNG in Southeast Asia 
The forecast for natural gas is bright, and IEA predict the next decade to be the golden age of gas 
(IEA, 2011). The global natural gas demand grew by 7.4 % in 2010 (BP, 2011) and the majority of the 
growth came from non-OECD countries. Southeast Asia experiences increased investment in gas 
infrastructure for domestic and intra region energy security. Increased LNG production capacity and 
LNG availability has turned gas into a less costly alternative energy source. A 50 % liquefaction 
capacity expansion is expected global in the period from 2009-13 (Hashimoto, 2011).  
Southeast Asia’s shift from a gas supplier to also be a significant consumer of natural gas is expected 
to last and the construction of LNG receiving terminals support this claim. To complement 
Singapore’s gas supplies from Malaysia, a 4.1 bcm LNG terminal is under construction in Jurong 
Island. In Thailand a 7.3 bcm re-gasification facility is under construction and in Indonesia pipelines 
and LNG terminals are being built to secure supplies. Indonesia and Malaysia will also use floating 
Figure 12: The upper picture showing major trade movements of LNG 
(Ito, 2011), the lower the major trade movements of natural gas (BP, 
2011). 
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storage and re-gasification units, FSRU, frequently (Shirodkar & Kunal Rana, 2009). The numerous 
LNG projects and various infrastructure projects in the region will probably link the individual 
markets together, give market security and a stronger relation with global gas markets (Hashimoto, 
2011).  
 
Figure 13: Comparison of Gas Market Consumptions [bcm] in Asia (IEA, 2010) 
With a wide range of applications, including the use of gas-fired combined heat and power plant and 
efficient distributed power systems, Hashimoto states that Southeast Asia could take advantage of 
the contemporary gas market that have developed over time. Figure 13 is a comparison of Gas 
Market Sizes in Asia. Energy and environmental policies will probably determine the future for 
natural gas in the region.  
Table 4: List of flows in the ASEAN gas market (CIA, 2012) 
Natural gas [bcm] Singapore Indonesia Philippines Malaysia Vietnam Thailand Brunei 
Production 0 82.8 3.2 58.6 9.4 30.9 11.5 
Consumption  9.7 40.5 3.2 29.1 10.3 39.2 2.7 
Imports 9.66 0 0 1.3 0.9 8.3 0 
Exports 0 42.3 0 30.8 0 0 8.81 
Proved reserves 0 3001 98.5 2350 192.5 312.2 390.8 
Today Indonesia is the second largest LNG exporter in the world behind Qatar. They have 3001 bcm 
of proven reserves, with the current production rates the reserves will last for approximately 40 
years (BP, 2011). Indonesia and Malaysia counts for 2.82 % of the world’s total proven reserves, and 
are by far the main contributors to the gas reserves in the Southeast Asia. 
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Infrastructure 
To improve energy security 
there are plans to further 
develop the gas pipeline 
network and to transport 
LNG with ships (DNV, 2010). 
Gas pipeline networks are 
not well established in the 
region. Development of the 
TRANS ASEAN Gas pipeline, 
connections between gas 
importing (Thailand, 
Philippines, Singapore) and 
exporting countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Myanmar) have been delayed due to challenges with varying technical standards and agreements. 
The nine countries participating also have different perspective of regulatory frameworks, cost 
sharing and environmental concerns. There is now only about 2300 km, 16000 km under 
development of bilateral pipeline, compared to 7975 km in Norway (Shirodkar & Rana, 2009). The 
LNG investments are strongly related to the gas price, but with the current gas price LNG projects 
are likely to increase in the medium term. With the Tanguh LNG project, Indonesia will start to 
export 10.3 bcm of gas. 
 
Figure 15: LNG terminals (IEA, 2010)  
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 Proved reserves 
Figure 14: Distribution of proved reserves in Southeast Asian countries 
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3.4 The bunker fuel market  
Southeast Asia, and specifically Singapore, is one of the busiest ports on the globe. Shipping is a true 
global industry as it is serving 90 % of the global trade. Bunker fuel is one of the most important cost 
components for the shipping industry. The bunker fuel market is currently estimated to 
approximately four million barrels per day and $100 billion per year (Abadie, et al., 2011). The choice 
of propulsion system is accordingly a key decision among ship owners as it affects profitability, 
operations and environmental footprint. Since the focus on environmental regulations is compiled 
differently around the world and there are uncertainties regarding the future price on bunker fuel, 
each factor needs to be assessed with respect to the market analyzed.  
From a technical perspective, LNG is a well-suited fuel both for trucks and ship vessels (Stenersen, 
2011). It has a high combustion factor, engine technology is available and it imposes high 
operational reliability. Today, the use of LNG as a bunker fuel is limited except from LNG-carriers and 
short sea shipping in Norway (Løset & Tveten, 2011). However, in Europe and USA, environmental 
regulations make LNG the best alternative. In Southeast Asia, a green focus has not arisen in the 
same scale. In this section, we will thoroughly present the effect of the regulations and the 
technological alternatives ship owners have in order to meet the requirements, and how these affect 
Southeast Asia.        
Regulations 
Due to the international orientation in shipping, ship owners can register their fleet in almost any 
country regardless of where they are in traffic. Furthermore, the fleets move between different 
jurisdictions during their entire life cycle, which make national regulations hard to impose. 
 
Figure 16: A map showing present and future Environmental Control Areas (ECAs) (DNV, 2010) 
The need for universal international regulations has been recognized for decades. In turn, this led to 
the establishment of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in Geneva, 1948 (IMO, 2011).  
Today, IMO is working to promote health, safety and environment in shipping. This includes 
prevention of pollution, which is controlled through MARPOL. The latest Annex VI entitled 
“Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollutions from ships” has decided to drastically reduce 
20 
 
emissions of NOX, SOX and particles (DNV, 2010). Different emission standards from IMO are 
commonly referred to Tier I, Tier II and Tier III. There are global requirements and more stringent 
requirements applicable in a geographical limited area, ECAs, as shown in Figure 16. From 2015, the 
first very strict emission limits of sulfur will enter into force in the ECAs. All new restrictions are 
outlined in Table 5. The last two requirements will first come into force in ECA, but be put into effect 
globally from 2020 or 2025.    
Table 5: New international legislation on maritime engine emissions for 2010-2020, IMO Annex VI regulations, modified 
from DNV (DNV, 2009) 
Date Refer
ence 
Regulation Area Target Consequence Ships owner’s position 
1.7.2010 IMO 
Annex 
VI 
Sulphur content 
in fuel < 1 % 
ECA Sailing 
ships and 
new 
buildings 
Equipment adaption, 
exhaust gas 
purification or higher 
voyage cost 
1) Use bunker < 1 % sulphur 
2) Use scrubbers 
3) Use LNG as a fuel 
4) Use fuel-water emulsion 
1.1.2011 IMO 
Annex 
VI 
Reduction of NOX 
to Tier II lever, 20 
% below Tier I 
Globa
l 
New 
buildings 
Special engines or 
exhaust gas 
purification. Higher 
voyage and capital 
costs 
1) Use low NOX-engines 
2) Existing engines with SCR 
or EGR 
3) Use LNG as fuel 
4) Use fuel-water emulsion 
1.1.2012 IMO 
Annex 
VI 
Sulphur content 
in fuel < 3.5 % 
Globa
l 
Sailing 
ships and 
new 
buildings 
Higher voyage costs 1) Use bunker < 3.5 % 
sulphur 
2) Use LNG as a fuel 
3) Use fuel-water emulsion 
1.1.2015 IMO 
Annex 
VI 
Sulphur content 
in fuel < 0.1 % 
ECA Sailing 
ships and 
new 
buildings 
Higher voyage costs, 
equipment adaption 
or exhaust gas 
purification 
1) Use bunker < 0.1 % 
sulphur 
2) Use scrubbers 
3) Use LNG as a fuel 
4) Use fuel-water emulsion 
1.1.2016 IMO 
Annex 
VI 
Reduction of NOX 
to Tier III lever, 
75 % below Tier 
II 
ECA New 
buildings 
Improved engines or 
exhaust gas 
purification 
1) Install SCR 
2) Use LNG as fuel 
3) Use fuel-water emulsion 
 
Furthermore, some of the biggest ports in Europe have introduced their own environmental 
requirements. The Port of Antwerp Authorities has established port-specific emission regulations 
where those ships vessels that meet them will get a 10 % reduction in port fees (Løset & Tveten, 
2011). Similar arrangements have been introduced in the ports of Dunkirk, Zeebrügge, Rotterdam 
and Oslo to mention some of them. Consequently, there exist monetary incentives as well as 
regulations that demand new technology to meet the requirements. In Norway specifically, the 
government has imposed a tax on emissions from NOX (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon, 2011). 
Ship owners pay a price per kilogram emitted NOX. The income from this tax finances environmental 
friendly investments such as installation of LNG-fueled machinery. This has proven to be an effective 
tool as Norway has established a short sea fleet running on LNG, with the infrastructure available 
and positive ship owners.  
In Southeast Asia, there are uncertainties regarding the environmental regulations. IMO has so far 
not specified or signaled any ECA in the region. This claim will be thoroughly assessed in our data 
analysis in Chapter 8. As described in Section 2.3, much work remains to stimulate to green growth 
in the region and balancing short-term economic needs and long-term environmental liabilities. An 
ECA will probably weaken the competitive power to the major ports in Southeast Asia, and is 
therefore opposed by many governments. In Section 9.2 the recommended markets to target are 
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assessed further, and the section gives a good impression of how established actors in the region 
consider the environmental aspects. 
3.5 Technological alternatives for the shipping industry 
With the upcoming regulations in ECAs, the ship owners will be the first to feel the impact, then 
refiners, marketers and ports. The dominant marine fuel today is high-sulfur HFO or MDO/MGO 
(Abadie, et al., 2011). Several possible actions can be taken to meet the requirements, but the 
consequence of choosing a sub-optimal strategy may be costly in a long-term perspective.  
In addition to meet the environmental regulations the fuel has to be technological feasible, 
commercially available and economically justified. Bio-fuels and hydrogen are not expected to be 
commercially available in the shipping industry in large scale until after 2030. The use of nuclear 
reactors on board is not anticipated to be an interesting option for international shipping, due to 
environmental, political and safety reasons (IMO, 2009). Substitution of HFO with MDO is a possible 
solution, but it is more expensive because the oil-gas differential is increasing. The refining industry 
would also struggle to supply an extra 4 mbd of gasoil because of limited production (Abadie, et al., 
2011). Compressed natural gas (CNG) or LNG is less carbon intensive, but need new engine design, 
larger tank volumes and rely on better infrastructure. Since a LNG-tank will require only half the 
volume compared to CNG, LNG is the most likely alternative. This analysis gives us two plausible 
solutions that comply with the ECA-regulations, are technological feasible and economically justified: 
Installment of smoke scrubbers to clean HFO on existing machinery and LNG-fueled ships. In terms 
of costs, LNG is the only alternative to HFO. 
3.5.1 Smoke scrubbers 
Smoke scrubbers are extended systems of exhaust gas cleaning. The basic principle with the 
scrubber is to use alkalinity to neutralize the dissolved sulfur dioxide from the exhaust gas. 
Seawater, caustic soda (NaOH) and limestone (CaCO3) are used as absorbent for different types of 
scrubbers. Motor producers, MAN BW and Wärtsila, states that their best smoke scrubbers reduce 
SOX-emissions by 90 % (CleanTech, 2011). The downside with scrubbers is an additional power 
consumption of 0.5-1 %, expensive investment cost and the scrubber water requires large spaces 
(Heim, 2008). The sulfur regulations from IMO is based on engine emissions, not the content of the 
fuel itself, meaning that ships can continue to use higher sulfur bunkers as long as the exhaust gases 
are cleaned sufficiently. Smoke scrubbers could be the preferred short-term solution, since 
scrubbers are technically mature and available.  
To reduce NOX-emissions engine manufacturers have developed selective catalytic reduction 
technologies (SCR) and fuel water emulsion (FWE). In SCR the exhaust gas is treated with ammonia 
or urea. A catalyst is placed in the exhaust gas channel, where the reduction agents react with the 
nitrogen oxides forming nitrogen and water, reducing the NOX with 90-99 % in the exhaust gas.  The 
basic engine design does not need any changes for applying SCR, but the solution is expensive and 
requires space for a urea tank. With FWE, the fuel is mixed with water on board the ship, causing 
local cooling of the combustion in the cylinder. The lower temperatures lead to less NOX from the 
combustion chamber and a reduction rate up to 30 % (MAN, 2012).  
3.5.2 LNG-fueled engines 
LNG was applied as a fuel as early as in 1960, when LNG-carriers started to utilize boil-off gas in the 
engines. The first working prototype of a pure LNG-fueled ship was “MF Glutra” operating from year 
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2000 propelled by a LNG-engine from Mitsubishi. The current fleet with LNG-engines counts 26 
ships, with an additional 37 under construction (World Trade LNG Database, 2012). LNG-fueled ships 
have been tested and applied with great success in ferries, platform support vessels (PSVs), coast 
guard vessels and LNG-tankers in Norway. Various engine manufactures have now entered the 
market, with Rolls-Royce, Wärtsila, MAN BW and Mitsubishi upfront. This has resulted in three main 
engine concepts available in the market: Spark ignited lean burn engine, dual fuel engine, and high 
pressure direct injection engine (Stenersen, 2011). The various concepts for utilizing LNG as a fuel 
have some unique characteristics, which makes them suitable in different environments and ships. 
Table 6: Different LNG-engines available in the market today, modified from Stenersen (2011) 
Spark Ignited Lean Burn Gas 
Engine 
  
 
Dual Fuel Engine  
 
 
High Pressure Direct Injection 
Engine 
 
Single fuel (LNG) Dual fuel capability (LNG or MDO) Multi-fuel capability (LNG, MDO or 
HFO) 
Otto cycle Combined Otto/Diesel cycle Diesel cycle 
Low gas-pressure supply, 4-5 bar Low gas-pressure supply, 4-5 bar High-pressure gas-injection, 300-
350 bar 
High energy efficiency and lower 
emission than a diesel engine 
Flexible and has back-up fuel Need NOX-reduction techniques to 
meet IMO Tier III 
Emits some methane, but 20-30 % 
GHG reduction compared to HFO 
Emits methane, and that is hard to 
limit by combustion process 
control 
No methane emissions, and 30 % 
GHG reduction compared to HFO 
Not sensitive to gas quality Sensitive to gas quality Not sensitive to gas quality 
Not suitable for retrofitting of 
existing engines 
Possible to retrofit in existing 
engines 
Suitable for conversion of existing 
engines, simple process 
 
All the three LNG-engines have low emissions, with a GHG-reduction potential in the range of 20-30 
% compared to HFO. Lean burn gas and dual fuel engines emit un-burned hydrocarbons, mostly 
methane, from the engines exhaust which reduces the net effect to about 15 % reduction of CO2 
equivalents (IMO, 2009).  
A technical challenge with LNG is finding the necessary space for storage of the fuel. For the same 
energy content more volume is required compared to HFO-tanks. This will influence ship design and 
require substantial modifications if retrofitting is considered (CleanTech, 2011). The ability of LNG 
and the need for infrastructure is also vital questions, but these challenges will be discussed in detail 
in Section 9.1.  
LNG-tankers have been operating from early in the 1960, and have an incredible safety record, with 
no major accidents. The excellent safety record is due to the combination of very robust vessel 
design, port state precautions and well-executed vessel operations (DNV, 2004). For gas-fueled ships 
it also exist rules and regulation from IMO, different class companies, and from authorities. The 
current IMO-requirements are minimum two separate engine rooms, redundancy of fuel storage 
and power generation and double piping of all gas pipes inside the ship. A new IMO-code is in 
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progress, and will be valid from 2014. As long as rules, requirements and guidelines are met, LNG 
does not involve a higher risk than other combustible fuel (Stenersen, 2011).  
3.6 Environmental emissions 
The main sources of pollution from ships are, CO2, NOX, SOX and particles. This section compares the 
environmental emissions associated with LNG, low sulphur fuel, conventional fuel with smoke 
scrubbers and conventional fuel without cleaning.  
 
Figure 17: The environmental consequences of the most plausible technical fuel systems on a typical Baltic Sea cargo 
ship (Blikom, 2011). This data stems from a DNV-study and compares LNG-propulsion with conventional engines.  
Figure 17 stems from a DNV-study, illustrating environmental emissions for alternative concepts for 
a typical Baltic Sea cargo ship (DNV, 2010). The study indicates that LNG offers the lowest emissions 
and gives the best environmental solution among the options, and meets the new IMO-
requirements. NOX emissions are reduced by 85-90 %, whilst emissions of SOX and particles are 
nearly eliminated. 
Different sources and research support these calculations from DNV. A new study from MARINTEK 
confirms that the emissions are less with LNG-engines, and that there are huge local and global 
environmental benefits (Stenersen, 2011). By taking the problem of related methane emission into 
consideration the research from MARINTEK, shows the net GHG reduction with best available 
technology is 15-20 % when comparing LNG to MDO-operation. LNG-fueled ships would be 
particularly attractive in NOX-ECAs, since they can meet Tier III emission levels without after-
treatment of the exhaust gases. Scrubber technology and low sulfur fuel would both need an 
additional system to reduce emissions of NOX sufficiently, with SCR and WFE as a possible option 
(IMO, 2009). It is important to consider the entire value chain of the fuel to assess its fully 
environmental impact with a LCA-analysis. Consequently, emissions related to extraction, 
processing, transport and final combustion to produce energy must be assessed. A NTNU-report 
states that LNG-production is more CO2-intesive in the production phase compared to MDO, but 
with lower combustion emissions LNG is still a better alternative (Hansen, et al., 2010).  
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3.7 Economic analysis  
The economic perspective of LNG engines compared to the alternative solutions would be crucial for 
the ship owners to estimate. With the current market situation, without comprehensive 
infrastructure available and most of the ships are built as highly customized ships, it is hard to do this 
estimate and the calculations are diverging. The costs are depending on both uncertain investment 
and operational costs, and it is obvious that different actors have huge own incentives. In this 
section we will assess different economic analysis and discuss their reliability.   
The selection of an engine solution to meet the environmental requirements will influence revenues, 
investment costs, maintenance and operating costs. LNG-tanks require today more space for fuel 
tanks, compared with MDO/HFO (Martinsen, 2011). This will be a big challenge for vessel designers, 
because the increased volume requirement from LNG-tanks will cause less cargo capacity, which 
might lead to a decrease in revenues. The actual decrease in revenue depends on the size of the ship 
and what kind of cargo that is carried. The capital costs will also be approximately 10-15 % higher 
than using HFO, according to a MARINTEK-study (Stenersen, 2011). The capital cost will depend on 
what kind of ship, the LNG tanks, safety and bunkering systems and what kind of engines that are 
built. In the MARINTEK study from Stenersen, he emphasize that the increased capital costs can be 
offset by reduced operational expenditures, such as lower fuel costs and lower maintenance costs. 
These calculations are challenged by another NTNU-study (Saga, et al., 2010). They show that for an 
LNG-propelled OSV there will be approximately 30 % higher CAPEX, but agree that they will be offset 
by reduced OPEX.  
Since 2000, higher oil prices have resulted in higher operating cost in the maritime sector. Bunkers 
represent between 25-50 % of the vessel operating cost (Stopford, 2008), and small changes in the 
oil-gas price differential will therefore have major impacts on the total profitability. Calculations 
show that during 2015-2030 the use of HFO with an installed scrubber will save 35 %, and the use of 
LNG up to 60 %, compared with the use of MDO as a primary bunker in a European price scenario 
(Abadie, et al., 2011). This is yet another argument to focus on smoke scrubbers and LNG, and not 
focus on MDO. Based on current prices in Europe, still the only market where LNG is applied as 
bunker, fuel cost of LNG is approximately 20 % less than HFO (Stenersen, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 18: The oil and gas price differential (Stenersen, 2011) 
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The payback time will depend largely on the future of the oil-gas price differential. Figure 18 shows 
prices on different bunker at Zeebrûgge. These price differentials currently generate substantial 
savings to ship owners that use LNG instead of MDO. The global supply of LNG is currently great with 
huge available reserves and is expected to grow substantially in the future. This compared to higher 
cost for low sulfur fuel and MDO indicates that this oil-gas price differential probably will last 
(Nysæter & Aadland, 2011). Since the infrastructure is not available global, a challenge for the 
industry will be to agree on specific standards for bunkers, so the ship owners know that they have 
available fuel.  
Today it is established infrastructure for fueling LNG primarily in the Nordic and Baltic ECA. 
Moreover, there is significant geographically differences in the LNG-price due to three price regimes 
in the world. There is an American, European and Asian pricing system for LNG making it hard to 
estimate future fuel costs for a ship owner who is operating globally (See Appendix 2 for more 
information). 
Stopford (2008) offers a framework for analyzing marine economics. He has taken into account the 
most important cost elements for different ship types, categorized them and made an average factor 
of the size of each cost. Figure 19 summarizes his framework. 
 
Figure 19: Cost components related to marine shipping (Stopford, 2008) 
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As we can see Stopford (2008) presents detailed cost elements for capital expenditure, operational 
expenditure and off course ship revenue. A number of factors will be affected by the choice of 
engine and fuel. Various conclusions on increased capital expenditure due to investment in LNG-
fueled ship vessels probably can be explained by different weighting of the cost factors presented. 
Table 7 is summarizing intervals on increased costs by investing into LNG-technology, and which 
factors that cause uncertainty on the exact rise in investments costs and exact decline in operational 
expenditure. 
To do an objective economic analysis of LNG-engines is difficult, especial because many ships have 
been produced as highly customized ships, and an efficient LNG bunker market affecting the 
operation cost does not exist. Anyhow, in Section 9.1 we have compared different cost factors 
presented in the framework by Stopford, and outline different cost scenarios for LNG. The fuel cost 
is probably not directly comparable, the market relies on some agreements and developments of 
standards for bunkering are still to come. We have assessed different calculations from different 
sources, and summarized this estimates in Table 7. 
Table 7: A summary of CAPEX and OPEX related to LNG-propulsion  
 Capital Expenditure 
(CAPEX) 
Operational expenditure 
(OPEX) 
Ship revenue 
Interval  [8-30] % increase 
compared to HFO-vessels 
[5-20%] decrease 
compared to HFO-vessels 
[0-5 %] reduction 
compared to HFO 
Uncertainty 
factors 
- Engine costs 
- Fuel system 
- Arrangement and 
structure (cargo 
space) 
- Design costs 
- Fuel price (oil-gas 
differential) 
- Maintenance costs 
- Port charges 
- Lubricants 
- Insurance 
- Taxes 
- Productivity 
- Off-hire time 
- Cargo space 
Assessment 
of most 
likely  
Engine costs and 
connected fuel system will 
be the main driver of 
increased CAPEX. Ships 
freighting cargo will be 
most exposed to this, 
meaning that the most 
likely added cost is in the 
higher part of the interval 
Fuel cost is between 25 
and 50 % of the OPEX. 
Consequently, the oil-gas 
differential will be the 
single most important 
factor. Taxes, port fees and 
repairs are also significant. 
A modest estimate can 
give 10 % reduction 
OSVs and RO-ROs rely 
heavily on cargo space. 
Ferries a little less. At the 
same time, off-hire time is 
worst case related to ship 
revenues. Higher 
operational reliability 
with LNG means little 
reduction in ship 
revenues.  
 
A recurring element is uncertainty regarding the economic viability in LNG-propulsion. As for today, 
machinery equipped for LNG-fuel demands significant increased CAPEX (Løset & Tveten, 2011). The 
increase in CAPEX might be offset by reduced OPEX due to lower fuel costs, reduced port fees and 
decreased maintenance costs (Saga, et.al, 2010). However, there is uncertainty regarding the level of 
the oil-gas differential in Asia (Nysæter & Aadland, 2011). It is highly beneficial in favor of LNG today, 
but there are different opinions concerning how it will evolve in the future. Pricing is very important 
for new technologies, and consequently this issue should be analyzed. A more thorough economic 
analysis of LNG-propulsion in Southeast Asia is carried out in Section 9.1. 
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3.8 Shipping in Southeast Asia 
With more than 4300 registered ships engaged in carriage of goods or commercial traffic, the marine 
market in the Southeast Asia is huge. Singapore is one of the busiest ports in world and with its 
central geographic position it is a natural hub for the maritime cluster. The aging and renewal of the 
fleet will have major impacts on the development, since LNG is not economical attractive for 
retrofitting, but for new builds. An old fleet, with a short renewal time will favor the development of 
LNG. As of today the fleet in Southeast Asia is considered as young. According to a DNV study the 
average age of the container feeder fleet is 10.7 years, while the OSV fleet has an average on 13.2 
years in the region. As much as 66 % of the OSV fleet has less than 5 years age (DNV Clean 
Technology Centre, 2010). Figure 20 shows how the fleet is distributed across the ASEAN-countries. 
 
Figure 20: The distribution of the ASEAN-fleet across the countries  
An ageing fleet is not in itself enough to initiate LNG-propulsion. Table 8 summarizes different 
factors that are stimulating development of LNG as a bunker fuel. Some factors favors LNG, but 
there are still regulatory changes needed before ship segments can adapt to LNG. Experience from 
Norway indicates that LNG as a bunker is possible for different types of ships; offshore supply 
vessels, passenger ferries, container feeders, cruisers and tugs (Løset & Tveten, 2011). We will in 
Chapter 8 discuss what kind of ship that have the largest potential for LNG in Southeast Asia.  
Table 8: A framework for which factors that will encourage development of LNG  
Factor Factors favoring LNG Factor present in Southeast Asia 
Voyage routes Regular, repetitive and high frequency Regular, repetitive and high frequency 
Infrastructure Proximity to LNG distribution Infrastructure is not available 
Ageing of fleet Old fleet 
- LNG is beneficial on new builds 
more than retrofitting 
Young fleet 
- Containers feeder 10.7 years  
- OSV 13.2 years 
Renewal High degree of new builds Medium degree 
Environmental focus Significant better than HFO Weak environmental focus  
Environmental 
regulation 
ECA ECA is not considered in the region 
Oil/gas differential Huge, price differential Small, in favor of LNG 
Singapore 
33 % 
Indonesia 
29 % 
Philippines 
10 % 
Malaysia 
7 % 
Vietnam 
12 % 
Thailand 
9 % 
Brunei 
0 % 
 Distribution of 
 fleet 
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LNG-projects in Southeast Asia 
As of today there are 7 LNG marine projects in operation in the Southeast Asia, but still an absence 
of small LNG receiving facilities. With expected increase in both liquefaction and re-gasification 
capacity around the world, increased domestic consume, indicates a return to regional LNG-markets 
and shorter distance voyages in the future. The building of small-scale terminals, where pipeline 
connections have been difficult to implement, supports this development (Hashimoto, 2012). The 
large geographical price differences prevent this, but many experts expect the price differences to 
decrease, due to one global market. But difficulties in production, shortages of skilled labor and 
higher material and engineering cost, in combination with market uncertainty have resulted in 
delays in several comprehensive LNG-projects. 
3.9 Norway’s role as a pioneer in the Southeast Asian LNG-market 
As of today Norwegian ship owners controls the world’s third largest fleet, thus making Norway a 
major maritime power. The maritime industry involves a large number of activities from 
shipbuilding, ship design, technical solutions and equipment manufacturing industry (Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, 2012). The last 50 years, the European dominance of the industry has shifted 
towards East Asia. In 2009, Japan, South Korea and China had approximately 80 % of the total world 
orders. The increased competition from Asia has lead focus on specialized high-tech vessels in the 
western maritime clusters (Amland & Espelid, 2010). 
Norway has in recent years experienced an increased use of LNG as a fuel in shipping. Within the 
maritime cluster a number of companies have been involved in LNG-projects for several years, 
ranging from ship classification societies, engine manufacturers, ship builders, ship designers and 
LNG-distributors. Norway is the only country where infrastructure for LNG is widely available and 
LNG-fueled ships will represent about 15 % of the market in 2020 (Einang, 2009). As the knowledge 
and expertise about LNG has increased, the skepticism towards gas as fuel has decreased (Løset & 
Tveten, 2011).  
Actions from policy makers can largely affect choice of technological standards (Løset & Tveten, 
2011). The development of the LNG-industry has been in a unique position in Norway. Government 
support and subsidies to R&D, innovation, infrastructure and regulations has resulted in creation of a 
LNG-market with both retail availability and LNG-propelled ships. Norway could use it unique 
competence and experience to transfer knowledge about LNG-technology to other markets.  
In Chapter 4 we review internationalization literature within emerging markets, entry modes, 
alliances, profitability and government trade initiatives. The purpose is to establish theoretical 
propositions, in which we can analyze based on pattern matching of our data analysis. On the basis 
of this analysis we will suggest how the Norwegian maritime industry can successfully establish 
export of LNG-technology to the Southeast Asian market. The potential of LNG as a bunker fuel is 
large across the globe, but it takes careful strategizing to capitalize on the development. Accordingly, 
this thesis aims to outline a thorough strategy for how Norwegian companies and government 
agencies can stimulate the development of LNG-propulsion in Southeast Asia, and make profits from 
selling technology.  
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4 Literature review 
This chapter is a review of literature regarding internationalization processes, entry strategies and 
performance of international alliances. Our project thesis emphasized strategic maneuvering in 
battles for technological dominance, and how sponsors of LNG as a bunker should position 
themselves in order to become the preferred propulsion technology. In the master thesis we extend 
the problem statement by investigating how the Norwegian maritime sector can succeed in 
internationalizing LNG-technology to the selected market Southeast Asia. The multinational 
company (MNC) Rolls-Royce is chosen as case company. 
The ASEAN-countries are thoroughly presented in Chapter 2. Southeast Asia is a region consisting of 
eight emerging economies and two developed countries, with a rapid economic growth and even 
more increasing energy consumption. We have chosen to focus on the gas producing and consuming 
countries in the region, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines and Brunei, 
given our focus on LNG-propulsion. The literature reviewed is targeted towards these specific 
markets.    
4.1 Internationalization theory 
International business refers to the performance of trade and investment activities by firms across 
national borders (Cavusgil, et al., 2008). From a strategy perspective internationalization theory 
explains the process by which a firm acquires and retains one or more value chain activities inside 
the firm, minimizing the disadvantage of dealing with external partners and allowing for greater 
control over foreign operations. Numerous researchers and scholars have investigated the subject of 
firm internationalization. It is a complex process consisting of several phenomenons, which has been 
studied from multiple disciplines. Within most disciplines rival explanations exist for each 
phenomenon. In total, this is a much researched topic in which demands a thorough review in order 
to gain sufficient input to create analytic and useful theoretical propositions.  
Due to the author’s academic specialization within Strategy and international Business Development 
we will primarily focus on literature from strategic management scholars, although we have 
reviewed articles from economists and political scientists. Moreover, we have chosen the Southeast 
Asian gas economies which consist of most emerging economies except from Brunei and Singapore 
which are advanced economies. Emerging economies are low-income, rapid growth countries having 
economic liberalization as a key component in economic growth (Hoskisson, et al., 2000). As 
developed economies throughout the world have reduced pace of growth, densely populated fast-
growing markets are becoming increasingly important for further growth of Multinational 
Corporations (London & Hart, 2004). To enter such markets demand tailored strategies due to a 
number of reasons. Political instability, lack of regulatory systems and specialized intermediary firms 
make it harder for Western firms to achieve profits by applying international strategies directed 
towards other Western economies (Khanna, et al., 2005). Accordingly, we will focus on entry 
strategies addressed towards emerging economies.  
In questions of international expansion firms are motivated to form alliances in order to reduce 
investment risk, share technology, improve efficiency and strengthen global competitiveness (Tse, et 
al., 1997). The formation of alliances is a key component of entry strategies in foreign markets. As 
with other aspects of entry strategy, the choice of alliances have particular dimensions when the 
host country is an emerging economy. Consequently, we will focus on general theory on alliance and 
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performance of them, but also specific theory towards choice of alliance partner and entry timing for 
emerging markets. To complement the review of literature regarding alliances and performance, we 
have undertaken additional theory on learning effects of organizations, and the potential of 
government trade promotion programmes. It is our assessment that review of the mentioned 
strategic management literature will enable us to offer valuable theoretical propositions.   
4.2 Strategy that fit emerging markets 
In this section we will introduce strategies that fit emerging markets. Until the end of the 1990’s, 
traditional internationalization theory had focused on the entering firm’s capabilities and its need for 
minimizing transaction costs (Meyer, et al., 2009). However, emerging markets have slowly 
developed legal infrastructure, which is a barrier to effective governance (Hoskisson, et al., 2000). 
Together with constant economic and political shocks risk and uncertainty increases for foreign 
investors in emerging economies. These circumstances demands tailored strategies. Strategy 
formulation and implementation in emerging economies are examined from three theoretical 
perspectives in the work by Hoskisson et al. (2000) as shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Theoretical streams within strategies that fit emerging markets 
 Institutional theory Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) 
Resource-based view 
(RBV) 
Characteristics Emphasizes the influences 
of the systems surrounding 
organizations that shape 
social and organizational 
behavior. The aim of 
institutions in an economy 
is to reduce uncertain and 
enhance stability, in order 
to reduce transaction and 
information costs. 
Consider the costs 
associated by a firm’s 
interface with other actors 
through contracts and 
exchange of services. The 
rationale governance choice 
relies on a trade-off 
between the transaction 
costs associated, a firm’s 
need of control and costs of 
governance structure. 
Treats the fact that 
heterogeneous capabilities 
give firms unique 
characteristics.  In the early 
1990s there were 
established analytical tools 
to better identify such 
capabilities (Barney, 1991). 
Consequently, each firm 
needs a unique 
international strategy.    
Particular 
relevance in 
emerging 
economies 
Firm growth is limited by 
institutional constraints, 
and network-based growth 
strategy is proven more 
viable in such countries. 
However, there is a 
demand for more 
longitudinal studies.   
Institutional voids might 
lead to extensive 
transaction costs. Network 
strategies and hybrid 
structures are often 
recommended in emerging 
markets, but these 
perspectives are missing in 
TCE. 
Many competitive 
advantages in emerging 
markets are relational 
based on business or 
government ties. It is harder 
to acquire such resources in 
these markets, which 
require further research. 
General 
implications 
The heterogeneity and the slowly developed institutions of emerging economies are 
crucial for firms to understand in order to gain profits from foreign market entry. Such 
knowledge can be acquired through working with all the theoretical streams mentioned.  
Hoskisson et al. (2000) suggested that internationalization strategies are affected by the 
characteristics of the market context in which firms operate. Hoskisson et al. define an emerging 
economy by two criteria: Rapid economic development, and government policies favoring economic 
liberalization and the adoption of a free-market system. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam 
and Thailand follow this definition. Singapore and Brunei are advanced economies, but the others 
are developing economies.  
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The article by Hoskisson et al. (2000) is very much cited, and the research needs addressed are 
largely covered during the last decade. More recent work point out that the transnational model of 
national responsiveness, global efficiency and worldwide learning may be insufficient to succeed in 
emerging economies (London & Hart, 2004). The same research indicates that success in low-income 
markets by acknowledge that Western-style strategies are unsuitable for these economies. 
Profitable investments require relationship building with new partners, customization must be 
reinvented and local capacity building is crucial.  
A combined McKinsey & Harvard study of foreign market entries into emerging markets carried out 
by the largest MNCs throughout the world show evidence of low profits (Khanna, et al., 2005). Many 
firms underestimate the cost of absence from specialized intermediaries performing distribution and 
support services as in the home market, and the increased uncertainty and risk from lack of 
regulatory system. Despite this, some MNCs have succeeded in emerging markets by identifying 
such institutional voids as described above, and avoided them. Khanna et al. (2005) have developed 
a framework for mapping country specific firm challenges that will help firms to enter foreign 
markets more smoothly. By solely rely on composite indices countries with large differences can 
appear to be similar. The framework shown in Table 10 aims to map a country’s context and enable 
firms to make appropriate strategic choices.  
Table 10: Framework for mapping a country’s context based on Khanna et al. (2005) 
 Political and 
social systems 
Openness Product 
markets 
Labor markets Capital 
markets 
Description Identification of 
political system 
and power 
centers 
Degree of 
international 
orientation and 
transparency 
Developing 
economies are 
absent of 
customer data 
The access for 
skilled labor are 
limited, and 
hard to identify 
The raise of 
equity and 
debt can be 
challenging 
Typical 
questions 
What type of 
governance 
structure is 
applied? How 
effective are 
regulatory 
institutions?  
Which are the 
attitudes towards 
foreign 
investments? 
What is the 
quality of 
bureaucracy? 
Family ties? 
What is the 
reliability of 
customer data? 
Can consumers 
obtain neutral 
market 
information? 
How strong is 
the educational 
system? What 
are the spoken 
languages? Can 
people switch 
work? 
How effective 
are the 
countries 
banks? Does 
venture 
capital exists? 
The purpose of the country context mapping outlined in Table 10 is to help firms capitalize on the 
strengths of different locations (Khanna, et al., 2005). However, before entering a market a firm 
must compare the expected benefits with additional coordination costs that will apply. The 
completion of this analysis will lead to three strategic choices that are further explained in the 
following paragraphs: 
1. Adapt your strategies 
2. Change the contexts 
3. Stay away 
The first strategic choice, adapt your strategies, involves modifying your strategy based on the 
countries context. Companies must keep their core business propositions even though the business 
model is adapted. An example of a successful company pursuing this strategy is Dell entering China. 
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With a business model based on customization and internet retail, the sales outlook in China with 
absent internet infrastructure, were limited. This was solved by offering fewer and completed 
computer models based on sales through retail shops.  
The second strategic choice, change the context, relies upon the premise that MNCs are powerful 
enough to affect the contexts in which they operate. This includes change of regulations, creation of 
new business and institutions. Suzuki provoked a quality revolution when entering India in 1981. The 
largest audit companies in the world, the big four, decreased the uncertainty and risk by investing 
into Brazil after establishing branches there. In itself this triggered foreign investments, which in turn 
led to increased revenues for Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC.   
The third strategic choice is simply to stay away. An example of such is Starbucks who until recently 
has avoided the large coffee consumers in the Nordic countries, and still only has a few branches. A 
more frequent example is retail chains that avoid emerging markets such as Home Depot staying out 
of Mexico. Institutions have an essential role in a market economy to support the functioning of 
market mechanism, and hence it plays a crucial role in international strategy (Meyer, et al., 2009). As 
Figure 21 shows, the strength of institutions is strongly correlated to the level of the economy. 
According to the theory, Singapore has a strong economy and a strong institutional framework, and 
the opposite with Vietnam, whilst Indonesia has a medium degree of both. 
  
Figure 21: Correlation between institutional framework and economy with country specific examples (Meyer, et al., 
2009) 
Proposition 1: A critical success factor in the Southeast Asian markets is to identify 
institutional voids by mapping the country’s context, and make strategic choices based on 
this analysis. LNG-propulsion is an immature technology and a pure market analysis may 
ignore government initiatives. A MNC can adapt its own business strategy, it can try to 
change the operational context or it can stay away from the market.  
With the increasingly important effect of institutions as a theoretical foundation it is fruitful to 
investigate the actual entry strategy. We also know that both transaction costs economics and the 
resource-based view can be applied in order to assess a firm’s strategic choice. In the next chapter 
we will elaborate on entry strategy with these reviews in mind.          
4.3 Entry strategies for emerging markets.  
Entry strategies describe the entire formulation and implementation of actions related to expand 
into new markets (Cavusgil, et al., 2008). This section will deal with a central aspect of such 
strategies, the choice of entry mode. Moreover, we will discuss which of the theoretical streams 
presented that are most suitable for the purpose of the thesis. At last, we will introduce formation of 
alliances, which will be further investigated in Section 4.4.  
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The appropriate choice of entry mode is investigated in light of different theoretical approaches, 
transaction cost economics, resource-based view and institutional theory. Institutions of the host 
economy significantly shape entry strategies (Meyer, et al., 2009). Meyer et al. (2009) also 
emphasizes the importance of analyzing a firm’s resources and capabilities. However, the much 
applied perspective of transaction cost economics has a micro-analytical level, which is insufficient in 
accounting all the macro-level factors that is associated by foreign market entry. Hoskisson et al. 
(2000) requested more research on this matter. Several researchers have covered the need, and 
results from the study by Meyer et al. (2009), Khanna et al. (2005) and London & Hart (2004) clearly 
indicates that institutional theory and the resource-based view are most relevant in finding the 
optimal entry strategy. In Table 11 different entry modes are listed. 
Table 11: List of different entry modes (Cavusgil, et al., 2008) 
Entry mode Characteristics 
Acquisition Direct investment into an existing company or facility 
Exporting To produce goods or services in one country, often home country, and to sell and 
distribute into other country’s markets. Direct exporting is performed without 
intermediaries in the particular export market 
Franchising  An organizational structure where the focal firm allow another firm to use their entire 
business model in exchange for a royalty, fees or other compensation 
Greenfield 
Investment 
Direct investment to a build a new manufacturing, marketing or administrative facility, 
as opposed to acquisition of existing facilities 
International Joint 
Venture 
A collaborative form where two or more firms across borders create a jointly owned 
enterprise 
Licensing An organizational arrangement where the focal firm allow another firm to use their 
property rights in exchange for a royalty, fees or other compensation 
Several empirical studies have examined the choice between the various entry modes. However, it is 
quite recently that global strategic relations for multinational companies were incorporated in 
analyzing choice of appropriate entry mode (Kim & Hwang, 1992). Their study revealed that 
considerations regarding global concentration within a market, global synergies by expansion and 
global strategic motivations play a crucial role in determining the entry mode. Country risk is another 
significant factor influencing the choice. Another study in this period stated that market 
diversification largely affected MNCs financial performance (Geringer, et al., 1989). In total, the 
entry strategy is largely affected by the choice of country to enter. 
The increased focus on expansion into emerging economies has brought back the traditional issues 
from the first internationalization theory, regarding importance of physic distance and entry costs 
(Buckley & Casson, 1998). Buckley & Casson (1998) have performed an integrated analysis of the 
different entry modes in order to map which entry mode that is preferred under various conditions. 
They revealed the following relevant specifically for emerging markets: 
 Factors like a high cost of learning about the foreign market through experience, and 
monopoly market situations, encourages acquisition, licensing and franchising 
 Factors like high level of technology with the entrant, and high costs of building trust, 
greenfield investments are preferred over acquisition 
 In general, subcontracting, is not an attractive foreign entry market mode, and is left out of 
our analysis 
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 In general, the market context in a country, is crucial to determine whether to acquire or to 
make a greenfield investment or acquisition 
Meyer et al. (2009) builds upon the work carried out by Buckley & Casson (1998) and Hoskisson et al. 
(2000), among others, and integrate the strength of country’s institutions and the need for resources 
in order to determine the appropriate entry mode. By combining survey and archival data from four 
different emerging economies, India, Vietnam, South Africa and Egypt, they have created a strong 
entry mode framework with empirical support as shown in Figure 22. Local resources required 
denote the demand for qualified personnel of different kinds, while institutional framework denotes 
the demand for a strong law system, stable currency and a predictable political regime. Meyer et al. 
(2009) underlines the importance of mapping institutional voids and identifying resource demands. 
 
Figure 22: Preferred entry mode under different resource constraints and institutional frameworks (Meyer, et al., 2009) 
Proposition 2a: In Southeast Asian markets firms are most likely to select the optimal entry 
mode by analyzing the country specific context. There is a risk that firms are overemphasizing 
the analysis of transaction costs associated with the foreign market entry, at the expense of 
analyzing institutional voids and the required resources needed to manage them.  
Proposition 2b: Based on the theoretical framework by Meyer et al. (2009) and our country 
risk assessment, appropriate entry modes can be outlined. Companies requiring access to 
local resources and mature markets can only do acquisitions in Singapore, while joint venture 
is recommended for all other markets in Southeast Asia. Where local resources are 
redundant Greenfield entry is recommended in all markets. 
After assessing the preferred entry mode it is useful to investigate how the process of choosing one 
is carried out. The entry mode must be seen in connection with formation of alliances (Tse, et al., 
1997). Tse et al. (1997) incorporated the choice of entry mode with the alliance strategy and 
outlined a generic model as described in Figure 23. The model shows policies outlined by 
governments are important to attract foreign investors, and that firms are motivated and 
encouraged to engage in strategic alliances when entering emerging markets in order to reduce 
uncertainty and risk. However, the study has some weaknesses. The empirical data builds solely on 
foreign market entries into China, and there are regional differences in performance of alliances. 
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Nevertheless, it is useful to perform a further review of formation of alliances and performance of 
them.  
4.4 Formation and performance of alliances 
 In circumstances where an international joint venture is of interest, an alliance must be created. 
Regardless of chosen entry mode, most MNCs have some degree of alliance collaboration through 
joint projects in their portfolio. This section review literature on formation of alliances, with a 
particular focus on internationalization processes and entry strategies. Moreover, we will link the 
form of alliance to performance of the chosen organizational form. The aim is to identify preferred 
strategic alliances.  
Firms are motivated to create strategic alliances with other foreign firms to reduce investment risk, 
to more easily capitalize on fast-growing markets and to facilitate their operations in the chosen 
market (Tse, et al., 1997). There are basically three choices of whom to form an alliance with: 
1. A foreign firm can form alliance with a home country firm 
2. An investing firm can gather an alliance with a firm from another country 
3. A non-Asian firm can form an alliance with an Asian firm  
The model in Figure 23 by Tse et al. (1997) emphasizes the impact from host country factors such as 
experience with attracting foreign investor, home country factors such as cultural dimensions and 
industry specific factors such as scale of operations, in performing this choice. It claims that most 
MNCs will engage with a non-Chinese business partner, but form an alliance with a home country 
company, another international partner or an Asian based, most probably from Hong Kong. 
The model is designed for Chinese investments, but the findings can be applicable for other 
countries in the Southeast Asian region. As we are focusing on the ASEAN countries, Singapore can 
be seen as a parallel to Hong Kong with economic freedom and strong institutional frameworks. 
However, in cases where the host country specifically wants to attract foreign investors, a less equity 
based approach with a local partner is preferred. The choice of alliance partner follows the same 
pattern as with the entry mode, the specific investment case before determining the formation.  
 
Figure 23: Factors shaping the choice of entry mode and alliances in China based on empirical evidence (Tse, et al., 1997) 
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Proposition 3a: In China, the choice of collaborative design of an alliance relies on the 
specific investment case, with variables such as level of government, scale of operation, 
cultural dimensions and the host country’s experience with foreign investments. The model is 
applicable for the Southeast Asian region. 
Although alliances are relevant on many levels in internationalization processes, it is useful to assess 
the performance of MNCs compared to international network alliances and markets regarding cross-
border knowledge building (Almeida, et al., 2002). MNCs play a central role in transferring 
technology and other knowledge between countries. This fact supports the article by Khanna et al. 
(2005) who referred to the fact that large enterprises actually can change the context in which they 
operate. Consequently, an analysis of the most effective way of building knowledge is useful. By 
using data from the semiconductor industry, Almeida et al. (2002) have investigated knowledge 
transfer between USA, Japan, Taiwan and Israel. This pattern can be viable for the Norway, 
Singapore and other ASEAN countries. They conclude that MNCs are superior to network alliances 
and markets in transferring knowledge. Although network alliances can be a good substitute, the 
transfer is often slow, uncertain and superficial. However, network alliances are proven more 
efficient than markets. Accordingly, managers of international network alliances and MNCs should 
be concerned with designing organizations and culture capable of sharing knowledge. 
International expansion is resource demanding. Several researchers have therefore investigated the 
correlation between degree of internationalization (DOI) and financial performance. Organizational 
learning is closely related to the internationalization process of MNCs, which in turn affect profits 
(Ruigrok & Wagner, 2003). This argument is widely acknowledged, but the exact relation between 
DOI and return on assets (ROA) is much debated. The first studies indicated a linear relationship 
between a linear relation between DOI and ROA (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). During the 1990s the 
risk of failure was incorporated into studies of this particular relation, and several researchers 
indicated that costs exceeded benefits at high degrees of internationalization following an inverted 
J-curve (Geringer, et al., 1989). More recent study has revealed more complex cost-benefits trade-
offs. Ruigrok & Wagner (2003) found that MNCs through an organizational learning process 
characterized by internal adaption allows superior firm performance at high levels of DOIs as shown 
in Figure 24. Findings across all studies of DOI and ROA indicate that firms should pay close attention 
to organizational learning in planning internationalization to achieve satisfying financial 
performance. 
 
Figure 24: Correlation between degree of internationalization (DOI) and financial performance (Ruigrok & Wagner, 2003)  
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Figure 25: Correlation between alliance portfolio internationalization (API) and financial performance (Lavie & Miller, 
2008) 
Organizational learning in the process of internationalization can be achieved in multiple ways. A 
popular method is to collaborate with a local partner in some kind of organizational arrangement. If 
a MNC chose to collaborate, it is useful to see if the degree of internationalization with the partner 
affects financial performance (Lavie & Miller, 2008). Lavie & Miller (2008) have measured the 
correlation between alliance portfolio internationalization (API) and financial performance. Their 
empirical study of this relation indicates that financial performance follows an inverted U-curve 
correlated with API. As Figure 25 shows, this means that the relation between API and financial 
performance carried out by Lavie & Miller (2008) is the opposite of DOI and financial performance 
proved by Ruigrok & Wagner (2003). However, the joint recommendation is to pay close attention to 
organizational learning, and be aware of challenges related to national differences and 
collaboration.  
It will be useful to investigate how knowledge sharing can be optimal managed given the uncertainty 
of its relation to ROA. Johanson & Vahlne (1977) presented one of the first widely acknowledged 
models of internationalization describing process as incremental and linear. In a more recent study 
the authors stated that it has lost its validity as new and improved models have arisen (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2003). In the same study, they use modern research to present a new model describing the 
internationalization process. Johanson & Valne (2003) highlights experimental learning as a critical 
issue to succeed by international expansion. This is the same conclusion given by Ruigrok & Wagner 
(2003) and Lavie & Miller (2008), but as those models leave confusion regarding when a MNC can 
expect great financial performance, the network model by Johanson & Vahlne (2003) can enrich our 
understanding of knowledge management. 
Proposition 3b: There is disagreement in the literature on which degree of 
internationalization that gives the highest return on assets. A weakness of the research is a 
missing link to timing of market entry. There is however agreement upon the positive effect 
between the ability to share knowledge with business partners and profitability. 
In Johanson and Vahlne’s (2003) improved model they reconsider the importance of physic distance 
and chosen entry mode, and increase the significance of trust and relations. Lack of knowledge 
about operations in foreign markets is the main barrier to internationalization, and this knowledge 
can mainly be achieved through experience from those particular markets. By being present and 
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operate in a specific country you learn how intermediaries, customers, policy makers and 
competitors cope with different situations. Unique experience from foreign operations is accordingly 
a core competence in which can be a competitive advantage for a firm (Barney, 1991). There are 
three types of business network learning. 
1. Through customer-supplier relationships knowledge of culture and coordination  
2. By interacting in a relationship two firms learn skills that can be transferred to other 
relations 
3. Through a business relationship you learn to manage coordination across a business 
network 
All barriers related to internationalization are connected with the establishment and development of 
business relationships, and is regardless of borders (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003). To some extent, this 
might be a plausible statement, but it can be challenged by the entry mode literature. If a country 
lacks a financial system and property rights to protect investments, it is hard to overcome the 
associated risk and uncertainty by relationships without facing corruption. In such cases, formal 
agreements must be made to protect the investment of the focal firm. However, it might be useful 
to investigate the roles of relations in alliances. 
The effects of relational-based versus contractual-based governance structure on overall market 
performance reveal helpful knowledge (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). Lee & Cavusgil (2006) have measured 
the effect of governance structure on performance in terms of sales, ROA, profits and partnerships 
satisfaction. They have also seen how environmental turbulence influences these variables. The 
conclusions are significant. Relational-based governance as opposed to governance-based yields 
greater market performance and the difference enhances during periods of environmental 
turbulence. Trust is a more effective instrument to achieve strength, stability and knowledge sharing 
in an alliance and the benefits are listed in Table 12.   
Table 12: Benefits of trust in relational-based governance 
Benefits of trust in relation-based governance in contrast to governance-based governance 
 Mutual trust reduce transactions- and negotiations costs 
 Overemphasizing contracts easily implies conflicts regarding interpreting them 
 Trust is a foundation for learning and knowledge sharing between business partners 
 I times of environmental turbulence, dependence on contracts alone is risky 
A general limitation of the literature investigating the link between strategic alliances and 
performance of them is the restricted focus on emerging markets. A much cited study suggests that 
firms in developed markets use selection of local partners in emerging markets to acquire lack of 
market knowledge (Hitt, et al., 2000). The suggestions by Hitt et al. (2000) are nevertheless criticized 
by London & Hart (2004). London & Hart (2004) states that emerging economies demands 
reinvention of traditional strategy, whilst Hitt el al. (2000) focuses on how strategic alliances can 
cover the gap between the two business environments in anticipation of a more Western-style 
economic pattern to be developed. It is our consideration that the criticism from London & Hart is 
relevant, but the formation of alliances is nevertheless required. Consequently, it will be useful to 
investigate the process of partner selection in emerging markets.  
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Proposition 3c: Business networks and alliances will give the highest return on investment if 
they are managed by relational-based governance involving trust, instead of focus on 
contractual factors. Asian business culture emphasizes long-term relations more than the 
European culture.   
Internationalization requires significance efforts from a MNC. Entering an emerging market carries 
particular attention to strategy, alliances and organizational learning. An alliance is required, 
informal or formal, and consequently the organization must focus on experimental knowledge 
building. The correlation between degree of internationalization, alliance portfolio 
internationalization and return on assets is much debated, but the significant importance of 
knowledge sharing, relationships development and building of trust is unquestioned.  
Analysis of correlation between return on assets and DOI and API miss a link to market entry timing. 
Timing and speed of entry is an extremely important strategic decision, a success criterion. 
Consequently, in the next section we will assess the importance of market entry timing. 
4.5 Timing of market entry 
Technology for LNG as a marine fuel is not an established market in Singapore, unlike the situation in 
Norway. However, several competitors in the marine supplier industry, amongst them Rolls-Royce, 
strongly believe such a market will arise. This section deals with the important strategic decision of 
market entry timing. Market entry should be timed to balance the risk of premature entry against 
the missed opportunity of late entry (Lilien & Yoon, 1990).  
Lilien & Yoon (1990) was one of the first researchers to investigate entry timing empirically. They 
found that the decision of entry time was both a strategic, qualitative decision and a tactical, 
quantitative decision. Empirical evidence indicated that a potential new product pioneer should 
spend time building expertise in R&D, production, engineering and marketing before entering the 
market. These investments yield returns that offset the expenditures. An early follower must hasten 
its new product entry. To capture rapid market growth tends to be more profitable than additional 
R&D. The same logic applies for late followers. Lillien & Yoon (1990) also found evidence for when 
pioneering is beneficial over being an early follower. When the expected returns are high, pioneering 
offset the reduced risk of being an early follower. 
Proposition 4: The timing of market entry is significantly related to the return on assets. Early 
market entry is preferred when the expected returns offset the risk associated, and laggard 
entrant strategy is applicable when the expected returns are uncertain. Timing is more 
important for return on assets than degree of internationalization and alliance portfolio 
internationalization. 
Emerging economies are important for growth of Western MNCs. At the same time, the uncertainty 
in these markets is greater. This creates two critical issues: Should a firm be an early mover into new, 
unexplored markets or await competitors move, and should a firm launch pioneer technology in 
emerging markets or invest into more traditional technology? A survey of 220 Japanese JVs targeting 
the Chinese market shows increased financial performance of both early entry and high 
technological commitment (Isobe, et al., 2000). The rationales for these results are interesting. First, 
the higher importance the firm considered an entry into China, the higher was the degree of 
technology transfer and early move. Consequently, success in emerging markets may depend on the 
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firm’s commitment. Second, the degree of a foreign firm’s control over a JV was inversely to the 
degree of early entrants. Accordingly, even though dominance in a JV seems logical in a risk 
perspective, the firm might fail to benefit from the local firms market knowledge. 
Despite extensive research on the topic, the empirical evidence for correlation between early market 
entry and financial performance are debated (Gaba, et al., 2002). Gaba et al. (2002) created a 
framework to explain the timing of entry based on a number of factors: 
 Firm-specific factors: DOI, firm size and product scope 
 Industry/market factors: Competitor behavior, product market growth 
 Host country factor: Risk conditions involving institutional framework 
Based on an extensive study of entry data from U.S. Fortune 500 firms entering China in a 20-years 
period, Gaba et al. (2002) have established an explanatory framework for entry timing as showed in 
Table 13. 
Table 13: Explanatory framework of entry timing 
Explanatory framework of entry timing 
Firm-specific factors Industry/market factors Host country factor 
DOI 
High DOI 
increase 
probability of 
early entry 
Competitor 
behavior 
Early entry by 
competitors 
force firms to 
enter 
Risk conditions 
such as 
institutional 
framework 
Favorable risk 
conditions, 
involving a 
strong 
institutional 
framework such 
as a legal 
system and 
financial 
market, 
accelerate 
market entry 
Firm size 
Large firm size 
increase 
probability of 
early entry 
Product market 
growth 
High market 
growth does 
not initiate 
early entry. It is 
more likely that 
expected 
market growth 
is initiating 
factor. 
Product scope 
Large product 
scope increase 
probability of 
early entry 
The strategic decision of market entry timing is very important, and there is correlation between 
entry timing and financial performance. Research also reveals which factors that increase the 
likelihood of early entrants. I n the next section we will focus more on how partners are selected, 
and what a MNC should emphasize in choosing partners.    
4.6 Partner selection 
Given the crucial importance of alliances, the process of selecting a partner becomes equally 
important. This section presents literature dealing with the subject of partner selection, with a 
particular focus on emerging markets. Firstly general research on the topic is presented, before 
specific determinants relevant for emerging markets are presented. 
The preferred partner in an IJV can influence the composition of available skills, resources, 
operational experience, and consequently the viability of the alliance. Due to this fact, it is crucial to 
understand the partner selection process and the variables affecting it (Geiringer, 1991). An IJV-
partner should complement a firm’s task-related capabilities. More precisely, this means a focal firm 
must decide on which task-related skills and capabilities it needs from its partner, and rank the 
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relative importance of them. This process may help a firm to fill its capability gaps when entering a 
new market. Moreover, research reveals that the use of external sources in analyzing and identifying 
required resources and skills are beneficial in the process of choosing capabilities. By using strategic 
frameworks or expert panels, the probability of identifying the critical success factors increases. The 
study by Geiringer (1991) was the first of its kind, and still has validity. For our purpose, it is however 
necessary to look at studies which focuses on selecting partners in emerging markets specifically.  
Hitt et al. (2000) developed a framework to identify differences in partner selection between 
emerging markets and developed economies. They state the purpose of a strategic alliance to 
establish and maintain a long-term collaborative relationship in order to compete more effectively 
than firms outside the alliance. Joint ventures are the most popular entry mode used by MNCs in 
emerging markets. But as many alliances dissolute, the decision of entering an alliance and select 
partners is a critical one. Hitt et al. (2000) have compared the differences in partner selection 
criterions from emerging to developed markets, and the findings are presented in Table 14.  
Table 14: Differences and similarities in partner selection between emerging and developed markets 
Partner selection criterions in emerging and developed market contexts 
Similarities in both markets 
contexts 
Differences between the market contexts 
Emerging market firms Developed market firms 
 Firms in both markets 
equally emphasize 
managerial capabilities as 
a criterion 
 Firms in both markets 
equally emphasize 
complementary 
capabilities as a criterion 
 More strongly emphasize 
financial assets 
 More strongly emphasize 
technical capabilities 
 More strongly emphasize 
intangible assets 
 More strongly emphasize 
local market knowledge 
and market access 
 More strongly emphasize 
the possession of unique 
competencies 
Table 14 shows that there are differences how criterions are weighed. Emerging market firms more 
strongly emphasize financial and intangible assets, and technical capabilities. Weak institutional 
framework is a characteristic of emerging economies, and a demand for such assets is not surprising. 
Likewise, developed market firms request local market knowledge and access. MNCs may lack 
necessary relations in a particular market, and seek a partner that may give them access. However, 
as discussed, emerging economies demands reinvention of traditional strategy and an alliance alone 
is not sufficient to overcome the gap between the business environments (London & Hart, 2004). 
Proposition 5: A MNC must take differences in partner selection criterions between emerging 
and developed market contexts into account when choosing alliances abroad. Where 
emerging market firms demand financial, technical and intangible assets, developed market 
firms demand local market knowledge and unique competencies. 
The work by Hitt et al. (2000) complements the work by Geiringer (1991). A MNC should not only 
rank the significance of different task-related capabilities among potential partners. A MNC must 
also take into account what the potential partner requests back. And what a partner may request 
varies across market contexts. To target new partners are a complicated task, and in the next section 
we will investigate how governmental trade promotion may help MNCs to enter a new market.   
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4.7 Political barriers and trade promotion 
Internationalization and the choice of entry mode is not solely a business decision. Political barriers 
are often present and limit the potential of expansion in a specific country or region. On the other 
hand, most governments in developed countries have trade promotion initiatives where they by 
different means help firms to enter new markets. This section discusses political barriers and the 
effect of government trade promotion. 
Countries tend to protect industries that are weak, on a decline and political important (Lee & 
Swagel, 1997). This pattern is outlined by a research project using data from trade flows, production 
and trade barriers for 41 countries, including several ASEAN-countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia. Accordingly, political barriers are very relevant to our countries 
of study. A ranking of trade protection shows that Singapore has a very high degree of free trade, 
whilst the other ASEAN-countries have a medium degree of trade protection. However, the research 
by Lee & Swagel (1997) does not link the degree of protection to countries and industries, but to the 
structure of non-trade barriers across the particular countries and industries.  Consequently, as 
countries participate in bilateral trade agreements, the free trade increases.  
Industries that are political important and at the same time on a decline tends to be most protected. 
Food products and beverages are most protected, explained by the political importance of food self-
supply (Lee & Swagel, 1997). Electric machinery, transport equipment and other manufacturers are 
less protected. This can be explained by their significant importance in economic growth and 
industrial development. Often it will be more important to access innovative technology than 
protecting existing industry.  
Proposition 6a: Countries tend to protect industries that are weak, on a decline and political 
important. Gathered data indicates that the LNG-market is strong and growing, but political 
important. Consequently, the LNG-market will not be protected, but still affected by 
government politics. 
Trade promotion initiatives aim to help host country 
firms to internationalize. However, many of the 
initiatives follow the outdated incremental step model of 
internationalization by Johansson & Vahlne (1997). This 
leads to outdated trade promotion activities by 
governments (Crick & Jones, 2000). Many high-
technology firms are international from the start-up, and 
the purpose of internationalization might as well be 
expansion and growth as export in itself. Consequently, 
government trade agencies should consider employing 
specialists on international business in addition to export 
advisors. Crick & Jones (2000) have made a model 
outlined in Figure 26 showing how government trade 
support is only factor affecting the internationalization 
pattern and process, and take more motivation factors for 
internationalization into account than the old incremental models.  
Figure 26: A modern internationalization model 
showing the limited effect of government policy 
and trade promotion initiatives 
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Proposition 6b: Norwegian government trade promotion programs in Southeast Asia rely on 
outdated models of internationalization. A MNC in the region will benefit from international 
business development specialists more than the available national export advisors. 
Political barriers and trade promotion initiatives are important aspects to consider for a MNC. 
Institutional voids can be avoided with help from government specialists. They might have 
experience from doing business in a foreign market where the firm wants to enter, or they might 
have useful relations that can be exploited. Government policy must be incorporated into a 
successful internationalization strategy.  
In the next section, which is the last in this chapter, we will assess the literature review and the 
relevance for our research question. In Chapter 5, we will summarize the theoretical propositions, 
which will function as our analytical starting point when discussing the gathered data.    
4.8 Strengths and weaknesses of reviewed literature 
How the Norwegian maritime sector can succeed in internationalizing LNG-technology to the 
Southeast Asian region is a complicated research question. However, a review of the strategic 
management literature has been useful in creating an analytical framework. This section assesses 
the strengths and weaknesses of the review, by using on relevance of the readings, maturity of the 
research and methodology among the research presented.  
The starting point of our review has been general strategic management internationalization theory. 
Due to our export related research question, the selected topics to review have been strategy 
formulation, entry mode, alliance performance, partner selection, government trade promotion and 
entry timing. In reviewing these topics we have emphasized internationalization theory with a 
particular focus on studies of MNCs situated in advanced economies entering emerging economies, 
especially in Asia. Enormous amounts of research exist within the field of internationalization, and 
we have only reviewed a niche. Nevertheless, in total, we consider the reviewed to be highly 
relevant given our research question. 
To ensure generalizing of theoretical propositions we have reviewed several research articles within 
each topic. Rival explanations strengthen a research field. Based on comparison of research we 
aspired to outline theoretical propositions that build on commonalities across multiple studies, even 
though they might have diverging findings. However, in some cases we have introduced propositions 
which builds on the most acknowledged research, and which might diverge existing theory. A 
general challenge by the literature is the use of small and geographical limited samples in empirical 
research. Several published research findings are associated with a high degree of uncertainty, and 
several theories are rejected throughout the latest decades. Falsification of theory is an important 
part of research dynamics, but there are still a lot of debatable issues regarding internationalization 
of firms.  
As a final consideration of our literature review we have looked into the research methods applied in 
the articles, and presented them in Table 15. No research method is superior to another, which 
means absence of specific methods will lead to a poorer theory development within a research field 
(Wacker, 1998). 
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Table 15: Overview of the main applied research method in articles reviewed 
Overview of the main applied research method in articles reviewed 
Research method  Articles Total number 
Statistical analysis 
of survey or 
empirical data 
(Almeida, et al., 2002), (Buckley & Casson, 1998), (Crick & Jones, 
2000), (Gaba, et al., 2002) (Geiringer, 1991) (Geringer, et al., 1989) 
(Hitt, et al., 2000) (Isobe, et al., 2000) (Kim & Hwang, 1992) (Lavie & 
Miller, 2008), (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006),  (Lee & Swagel, 1997),  (Lilien & 
Yoon, 1990),  (Meyer, et al., 2009),  (Ruigrok & Wagner, 2003), (Tse, 
et al., 1997) 
16 
Case study (Barney, 1991),(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), (Johanson & Vahlne, 
2003),  (Khanna, et al., 2005), (London & Hart, 2004) 
5 
Archival analysis (Hoskisson, et al., 2000) 1 
Table 15 clearly indicates that statistical analysis is a preferred method in theory development. It is 
interesting however, that three of the four most cited articles in our literature review, (Hoskisson, et 
al., 2000), (Khanna, et al., 2005) and (London & Hart, 2004) are either a case study or an archival 
analysis. As the study by Wacker (1998) states no research method is superior. Consequently, the 
predominance of empirical studies in our literature review is a weakness in developing the 
theoretical propositions. However, our sample reflects the research methods in the research field in 
general, which implies that the composition of articles in our review is similar to other researchers 
within this field.   
In total, we consider our literature review to serve as a good foundation for analysis. In the next 
chapter we will summarize and categorize the theoretical propositions. Our gathered data will be 
analyzed based on the propositions we have identified, and either be confirmed or rejected. This 
analytical tool is important when we will present findings and implications of our research.  
  
45 
 
5 Theoretical propositions  
This chapter aims to summarize and categorize theoretical propositions presented throughout 
Chapter 4. Based on the literature review we have outlined a total of 10 propositions. They all serve 
as an analytical tool when gathered data are analyzed, but they different properties. Therefore we 
have chosen to categorize the propositions into which analytical level they belong. Some 
propositions concern the firm specifically, while others regard alliances or macro-levels such as 
government-related issues or country-specific issues. Table 16 presents our categorization. 
Table 16: Categorization of theoretical propositions 
Theoretical propositions  
Firm-specific  Alliance related  Market related  Country specific  
Proposition 1: A critical success 
factor in the Southeast Asian 
markets is to identify institutional 
voids by mapping the country’s 
context, and make strategic 
choices based on this analysis. 
LNG-propulsion is an immature 
technology and a pure market 
analysis may ignore government 
initiatives. A MNC can adapt its 
own business strategy, it can try to 
change the operational context or 
it can stay away from the market.  
Proposition 2a: In Southeast Asian 
markets firms are most likely to 
select the optimal entry mode by 
analyzing the country specific 
context. There is a risk that firms 
are overemphasizing the analysis 
of transaction costs associated 
with the foreign market entry, at 
the expense of analyzing 
institutional voids and the required 
resources needed to manage them.  
Proposition 2b: Based on the 
theoretical framework by Meyer et 
al. (2009) and our country risk 
assessment, appropriate entry 
modes can be outlined. Companies 
requiring access to local resources 
and mature markets can only do 
acquisitions in Singapore, while 
joint venture is recommended for 
all other markets in Southeast Asia. 
Where local resources are 
redundant Greenfield entry is 
recommended in all markets. 
Proposition 3a: In China, the 
choice of collaborative 
design of an alliance relies 
on the specific investment 
case, with variables such as 
level of government, scale of 
operation, cultural 
dimensions and the host 
country’s experience with 
foreign investments. The 
model is applicable for the 
Southeast Asian region. 
Proposition 3b: There is 
disagreement in the 
literature on which degree 
of internationalization that 
gives the highest return on 
assets. A weakness of the 
research is a missing link to 
timing of market entry. 
There is however agreement 
upon the positive effect 
between the ability to share 
knowledge with business 
partners and profitability. 
Proposition 3c: Business 
networks and alliances will 
give the highest return on 
investment if they are 
managed by relational-
based governance involving 
trust, instead of focus on 
contractual factors. Asian 
business culture emphasizes 
long-term relations more 
than the European culture.   
Proposition 4: The 
timing of market 
entry is significantly 
related to the return 
on assets. Early 
market entry is 
preferred when the 
expected returns 
offset the risk 
associated, and 
laggard entrant 
strategy is applicable 
when the expected 
returns are uncertain. 
Timing is more 
important for return 
on assets than 
degree of 
internationalization 
and alliance portfolio 
internationalization. 
Proposition 5: A MNC 
must take differences 
in partner selection 
criterions between 
emerging and 
developed market 
contexts into account 
when choosing 
alliances abroad. 
Where emerging 
market firms demand 
financial, technical 
and intangible assets, 
developed market 
firms demand local 
market knowledge 
and unique 
competencies 
 Proposition 6a: 
Countries tend to 
protect industries 
that are weak, on a 
decline and political 
important. Gathered 
data indicates that 
the LNG-market is 
strong and growing, 
but political 
important. 
Consequently, the 
LNG-market will not 
be protected, but still 
affected by 
government politics. 
Proposition 6b: 
Norwegian 
government trade 
promotion programs 
in Southeast Asia rely 
on outdated models 
of 
internationalization. 
A MNC in the region 
will benefit from 
international 
business 
development 
specialists more than 
the available 
national export 
advisors. 
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Each proposition has its unique characteristics. Accordingly, different interview data has been 
applied. Our case company Rolls-Royce Marine also has a deviating role in the pattern matching of 
the various propositions. By interviewing several companies, additional features such as the effect of 
government trade initiatives are tested. In total, we get a reliable and valid analysis subject to 
replication from other researchers. In Table 17 we have summarized how each proposition will be 
approached.  
Table 17: Analytical approach to each theoretical proposition 
Proposition Specific analytical strategy  
1 This is a proposition that aims to identify which countries firms exporting LNG-technology 
should target, and by which strategy. Accordingly, we use data from all interviewees and does 
not focus particularly on Rolls-Royce  
2a Proposition 2a aims to sort out if Norwegian MNCs are overemphasizing transaction costs on 
behalf of institutional voids. Rolls-Royce Marine is thoroughly assessed in this proposition. 
2b This proposition tests if a framework for choosing entry mode is applicable for Southeast 
Asian countries. Data from Rolls-Royce is used to test the validity. 
3a Proposition 3a tests the validity of a model suggest collaborative agreement in alliances from 
China. Data from several interviewees are used to test the claim. 
3b Proposition 3b seeks to test the causality of an empirical link between return on assets and 
internationalization data. All export companies from Norway are used to assess the claim. 
3c This proposition tests the claim of which alliance governance structure that is the best. Data 
from several interviewees are applied to ensure replication. 
4 Proposition 4 investigate the link between timing and profits. Data from Rolls-Royce Marine is 
used in a large scale as a qualitative approach.   
5 Data from all interviewees are used to assess how partner selection processes should be 
carried out 
6a Macro data from Singaporean interviewees and an analyst are used to investigate the political 
importance of LNG and propulsion specifically 
6b Data from Norwegian companies established in Singapore and Innovation Norway are used to 
investigate how government trade initiatives can be most efficient 
We have theoretical propositions within both micro-level and macro-level perspectives. This 
strengthens the probability of outlining an internationalizing strategy that takes the most important 
considerations into account. By analyzing these propositions with gathered data, we are able to offer 
a comprehensive strategy that is likely to be successful. In the next chapter we present our 
methodology, with research design, strengths and weaknesses. The methodology chapter is 
important to enable the reader to evaluate and control our research.    
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6 Methodology  
Our master thesis has the purpose of suggesting an internationalization strategy for exporting LNG-
propulsion technology to the Southeast Asian market by doing an in-depth study of Rolls-Royce 
Marine. This chapter describes our research method, and how we have worked towards presenting a 
proposed strategy for how and where the Norwegian maritime sector can succeed in the given 
market.  
The research question of the thesis is “How can the Norwegian maritime sector succeed in 
internationalizing LNG-technology in South-East Asia”? By analyzing this research question we have 
selected an appropriate research method. It is a how-question that indicates three relevant research 
methods: Experiment, historical study and case study (Yin, 2009). The research question do not 
requires control of behavioral events, but it focuses on a contemporary phenomenon within its real 
life context. Accordingly, a case study approach appears to be the most beneficial research method. 
The chosen case study method strengthens our thesis as it relies on multiple sources of evidence 
which increase the construct validity.  
6.1 Research design 
Yin (2009) refers to a definition of research design as a plan that guides the investigator in the 
process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting observations. It is a logical model of proof that 
allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under 
investigation. A more simple way of describing research design is as a logical plan for getting from 
here to there. This section describes key decisions in how we built our research design. 
A key distinction in designing case studies is the choice between single- or multiple-case designs (Yin, 
2009). Both designs have its advantages and limitations, but we chose a single-case design of Rolls-
Royce Marine. There are practical and theoretical reasons why we made this choice. A practical 
matter was a significant interest from Rolls-Royce Marine to collaborate and contribute into our 
diploma thesis. From a theoretical perspective, Rolls-Royce Marine as a single case has several 
advantages: 
 Rolls-Royce Marine represents a critical case as the company is a multinational company 
with extensive international experience, enabling us to match data from the firm 
towards theoretical propositions 
 Rolls-Royce Marine has a unique relevance to our research question as they are 
headquartered in Norway combined with an extensive focus on marketing of LNG-
propulsion towards Southeast Asia 
 Conversely, regarding the focus on general internationalization theory, Rolls-Royce 
Marine can be viewed as a typical case representing MNCs 
An advantage of multiple-case design would be replication to predict similar results across the cases. 
We have met this issue by interviewing several experts on respectively LNG and internationalization 
towards the Southeast Asian market. In the analysis of propositions, an industry perspective is first 
undertaken before the case specific focus on Rolls-Royce is presented where it is relevant.  
A strongly related case design decision is the chosen units of analysis, where one can chose to focus 
on single-unit or embedded units of analysis (Yin, 2009). Our research question implies two units of 
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analysis. We have a focus on internationalization processes from a strategic management 
perspective, but we have a particular on export of LNG-propulsion technology. Consequently, our 
units of analysis are internationalization processes and a product specific focus on export of LNG-
propulsion. 
To logic link the data to the propositions and interpret findings we have an analytic strategy and 
technique (Yin, 2009). Our analytic strategy is to rely on theoretical propositions. This is the first and 
most preferred strategy in case design. We have built our interview guide on the outlined theoretical 
propositions, and this strategy is adequate to answer the research question. As an analytic technique 
we are doing pattern matching. By testing the theoretical propositions with collected interview data, 
we assess their validity. In total, our research design is built as described in Table 18.  
Table 18: Research design 
Exploratory research design 
Time Case study component 
addressed  
Research actions 
Start 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End 
- Research question - Attending workshop with Innovation Norway on the topic 
- Establishing boundaries of study 
- Propositions Literature review: Data collection: 
- Theoretical background, both 
academic and industry relevant  
- Literature discussion: Developing 
theoretical propositions 
- Building on project thesis 
(Løset & Tveten, 2011) 
- 11 expert interviews of 
Asians and Norwegians 
- Units of analysis Embedded single case study of Rolls-Royce Marine: 
- The internationalization process of the firm 
- Product specific study of LNG-propulsion and associated 
technology 
- The logic linking the data 
to the propositions 
- Criteria for interpreting 
the findings 
- Analytic strategy: Relying on theoretical propositions 
- Analytic techniques in discussion of findings: 
o Pattern matching of data collection to the outlined 
theoretical propositions 
o Identify characteristics from cases 
Results from research:  Conclusions: Key findings and implications for managers, literature 
and future research 
6.2 Data collection 
One of the advantages of the case study method is that it relies upon multiple sources of evidence. 
This section examines the thesis’ data collection. We have exploited this opportunity and collected 
data from a number of sources: 
 Academic articles and books 
 Industry reports and project thesis 
 Industry workshop 
 Interviews 
 News articles and other secondary data 
To classify and more thoroughly assess the data collection it can be divided into two groups. Firstly 
we collected data to establish theoretical propositions, the Academic and industry specific literature. 
Secondly we performed several expert interviews with LNG-experts, international business 
specialists in Southeast Asia, mainly in Singapore, and in Norway.  
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Academic and industry specific literature  
After establishing the research question and the units of analysis, a thorough literature review was 
carried out. Three major data types have been assessed. Firstly a country risk assessment where 
presented based on key economic and geographical data collected from reliable sources. Secondly 
industry reports where analyzed. Thirdly a major literature list where reviewed in order to establish 
the theoretical propositions.  
A central part of the assessment of industry reports included a review of our project report “The 
future potential of LNG” (Løset & Tveten, 2011). Major parts of Chapter 3 are reproduced from the 
project thesis since we already last autumn gathered a comprehensive material on the natural gas 
market and the bunker fuel market including LNG. Accordingly, it was natural to reproduce parts of 
the material and update some of the models we established in the project thesis, in this master 
thesis. 
The academic literature of international business and internationalization processes is almost 
endless, as many researchers within several special fields study it. We have searched for relevant 
literature in the library database at the website of NTNU and at Google Scholar. The process of 
selecting articles is described in Table 19.  
Table 19: Structure of literature search 
Process Content 
Search strings Internationalization process, entry mode, emerging markets, timing of entry, 
international alliance, performance of alliances and trade promotion programmes 
Sorting criteria   Number of citations 
 Relevance to the strategic management research field with a particular focus on 
multinational companies 
 Relevance to the targeted markets in Southeast Asia, where the majority is 
emerging market 
 Relevance to the maritime industry 
Number of academic articles gathered 35 
Number of academic articles cited in thesis 21 
The combination of literature, academic, industry relevant and our project thesis, constitutes a 
strong literature review as a foundation for analyzing the research question. In-depth industry 
analysis and a thorough literature review enable us to establish well-founded theoretical 
propositions which serve as our analytical tool. The literature review and the theoretical 
propositions are also the basis for developing the applied interview guide (Appendix 1), whereas the 
expert interviews are more described in the next section.     
Expert interviews 
To analyze the theoretical propositions in order to answer the research question, several expert 
interviews were carried out. Firstly we had an interview with the case company Rolls-Royce Marine 
in Bergen, Norway. The remaining interviews were carried out in Singapore on a field trip in the 
period from 19th of March to 28th of March. Selected interviewees were chosen based on experience 
relevant to our research question. The interviews have an open-ended structure with only a few 
general questions on each topic. The purpose with this structure is to avoid leading question and get 
trustworthy answers (Yin, 2009). A generic interview guide was developed based on the theoretical 
propositions (Appendix 1). However, we made small adjustments to each interviewee based on the 
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interviewee’s special competence. The complete list as outlined in Table 20 of interviewees 
complements each other and covers the research question sufficiently.   
Table 20: List of interviewees  
Industry Company Expertise 
Maritime 
equipment 
industry 
Rolls-Royce Marine Norway, Rolls-
Royce Marine Singapore 
Internationalization, LNG-propulsion 
Ship owner Masterbulk Ltd, Tian San Shipping, 
Höegh LNG, PSA Marine, North 
Sea Container Lines 
The maritime industry, selection of ship 
equipment, Southeast Asia, international 
business 
Trade advisor Innovation Norway International business, LNG-propulsion, 
exporting from Norway to Southeast Asia 
Oil service Aibel Internationalization 
Finance DNB Bank LNG-market, shipping market 
Classification and 
consulting 
DNV LNG-propulsion, internationalization 
In total, our data collection represents a unique and comprehensive source of information relevant 
to our research question. It is more than sufficient to answer the research question and analyzing 
the theoretical propositions. In order to evaluate the methodology, we will assess four different 
criteria for judging the quality of research designs. 
 
Figure 27: The thesis’ authors in the field conducting interviews at PSA Marine, Singapore 
6.3 Evaluation of methodology 
A case study is a complex research method requiring a good research method to provide new 
knowledge. Whatever research method is applied, trustworthiness and credibility are important to 
ensure quality of the study (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) presents four criteria upon the quality of a case 
study can be assessed and judged: Construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
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reliability. The different criteria are associated with different research phases and have different 
belonging tactics. In this section, an assessment of the criterions is carried out. 
Construct validity 
Construct validity has to do with identifying suitable operational measures for the concepts being 
studied (Yin, 2009). This is a particular challenge in case studies and critics claim data is subjective 
collected. To meet this challenge this thesis contains multiple sources of evidence. Our most 
important source of information is interview data, and hence the interviewees are both Norwegian 
and Singaporean from several industries and with different perspectives. All interviewees are on a 
higher management level including several CEOs, whereas all have confirmed the citations. In total, 
the interview data as presented in the thesis gives an honest picture of the LNG-industry in 
Southeast Asia. As a last tactic, we maintained a chain of evidence linking the case study questions 
to the case study report in order to enhance construct validity.  
Internal validity 
To achieve internal validity it is important to establish causal relationships, whereby given conditions 
lead to other conditions (Yin, 2009). This has particular importance in the phase of data analysis. To 
test theoretical propositions this thesis has the tactic of pattern matching. Collected data from 
interviews and other sources of evidence are matched towards the intended outcome outlined in 
theoretical propositions. Further, the propositions are either confirmed, rejected or more research is 
requested on the topic to ensure internal validity. In our chapter concerning implications, the result 
of the pattern matching of theoretical propositions lead to recommendations for respectively 
managers, policy makers and future research based on the nature of the analysis.   
External validity 
External validity is to which degree the thesis’ findings can be generalized (Yin, 2009). This is a giant 
challenge in case studies the findings are analytical instead of statistical. In single case studies, such 
as this of Rolls-Royce Marine, the use of theory is important to ensure generalization. It is the same 
theory helping us to develop theoretical propositions that can help us to generalize. If the findings in 
the case study are strongly deviating existing theory, and the results cannot be explained by the 
theory’s suggested limitations, the study should be replicated. We have examples where the theory 
and the collected data are incoherent, and in such cases we recommend further research to reveal 
the missing link. In other cases where we confirm existing theory, general recommendations are 
deducted. In this thesis, theoretical propositions are developed on behalf of several theoretical 
studies within each topic. Although strategic management literature is the main focus, the literature 
review is strengthened by elements from economics and political science. A thorough theoretical 
study alongside with extensive data collective enables this study to generalize findings in a larger 
sense.   
Reliability 
If the operations of a study, in this case primarily the data collection procedures, can be repeated 
with the same result, the reliability is high (Yin, 2009). The most important step to undertake in 
order to increase reliability is to document all procedures undertaken in the study. To increase 
reliability, we have thoroughly described our methodology and research design, and we have 
documented the dates in which interviews are conducted. Moreover, we have a comprehensive case 
study protocol with all notes, drafts, time schedules, meeting logs and academic articles are 
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collected. The case study protocol is available on a case study database, which we have duplicated. It 
is stored on a hard drive, as well as online at Dropbox. In total, we consider the case study database 
to ensure reliability as other researchers can repeat our procedures to validate the presented 
results.  
6.4 Summary and key learning 
Researchers will probably study internationalization processes in all times. LNG-propulsion is an 
immature technology and the LNG-industry is growing, implying an increased focus in the next few 
years. Therefore, for the sake of thesis’ authors as well as further research on the topic, self-
examination of the research design is necessary to improve future studies of the issues addressed. 
The strengths of this study are a comprehensive literature review, many interviewees in the relevant 
markets and a methodological correct data analysis. The literature review contains several rival 
explanations of internationalization phenomenons enabling us to not only offering solid theoretical 
propositions; we are also enabled to recommend areas of further research. The interview list has 
given us input from the entire LNG-propulsion value chain, and we have spoken to actors in both 
Norway and Singapore, which is very useful in an internationalization thesis. Not least, the data 
analysis allows to correctly addressing the theoretical propositions with the collected sources of 
information. 
Nevertheless, the thesis has its weaknesses. The study is conducted in a limited time span, which has 
made it impossible to repeat the research method on a different time. Moreover, it would be 
interesting to consider a multiple case design to follow more Norwegian enterprises within the LNG-
industry that is targeting the Southeast Asian market. It would also be interesting to have more 
quantitative numbers to justify foreign market entries with technological immature products. The 
immatureness of the LNG-propulsion market forces us to use similar industries and products as 
references, which is a challenge when the research design is developed. 
Another weakness is the lack of interview data from firms headquartered in emerging markets. We 
have only visited Singapore, which is the only developed economy in the region. By travelling to 
another sample country, we could have enriched our data collection significantly. We strongly 
recommend future researchers on this topic to visit emerging markets. 
In total, we can justify our chosen method. The internationalization literature is often based on 
quantitative data sets without any additional case studies. Accordingly, a case study design can 
complement existing literature rather than limit it. In the next chapter, we present our expert 
interviewees and their opinions.            
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 7 Expert interviews 
In order to establish an overall understanding of the industry and its market dynamics, the authors 
have completed a series of 11 expert interviews. Ten were conducted during a field trip to 
Singapore. The last extensive, interview with the case company, Rolls-Royce Marine, were 
conducted in Bergen, Norway, before the field trip. The purpose is to map the current situation for 
LNG-technology and the business environment in Southeast Asia. The published content will be an 
important source of evidence for further discussion and analysis.  
Table 21: Classification of interviewees  
Interviewees Presence Industry Experience with LNG  
Rolls-Royce Marine Norway Global Engine manufacture High degree 
Rolls-Royce Marine Singapore Singapore Engine manufacture Medium degree 
Innovation Norway Global Government trade advisor Medium degree 
DNV Global Classification and consulting High degree 
Höegh LNG Norway, Singapore Ship owner High degree 
Masterbulk Ltd Singapore Ship owner Medium degree 
North Sea Container Lines Norway Ship owner High degree 
Aibel Norway, Singapore Oil service Little degree 
DNB Bank Global Finance Medium degree 
PSA Marine Global Ship owner Little degree 
Tian San Shipping Singapore Ship owner Little degree 
The interviews have an open-ended structure with only a few general questions on each topic. The 
purpose with this structure is to avoid leading question and get trustworthy answers (Yin, 2009). A 
generic interview guide was developed based on the theoretical propositions (See Appendix 1). 
Moreover, all the interviewees work on a higher management level, and have given written approval 
for their answers.  
The interviewed firms have different special competences and are established in several industries. 
However, they all have experience relevant to our research question; either internationalization 
processes or experience with LNG technology. For our analysis a broad perspective was important. 
Not all the interviewees had experience with LNG, but still their opinions about LNG were important 
to study. Some ship owners provided us with important information about local factors that are 
essential for them when considering new technology, while other interviewees gave an account for 
support schemes and data about the most relevant factors for Norwegian firms when establishing 
business in Southeast Asia. 
The interviewees were able to provide us with updated information about the industry status and 
the current business environment for the region. We have included quite extensive parts of the 
interviews in this chapter to provide the reader with sufficient background and insight. In Chapter 8, 
data from the interviews are analyzed and compared to the theoretical propositions as a step to 
answer the research question.  
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7.1 Rolls-Royce Marine, Norway  
Name: Petter Stensaker 
 
Position: General Manager, System Sales & 
Marketing Campaigns 
Company: Rolls-Royce Marine AS 
Industry: Ship designing and supplier of ship 
systems, and provider of engines  
Rolls-Royce divides their projections of the future outlook for LNG-technology in Southeast-Asia into 
a short-term view and a long-term view. In a short-term perspective you must invest time and 
resources to access the market. In a long-term view Southeast Asia will be one of the most 
important maritime markets on the globe. Rapid economic growth, central geographical location and 
their role as trading spot make this a key market.  
The strategic considerations to enter a new market may vary depending on whom you ask. In 
general however, new market entries rely upon a market opportunity, preferably identified before 
the potential is executed. It is important to work in parallel with new markets and competing in 
existing ones. Moreover, a reliable political framework is important for Rolls-Royce. And specifically 
for LNG as a marine fuel, the government must be willing to invest into new bunkering 
infrastructure.  
The first ship segment for Rolls-Royce to target in Singapore is tug boats. LNG-propulsion are 
suitable for such vessels and it will be economic viable with only a three years payback time. In turn, 
all types of short sea shipping vessels can install such machinery; cargo ships, passenger ferries and 
cruise ships. The reason why Rolls-Royce have invested heavily into marketing and sales of LNG-
solutions in Singapore is the LNG import terminal on Jurong Island and an initiative from the 
Maritime Port Authority (MPA) giving financial support to set off green shipping and environmental 
friendly technology. It can be compared to the Norwegian NOX-fund, although in a smaller scale. 
Singapore is probably the only country in the region that has such an arrangement. Moreover, 
Singapore has an ambition to become an LNG-hub, and in total this made it clear that Rolls-Royce 
wanted a campaign towards this market with their green technology. 
Rolls-Royce has a mix of investments in new markets. Within the Marine Division, acquisitions have 
been the main strategy, but Rolls-Royce is also participating in several international joint ventures. 
The level of knowledge in the labor market where Rolls-Royce invests is not the most important due 
to amount of knowledge the company possess, but quality of the products and among partners are 
vital.   
Rolls-Royce use alliances actively, and enters into industry alliances that can be profitable to them. 
Within the LNG-segment alliances are especially important. Due to the lack of a complete value 
chain offering distribution of LNG as a marine fuel, it is important for Rolls-Royce to be a part of 
alliances which contribute to complete the LNG value chain. As an example Rolls-Royce work 
together with SLNG to duplicate the systems available for bunkering in Norway. Moreover, they 
recently signed a memorandum of understanding with Liquiline, which offers collaboration on 
marketing and relations. Liquiline’s system is also complementary to Rolls-Royce technology.  
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Rolls-Royce also attends less resource-demanding alliances such as Joint Industry Projects (JIP). Such 
collaborative arrangements are committing, but they are cost efficient and at the same time they 
push technology development.    
 
Figure 28: Interview with Petter Stensaker, General Manager, System Sales & Marketing Campaigns 
Rolls-Royce collaborative partners are chosen based on market conditions and complementing 
capabilities. As an example Rolls-Royce recently acquired MTU together with Daimler. MTU offers 
high-speed engines, which Rolls-Royce did not produce. This acquisition was a strategic decision to 
extend Rolls-Royce own product range. In general, acquisitions are controlled from the headquarters 
in Aalesund and administrated on a higher executive level. Mr. Stensaker emphasizes that alliances 
are especially necessary to succeed in Southeast Asia.  
When Rolls-Royce is making investments in new markets the potential for revenues are the most 
important. Nevertheless, infrastructure and the possibility to run the business after international 
standards are of great importance. The mapping of institutional frameworks and market conditions 
in new markets are also performed on a higher executive level in the firm. The significance of a 
stable political regime is almost crucial. Rolls-Royce has high ethical standards regarding policies and 
institutions. These can never be challenged for the sake of profits. 
The absence of corruption in Singapore makes it an easy market to target. Moreover, infrastructure 
and well-runned intermediaries are beneficial. To Rolls-Royce, logistics is a core business function. 
Punctual deliveries are important to Rolls-Royce customers, and frequent strikes or other 
instabilities can impede reliability.  
Rolls-Royce relies on high-skilled labor that speaks English. It is not that important with local workers 
due to the amount of knowledge in the firm. In Singapore, the CEO is an Englishman, but in Vietnam 
and Japan they are local.   
Norwegian authorities can provide Rolls-Royce with useful contributions to their international 
operations. Eksportfinans is an example where companies can get help with financial needs. An 
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independent research institution such as MARINTEK is very important in product presentations. 
Moreover, Innovation Norway, DNV and MARINTEK are useful door openers in new markets where 
Rolls-Royce does not have the same relations established.  
In Norway the development of a LNG-propelled fleet has been driven by political measures. 
Singapore on the other hand, is not an ECA and they will probably not impose NOX-tax. The driver of 
LNG as a marine bunker fuel in Singapore and Southeast-Asia is simply commercial interests. LNG is 
available in large quanta and is applied in industry and households. An additional bunkering 
infrastructure and distribution will strengthen Singapore’s position as a LNG-hub and bring along 
profits. The Port of Singapore will probably offer reduces port fees to environmental friendly ships 
rather than impose taxes. Other ASEAN-countries view Singapore as a pioneer, as they got both 
capital and technology.   
 
 
As mentioned, Rolls-Royce attends two JIPs in Singapore. MPA has taken the initiative to one 
technical and one commercial. The technical JIP, Assessment on LNG-bunkering in Singapore, is led 
by DNV. A total of 20 stakeholders, both industry actors and authorities are represented. Rolls-Royce 
was asked to participate, and contribute by personnel and knowledge. The JIP maps the risk 
associated with LNG-bunkering, and consists of a quality group, a steering group and a working 
committee where much of the work is carried out. The commercial JIP focuses on implementation of 
technical features concerning LNG as a marine fuel. 
To operate in emerging markets, which constitutes a major part of the Southeast-Asian region 
involves specific challenges. Cultural differences can be large, and must be managed. For Rolls-Royce 
it is also important to emphasize and implement a global perspective in all their new offices. This can 
be challenge in markets that is emerging, and has limited international trade experience.    
  
“If you are going to succeed in Southeast Asia, you must 
succeed in Singapore” – Petter Stensaker, Rolls-Royce Marine 
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7.2 Rolls-Royce Marine, Singapore 
Name: Jay Chia 
 
Position: Customer Relationship Manager 
Company: Rolls Royce Marine AS 
Industry: Design and supplier of ship systems, and 
provider of engines  
Mr. Chia highlights that today; the price of LNG is significant higher in Southeast Asia than in Europe 
and USA offering only a 10 % reduction compared to oil. In short-term this could kill the business 
case of LNG because the payback time will be longer and the investment more risky. The 
government needs to take initiatives towards green shipping, and MPA is giving up to 2 million SGD 
per project, which is a start. But still this is only a fraction of the investment. Gas engines are the 
only solution to meet IMO’s Tier 3 requirements, without using scrubbers or gas treatment systems. 
Consequently, Rolls-Royce delivers lean burn gas engines that will be compatible in terms of price 
with smoke scrubbers and SCR. Nevertheless, Mr. Chia states that Singapore will probably not be an 
ECA in the next 10 year, due to the importance for Singapore to stay competitive on price levels in a 
global industry.  
Rolls-Royce has LNG-engines for almost all types of vessels. In Singapore they focus on smaller 
segment such as tugs, which serves as a good starting point for LNG bunkering in Singapore. 
Container liners need available LNG also outside Singapore to be viable. In about three years’ time, 
Rolls-Royce predicts a commercial market for LNG in the region. The main barriers against such a 
market is the uncertainty regarding LNG as a fuel; procedures for bunkering and refueling, available 
infrastructure and general knowledge about LNG. 
Mr. Chia points out Norway as a frontrunner of LNG-technology proving that the solution is viable. 
Knowledge and expertise from Norway has to be spread to Southeast Asia. Norwegian companies 
need to demonstrate that LNG is safe and could be applicable in this region. An independent 
information campaign and an information brochure could be helpful in communicating the safety 
aspects to the market and end-users. 
Rolls-Royce is a part in multiple JIPs, and contributes with human capital. The company gets 
enormous value from the cooperation, in terms of business relations, responsiveness on market 
trends and knowledge sharing. Rolls-Royce is also in the position to influence decision makers 
directly.  
In Asia, ship owner’s main concern is price. Rolls Royce’s brand is known for good quality, reliability 
and customer service, but LNG-engines will require a greater investment cost. They also target the 
aftermarket to increase competitive advantage. Rolls-Royce’s main competitor in the LNG-segment 
is the engine manufacturer Wärtsila. But the two companies focus on different solutions for LNG-
engines. Wärtsila offers dual fuel that is able to run on diesel and LNG, while Rolls-Royce has four-
stroke lean burn engines. With different acquisitions Rolls-Royce has built up and extended their 
product portfolio. Rolls-Royce acquires companies that have complementary products with a good 
reputation and high quality.    
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Opportunities for LNG-technology outside Singapore are huge. Countries look into LNG as price of 
fossil fuel continue to increase, and not to mention that the World’s supply of gas is far more than 
oil. The economic growth for the ASEAN region allows this development to happen fast. When Rolls-
Royce considers investments in new countries, they first assess the market potential. A sufficient 
market is essential for a market entry. Rolls-Royce also focuses on the barriers to entry, like a stable 
political and legal system. Especially corruption is widespread in the region; furthermore this 
prevents investment and development.  
Rolls-Royce believes Indonesia probably will be the next country to adapt to LNG-technology. 
Indonesia has the biggest market potential in the region. With Singapore as a reference point in 
technological development, LNG as a marine fuel must be proven viable there first before Indonesia 
adapts.    
 
Figure 29: Interview with Jay Chia, Customer Relationship Manger in Singapore 
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7.3 Innovation Norway 
Name: Egil Rensvik and Una Skram  
Position: Special advisors, South- & Southeast Asia 
Company: Innovation Norway 
Industry: Government 
Innovation Norway has a strong position in Southeast Asia, with offices in Malaysia, Thailand, 
Singapore and Vietnam. Their main activity is to help Norwegian companies by establishing business 
in the region. With local knowledge, presence and long experience from Southeast Asia, many 
Norwegian companies have used Innovation Norway for special advising and relationship 
management with local partners.  
Currently, approximately 200 Norwegian companies are established in Singapore. Innovation Norway 
has worked closely with the shipping sector and observes increased activity by oil and gas companies 
in the region. Regarding LNG as a marine fuel, they have recently done some initial studies, arranged 
workshops and conferences on the topic. About 20-25 Norwegian companies have been involved in 
these projects. In June 2012, Innovation Norway will establish a new office in Jakarta in Indonesia. A 
promising gas and LNG market in the country is one of the reasons for this, with a potential 
establishment of many Norwegian companies.  
Innovation Norway expects the market of LNG in Southeast Asia to be large. The energy 
consumption in the region has increased drastically and the area is in a desperate need for energy, 
especially Indonesia, The Philippines and Vietnam. LNG is also an environmental friendly and 
economically viable energy source compared to other fossil fuels such as coal and oil. Indonesia, a 
country with huge gas reserves consisting of many small islands with limited gas pipeline 
infrastructure, particular in the east, will be suitable for LNG. There are planned some small-scale 
LNG projects in Indonesia, and two re-gasification terminals are under construction. This will 
increase the development and the domestic consumption of the country’s huge gas reserves. In 
Indonesia, foreign investors cannot have the largest share post; however silent partnership can solve 
this. Some Norwegian companies have already established business in the country. 
As a marine fuel, Innovation Norway sees the biggest potential for LNG in short sea shipping. Smaller 
vessels are most promising, like ferries, RoPax and medium container ships. With the new import 
terminal for LNG on Jurong Island, Singapore has the potential to distribute LNG in small-scale from 
2013. Still some standards and regulations are missing, but a JIP led by the classification company 
DNV are working with this topic. Another barrier towards implementation is still the common 
chicken and egg problem: Who is willing to take the first step? In Southeast Asia the knowledge 
about gas is very limited, and people are in general afraid to use gas. The JIPs are very important to 
increase the understanding and to share experiences from Norway with the Southeast Asian market.  
The region, Southeast Asia, is at the moment not a potential ECA, and consequently the financial 
upside in choosing LNG will probably be more important in Asia than in Europe. The financial 
considerations are hard to predict, as the LNG-price is higher in the Southeast Asian region 
compared to prices in USA and Europe. But the difference in costs between oil and gas in favor of 
LNG will reduce OPEX and initiate LNG as a marine fuel. With huge gas reserves in the region, gas will 
be available and extensively used when the infrastructure is established. 
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International strategy: To succeed in Southeast Asia it is vital to be established in the region. 
Norwegian companies operating from Norway are generally not responsive enough and do not show 
enough commitment to win contracts. This is enhanced by factors as different time zones, long 
geographical distance and language barriers. In general, personal relationships, meetings and to use 
enough time on partners, are 
more important than in Europe. 
If the LNG-market booms, the 
Norwegian companies must be 
established in the region with 
strong relationships built on trust 
to be preferred by local partners. 
In particular, Singapore is a 
strategic important hub; with 
good infrastructure, skilled 
employees, a stable political 
regime and suitable legal system. 
There are no particular 
requirements to the number of 
local employees, but unique for 
Singapore is an Economic Development Board that in some cases gives support to companies with 
special R&D-projects or local employees. For instance, DNV got support with the establishment of 
the Clean Technology Center with its Singaporean location and Singaporean recruitment. 
A strategy to get cheap and skilled labor is to select local partners or agents; however they need to 
be evaluated carefully. It is both time consuming and requires a lot of resources, but it is extremely 
important to find a company matching your business. A typical problem is lack of product 
knowledge, as agents representing too many companies or having interest conflicts among clients, 
which can be a costly affair. Innovation Norway can help Norwegian companies with this screening 
to find relevant and suitable partners. Even more risk is involved with merger and acquisitions, but 
acquisitions could be a solution to enter a market fast or to get complementary products into the 
product line.  
The huge network of Norwegian companies operating from Singapore bring along many synergies. 
The tax regime between Singapore and Norway is very beneficial for the companies. And the stable 
and predictable business environment in Singapore is hard to find elsewhere. For the maritime 
cluster in Norway it is useful that the engineering capacity in the region is skilled and available.  
Each year, 10-12 Norwegian companies establish in Singapore. Already, in March 2012, 6-7 
companies have internationalized to the region. The most common mistake associated with doing 
business in Southeast Asia is to not establish presence in the region. Several comprehensive 
meetings are often necessary as well as long-term relations and trust are emphasized much higher in 
the Asia business culture compared to the European. To be considered serious, presence in the 
region is vital. Specifically, Mr. Rensvik is very optimistic to the future potential for LNG and the 
economic development in the region: “You must establish before the market booms”.  
Figure 30: Interview with Innovation Norway at the Royal Norwegian 
Embassy, Singapore. From the left: Una Skram and Egil Rensvik 
61 
 
7.4 DNV 
Name: Geir Fuglerud  
Position: Head of Solutions 
Company: DNV Clean Technology Center Singapore 
Industry: Classification and consulting 
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) is an independent foundation and classification society, serving industries 
across the globe. They are working with classification, verification, certification and advisory in 
multiple industries including maritime, energy, aviation, automotive and information technology. 
DNV is positioning and investing huge sums to ensure safe and reliable LNG value chains. It is a 
global firm with 300 offices in more than 100 countries and 10.000 employees. In Southeast Asian 
their offices are located in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand. 
Singapore has a position as one of the busiest ports in the world, and approximately 20 % of all the 
global bunkering is conducted in Singapore. DNV has therefore been present in Singapore for 40 
years, and considers Singapore to be a strategic and important hub for the region. DNV has currently 
400 employees located in the country, in which about 20 of them are Norwegian. 
DNV has taken a strong and proactive position in the emerging LNG-market in Southeast Asia. They 
consider the potential for LNG in the region to be huge. Indonesia has increased their energy 
consumption dramatically the last decade and need additional energy supply. They have huge gas 
reserves, while their oil resources are limited. Coal is not well suited for distributed power 
production in small-scale, since it require significant investments. The underdeveloped infrastructure 
in East-Indonesia with lack of gas pipelines and roads makes small-scale LNG a suitable choice. 
Regarding Singapore, DNV underlines the need of energy security, and with the new import terminal 
on Jurong Island, LNG will probably play a vital role in their future energy mix. Eventually, Singapore 
will be the LNG-hub for the region, and because of increased demand the terminal has been 
upgraded already before its opening.    
The most important factor for the development of the LNG-market in Southeast Asia is economic 
considerations. The price of LNG is uncertain and currently more expensive in Asia than in Europe 
and USA. Shale gas is a game changer, with a lot of extra gas in USA that could affect the LNG-price 
and result in a spot market if it is exported. Anyhow, the LNG-price is significantly lower than the oil 
price, and DNV predict that oil will be traded to a premium of gas also in the future. As more LNG is 
coming to the market when Australia becomes a major LNG-exporter and Brunei’s long-term 
contracts to Japan expire, the LNG-price will stay low.  
DNV expects that when the market for LNG as a marine fuel becomes established; the development 
will be very rapid. Mr. Fuglerud believes many conservative ship owners in Asia will be surprised by 
the market change. They are currently not prepared for the introduction of LNG as a marine fuel. A 
key factor to capitalize on the change in the fuel mix will be to get a strong market position, be 
proactive and forward-looking, like many of the Norwegian maritime enterprises currently are doing.  
62 
 
In Singapore, DNV predicts that LNG-propulsion are most interesting for ships operating on fixed 
routes with large tanks like VLCCs, bulk, feeder and container ships. OSVs probably need more 
flexibility. They are often operating on relatively short time contracts in areas with very limited 
infrastructure. DNV works closely with yards, governments and ship owners in different Joint 
Industry Projects to develop the marine fuel market for LNG. DNV is experiencing increased interest 
for LNG trough the JIPs, where they have identified different barriers to solve. Standards and 
procedures need to be aligned, and investment into infrastructure is required. Exhaust scrubbers are 
the only real alternative to LNG in the ECAs, because a fuel switch to MDO/MGO will be too 
expensive for ship owners that operate a considerable amount of their time in ECAs. DNV do not 
think Singapore will be an ECA, but global environmental regulation will definitely also influence 
Southeast Asia in the long run.  
Many Norwegian companies have experience, knowledge and operational skills from different parts 
of the LNG value chain. Innovation Norway can help these Norwegian enterprises with export and 
establishment in the region. Since commercial aspects are prevalent, tax agreements are also 
efficient tools. But for the foreseeable future DNV thinks a NOX-found not will be applicable in this 
region.  
As stated, many countries in the region will probably apply LNG in shipping in the future. When DNV 
consider the different countries, they first assess the market potential, than the business 
environment. Specifically, they look into how the labor market and the political stability work in the 
country. Indonesia has the largest market potential in the region, but extensive use of red tape and 
corruption is a major problem. Vietnam has a lot of shipping and shipyards, but business is time 
consuming and demanding which is a barrier to development of LNG as marine fuel. Singapore does 
not have any own resources, but is anyhow a natural hub for the region.  
DNV strongly believe LNG will be an important marine fuel in Southeast Asia. However, the driver 
will not be environmental regulations as in Europe. Profit is the reason to change to LNG as bunker 
fuel. Mr. Fuglerud finish: “Ship owners better be prepared, because the development is happening 
now.” 
  
Figure 31: The authors and Geir Fuglerud in front of DNV Clean Technology Center Singapore 
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7.5 Höegh LNG Asia Pte Ltd 
Name: Ragnar Wisløff and Thomas Fiskaa  
Position: Managing Director and Business Development 
Manager FPSO 
Company: Höegh LNG Asia Pte Ltd 
Industry: Ship owner 
Höegh LNG is a pioneer in LNG transportation with almost 40 years of experience. Ten years ago, the 
company decided to enter other business areas within the LNG value chain and launched 
downstream offshore receiving terminals. Later, an upstream production unit for LNG was also 
developed. Today Höegh LNG is a fully integrated ship-owning company offering long-term floating 
production, transportation, re-gasification and terminal solutions for LNG. Their unique technology is 
produced with parts from the entire globe, but is developed in Norway. The businesses areas have 
high entry costs and hence high entry barriers for competitors. The main office for Asia is in 
Singapore with 12 employees, whereas three of them are Norwegian.  
The last decade, Höegh LNG served the Asian market from Oslo, Norway. When the market 
opportunities within upstream and downstream LNG-production became very promising, they 
decided to establish in Singapore. To serve the market properly and to be considered serious, you 
have to be present in the region. Today Singapore is a hub for the entire LNG-industry and Höegh 
LNG runs all their market activities for Asia east of Suez from the country. Customers, lawyers and 
financial services can all be found in Singapore, and it is easy to bring along families. Höegh LNG’s 
project in Indonesia will also be engineered from the Singapore office, while the technology is 
developed and composed in Norway.  
In Southeast Asia diesel and other oil based fuels are mainly used as fuel for power plants. These are 
both polluting and costly compared to LNG. Among the decision makers in Southeast Asia, it is 
primarily the financial gains that are important, and not the environment. Large power plants can be 
converted to run on natural gas offering a 15 % price discount on fuel, better energy efficiency and a 
total saving of hundreds of millions of dollars each year.  
Regarding LNG as a marine bunker fuel, Mr. Wisløff is more skeptical. They are sure small-scale LNG 
will arise, but are not sure about the time perspective. The building of receiving and export terminals 
in the region will create more spot trading, which will have a favorable effect on the LNG market. 
Anyhow, the main barrier towards bunkering of LNG on ships is infrastructure. Someone must take 
the huge investment cost. Mr. Wisløff does not believe any companies will invest alone, but a 
government is more likely. Moreover, they point at the need of several bunkering stations around 
the world to make it more plausible for ship owners, alongside with safety standards and a price 
discount. To succeed with LNG as a marine bunker fuel you need a complete value chain with 
distribution. 
Concerning the driver of LNG as a marine bunker fuel, Mr. Fiskaa underlines that commercial 
feasibility is the only possibility for growth. In Norway ECAs and the NOX-fund have been additional 
drivers, but similar services is less likely in Southeast Asia. Höegh LNG’s carriers have used boil off 
LNG for fuel in 30 years with no serious problems and low maintenance costs. Mr. Fiskaa does not 
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understand the skepticism concerning the safety aspect with LNG, and refer to an excellent track 
record.   
Höegh LNG recent new builds have installed Wärtsila’s Dual Fuel engines. Duel fuel offers better 
energy efficiency which offsets the higher CAPEX, but the crew requires more training. 
Consequently, the staff on LNG-carriers is among the most expensive in the shipping industry.  
International strategy 
Höegh LNG claims it was an absolute necessity to establish in Singapore to succeed in Southeast 
Asia. Personal relations are much more important according to Mr. Wisløff. Decision processes take 
more time in this market, and the culture must be learned by living here, not by travelling to the 
region by airplane from Europe. If a firm commutes round trips to Singapore from Norway they are 
not considered as a serious market player. Höegh LNG emphasizes that one must be able to held 
physical meetings in only a few hours’ notice. They underline that e-mail is not sufficient as meetings 
are most effective in an office, and consequently presence in Singapore is required.  
A challenge for Norwegian companies by establishing in Singapore is to get qualified personnel from 
Norway that is willing to move. Besides that, there are very few obstacles Mr. Wisløff reports. 
Singapore is the easiest country in the world to establish within. In other countries in the region, 
communication is a greater problem than language.  
 
Figure 32 Höegh will deliver the first FPSO for the east cost of Sumatra, Indonesia 
There are some synergies across countries in the Southeast Asian region, but each country is quite 
unique. They are proud and concerned with culture. Presence in the region is probably the most 
important synergy. Vietnamese people can travel to Singapore, but not to Norway.  
Höegh LNG can report that it is not harder to do business in the Southeast Asian region. Corruption 
and political involvement is a challenge in Southeast Asia, but on the other hand, business cases are 
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executed as planned. USA and England can be harder in that manner. Höegh LNG has no formal 
alliances, but they have important relations to local partners. Local partners can be very useful in 
accessing new markets. 
In Southeast Asia, Höegh LNG says that the Norwegian government’s international activities are very 
important. Höegh LNG has undertaken beneficial help from the Norwegian Royal Embassy, 
Innovation Norway and INTSOK. Officials can be helpful in establishing relations and meetings on a 
high-level, political and business wise. In short, the diplomacy is more important in Southeast-Asia 
than in Western markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 33: Artic Lady is one of Höeghs major LNG carriers 
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7.6 Masterbulk 
Name: Rune Sten 
 
Position: CEO of Masterbulk 
Company: Masterbulk 
Industry: Ship owner 
 
Masterbulk was established as a ship owning company in 
Singapore 1995 as a spin-off from Westfal-Larsen based in 
Bergen. The company has an office in Shanghai, and 
extensive in-house crew training on The Philippines. 
Masterbulk has a crew retention rate on 95 %. The fleet 
consists of 23 Open Hatch Gantry Crane vessel, and operates 
in the dry bulk segment, freighting much cellulous 
worldwide.  
Masterbulk has been looking into LNG as a propulsion fuel. 
DNV and Oshima Shipbuilding have made an assessment of 
the Open Hatch segment running on LNG, and they 
concluded it is an appropriate technology for Masterbulk’s 
fleet. The Open Hatch segment consists of high standard 
ships with a life expectancy on 30 years. Mr.Steen describes 
a segment with high entry barriers, where entrants invest in 
new builds due to absence of second-hand sales, and new 
build programmes could be up to ten ships. These 
conditions make ship owners open towards new 
technology, in contrast to typical asset players. Mr. Steen can tell that Masterbulk will probably not 
be the first to contract LNG-propulsion. Short sea shipping such as ferries or supply ships in Norway 
are more suitable, but Masterbulk is positive towards the technology and will consider LNG in the 
future.   
In discussion on barriers towards implementation of LNG as a marine fuel, Mr. Steen directs the 
attention towards bunkering infrastructure, standards for operating with LNG, CAPEX and expensive 
staff. Bunkering facilities must be established in the region. Masterbulk is doing heavy triangulation 
between the spot market and given routes to minimize ballast voyages without cargo, and the 
destinations can therefore vary. Due to this fact, bunkering availability is very important. Moreover, 
necessary standards for the bunkering procedure are crucial to ensure safety.  
Other barriers are cost-related. LNG-carriers have the most expensive crew due to extensive 
training. Also, the CAPEX could increase by around 20 %. On the positive side, LNG-price is presently 
lower than oil. Mr. Steen underlines the need for the LNG-price to develop from the situation today 
where three price regimes co-exist. Both the shale gas revolution, huge gas reserves in Australia and 
Indonesia, and environmental considerations may affect the price in a positive direction. Masterbulk 
strongly believes LNG will be a preferred solution as a marine bunker fuel over time, and when the 
market first is established, the development will go fast.  
Figure 34: Interview with Rune Steen, CEO of Masterbulk 
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Regarding what will be the driver of LNG as a marine fuel, Mr. Steen highlights profitability as the 
single most important factor. Governments can work towards SECAs and ECAs with lower sulphur 
emissions, but it is unlikely that Singapore will become an ECA in a short-term perspective. However, 
Singapore is a technological frontrunner, and if LNG turns out to be profitable because lower OPEX 
offset the increased CAPEX, the development will go fast. LNG will come, and a paradigm shift will 
arise, states Mr. Steen. 
In Masterbulk’s case, the fleet has an average age of 13 years, which is quite young given the high 
life expectancy. They have no new builds today, and no planned, due to the difficult market 
conditions. But new builds will be contracted in the future, and LNG is an alternative if bunkering 
facilities are established, and some pioneers such as in Norway have showed that it is possible. 
International strategy 
Mr. Steen describes why Singapore is a good place to do business. They have a beneficial tax system, 
and a lucrative geographic position within shipping. Masterbulk is present in Singapore, but it is not 
only large companies that will benefit from establishing in Singapore. In Asia, Singapore is 
considered as the preferred country to establish within, given their stable law system, large and 
well-functioning shipping industry. Moreover, international schools are available which makes it 
easier to carry family along. On the other hand, Singapore is expensive.  
The CEO of Masterbulk points at a good business culture in Singapore. There is virtually no 
corruption, and you are very central located with the possibility of to fly everywhere easily. Hong 
Kong and Shanghai are very Chinese focused, but in Singapore you have more varied cultures and 
works as a hub for the entire Asian region.  
Success in the Southeast Asian region relies upon the recognition of some distinct features. Asian 
business culture is more long-term, and relations must be established to make deals. In that respect, 
local presence is crucial. There are many formal network events, and recurring meetings are 
important to develop trust and business relations.  
As a Norwegian linked company, Masterbulk points out that Innovation Norway can be door openers 
for new entrants in Singapore. New entrants often use Norwegian actors to internationalize, 
especially within the maritime industry. It is important to be on a ship owner’s makers list, which are 
the specifications for ship equipment. Ship owners, yards and designers often want experienced 
suppliers to ensure availability of service and spare parts in the future. As a small company, relations 
are crucial to open doors into makers list, since trust is a central decision variable in choosing 
equipment.  
Before making a foreign market entry, a potential market must be present. Also, political stability is 
important according to Mr. Steen. That is an advantage in Singapore, where the law system is 
reliable. In other countries, contractual disagreements can be very challenging for international 
ventures.  
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7.7 North Sea Container Line AS  
Name: Tom Preststulen  
Position: Chairman 
Company: North Sea Container Line AS 
Industry: Ship owner 
North Sea Container Line AS (NCL) is a Norwegian operator with seven self-loading/-discharging 
container feeders. Quality, punctuality and service are the company’s philosophy, as they serve 
clients primarily to and from the Norwegian West coast. NCL is now considering changing from gas 
oil to liquefied natural gas for their future North Sea feeder fleet, as well as entering into a similar 
service in Southeast Asia with joint venture partners. 
Tom Preststulen is an entrepreneur and investor with experience from inters alia the oil and gas 
sector in Asia. Mr. Preststulen predicts that the strong economic growth which has been 
experienced over the last two decades in Asia will continue also in the years to come, especially 
within the energy sector, albeit with some intermittent cyclical corrections. In China, they have 
already upgraded the number of planned LNG import terminals from 6 to 20 in order to meet the 
growing demand for energy, although this number may be scaled down in view of a recent decision 
to exploit China’s onshore shale gas. Moreover, discovered stranded areas of gas can be developed 
for extraction of natural gas and production of LNG in Southeast Asia by using new small-scale 
technologies.  
The potential market for use of LNG in the region is huge, as fuel in small and medium sized power 
plants, for industrial use, on-land transportation, as well as for commercial vessels as a replacement 
for marine diesel or heavy fuel oil. The import and consumption of LNG will boom in Singapore and 
the rest of Southeast Asia as well. Mr. Preststulen is optimistic towards LNG because he predicts that 
today’s substantial geographical price differences cannot be sustained and will sooner or later start 
to converge. Massive gas resources in Qatar and Australia, in addition to shale gas production in USA 
and China will cause a global surplus of natural gas, and the price of LNG will stay low compared to 
oil. Today, because LNG import terminals in USA are still under conversion to become export 
terminals, the price difference between North American gas and Asian gas is simply too high. In USA, 
statistics show that the price ratio of energy equivalent of oil to gas averaged 11 to 1 during the past 
10 years, whilst the current ratio is 53 to 1. On the one hand, the shale gas development will give 
USA an important competitive advantage in re-industrializing, particularly in the chemical sector. On 
the other hand, it will also enable North America to become a competitive exporter of LNG which 
should contribute to balancing global LNG prices, assuming that the US Congress will allow a free 
trade of U.S. gas.  
LNG is also a clean and environmentally friendly product compared to crude oil and its derivatives.  
Since shipping is global in nature, the effects of IMO Tier 3, will force changes and restrictions on 
release of NOX and other gases and substances considered harmful to the environment, not only in 
North America and Europe, but probably also in parts of the Asian region.  
Mr. Preststulen furthermore underlines that experience from Norway has demonstrated that many 
types of ships can be converted or built to use LNG as a bunker fuel, and that small-scale distribution 
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of LNG also benefits industrial and transportation sectors at large. The development in Southeast 
Asia will probably follow the same path. It will start out with short sea shipping, due to closeness to 
planned bunkering facilities; initially servicing ferries, supply vessels, and tugs, and will then 
gradually expand to include deep sea vessels. It is expected that the LNG import and export facility 
under construction in Singapore, due to be commissioned in the second quarter of 2013, will act as a 
regional catalyst for the change from fuel oil to the use of LNG. Important barriers to LNG as bunker 
fuel are lack of international standards and regulations, as well as inadequate infrastructure. 
However, these issues are currently being looked into. The maritime authorities in Singapore will 
engage in agreements on common standards and safety issues. In Norway, there are two companies 
operating LNG bunkering facilities, namely Gasnor and Scangas. Gasnor is owned by Statoil, while 
Scangas is a private independent company. However, Scangas has to buy LNG from Gasnor, which 
therefore currently controls the price of LNG in Norway, which is another unsustainable and 
undesirable situation. International free trade of gas will enhance its usage to the benefit of the 
environment and consumers. 
It will probably be vital to facilitate and provide LNG as a marine fuel in Singapore first, before 
entering other countries in the region. Singapore is the center point of Southeast Asia and the 
world’s largest bunker port. Still, Indonesia has the largest potential in the region with respect to the 
use of LNG with numerous islands with rich resources, but undeveloped infrastructure. Also 
Vietnam, The Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar and Thailand have huge potential. The need for 
additional and environmentally friendly energy is the key when entering Southeast Asia with small-
scale LNG projects, serving power plants, certain industry sectors, and terrestrial transportation. 
Norway can contribute with several years of experience and know-how to the development of 
required infrastructure for the use of LNG in Asia. Network projects will stimulate to further 
development of relevant technologies, although substantial investments will naturally be required. 
Typically though, a double-digit return on investments can be expected, if properly organized. 
Corruption represents a general problem in the region, and is causing complications and delays in 
developments. Other cultural differences to Western practices may also represent hindrances when 
doing business in Asia. However, these issues may be resolved by education, proper ethical 
guidelines, adhering to a moral code of conduct, and by using local expertise. 
To succeed with business in the region, Mr. Preststulen highlights the importance of having access to 
appropriate, efficient and experienced networks and relationship in order to obtain the necessary 
licenses and approvals to operate. Such relationships and connections can partly be built through 
the assistance of Norwegian Embassies and Consulates, including support from Innovation Norway, 
and through joint venturing with the right local partners, like gas partners in Singapore. Acquisitions 
and joint ventures will be essential solutions when employing local labor, and to bridge cultural 
differences, with the objective of fast-tracking entries into these booming markets. 
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7.8 Aibel Pte Ltd 
Name: Øyvind Vigeland  
Position: Senior Manager – Business Development 
Company: Aibel Pte Ltd (Singapore & Thailand) 
Industry: Oil service 
Aibel is a leading supplier of services related to oil, gas and renewable energy. They are owned by 
Norwegian investors and are headquartered in Stavanger, Norway. The last decade Aibel has 
expanded their business area from mainly operating in the North Sea with oil and gas to be a highly 
global firm with a broader focus. In Southeast Asia, Aibel has experience by operating from both 
Thailand and Singapore. Their first office in the region was opened in Thailand in 1999 to give Aibel 
in-house capability and to deliver competitive priced offshore modules. After success and increased 
activity in the region, Aibel Singapore was established in 2007. Currently the office has more than 
400 local and regional engineers, cooperating closely with Aibel Norway to provide Engineering, 
Procurement and Construction (EPC) projects.  
Aibel is present in multiple markets which are aligned with their superior strategy. They are targeting 
several markets, because the company reduce risk by not depending on one single region. It is also 
an important part of Aibel’s international strategy to serve and work closely with their customers. In 
the last decade the Southeast Asian offshore market has seen a substantial growth. Aibel has built 
up their organisation in the region step by step with organic growth following the market demand. 
When Aibel decided to extend their investments in Southeast Asia, three factors was vital, 
infrastructure, skilled resources and a strategic location. 
Singapore is an easy and convenient location to operate from with good infrastructure. The region 
provides considerable skilled engineering resources and compared to Norway the labour cost is low. 
Work permits are easy to acquire, it takes often just one day. In general, Aibel employ high-skilled 
competence from all over the region: India, China, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. The 
government in Singapore is also stable, effective and facilitates for international business with a 
beneficial tax regime and subsidies to new ventures. With Singapore´s central geographical position, 
it is easy to serve customers in the entire region.   
Personal relations, mutual trust and loyalty are vital elements to consider in order to successful 
business in Southeast Asia. Compared to the European business culture, it is more time consuming 
and usually involves a lot of meetings and activity together with the customers in Asia. The same 
factors are applicable when choosing subcontractors and partners. Aibel is also working through 
alliances and collaboration with partners. Their customers demand competitive prices and quality, 
and Aibel therefore normally cooperates with companies that have the same perception of quality. 
By operating from Southeast Asia, Aibel make this customization possible to a reasonable price. They 
choose primarily partners that can expand Aibel’s capacity and expertise, and in addition give 
complementary synergies. Strategic alliances are usually settled by the top management, but 
relations and knowledge sharing with partners are often present in joint projects. Aibel do not use 
agents, mainly because Aibel does not want other companies to represent them. Agents could also 
have multiple and different agendas.    
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When doing business in other countries in Southeast Asia, certain pitfalls are more evident. 
Indonesia, The Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia can be bureaucratic, with local regulations and 
transparency challenges. In general, business in Southeast Asia is more time consuming. Aibel use a 
lot of resources on local management, coordination and comprehensive supervising. But overall 
Aibel use the same codes of conduct as in the rest of the world.  
 
Figure 35: Interview with Øyvind Vigeland 
A number of organizations and institutions set up by the Norwegian government are present in the 
region. Their presence is important not only for new establishment, but also for existing businesses, 
knowledge sharing and experiences, networking and relations. Aibel is currently working closely with 
Innovation Norway and INTSOK for advisory and to assess new market opportunities. INTSOK is a 
network-based organization, where the organization establishes dialogue between oil companies, 
technology suppliers, service companies and governments. 
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7.9 DNB Markets, Singapore 
Name: Erik Bergöö  
Position: Senior shipping analyst 
Company: DNB Markets 
Industry: Finance 
DNB is Norway’s largest financial service group and one of the largest in the Nordic region in terms of 
market capitalization. Shipping, offshore and logistics are priority areas within DNB’s international 
strategy. DNB Markets has a global presence with offices in New York, London, Oslo, Shanghai, 
Athens and Singapore. The Singapore office has served the Asian market since 1970, and is the 
leading bank for Norwegian businesses in Asia. 
The DNB shipping analyst Erik Bergöö underlines the enormous popularity of LNG in Southeast Asia. 
By applying LNG, the region is diversifying the energy mix. This creates several business 
opportunities, such as Höegh LNG building a FSRU to serve an Indonesian client, and likewise with 
Golar LNG. There is an endless demand for LNG, and the market is only restricted by supply of LNG.  
Regarding the price, Mr. Bergöö points at different aspects concerning LNG. Historically, there has 
always been an oil-gas differential, and oil will always trade on a premium compared to gas. The oil 
is easy to handle, store and transport. As for today, there are large price differences across the world 
due to the shale gas revolution in the USA, making the trade price of LNG at Henry Hub a quarter of 
the Asian price. How this difference will evolve is uncertain. Mr. Bergöö says USA wants to export 
LNG, but they want to be independent of energy as well, which implies production for own use. If 
USA chose to export, the price of LNG will decrease, but for the next two years, the arbitrage will 
continue. Europe will probably build up import capacity of LNG, to be less dependent on gas from 
Russia.  
In a discussion with Mr. Bergöö on the future price of LNG compared to oil, he elaborates on 
different factors affecting the price and creates uncertainty. The Southeast Asian region and China 
grows 10 % a year, but the energy consumption 30 % a year which put pressure on the price. On the 
other side, China has found shale gas. If they have the same development of the resources as USA, 
the price might fall. But again, if they close down coal plants and replace them with LNG, DNB 
Markets expects higher gas prices. 
On a question of the impact from increased LNG-shipping, Mr. Bergöö argues that it is not that 
important. Transportation cost is only 1 dollar of the price on LNG, and reduced freight fees will 
affect a rather small proportion of the LNG-price. But what will affect the price is the fact that many 
countries build LNG import terminals, because of arbitrage possibilities and to get more energy 
security. This may lead to a larger spot market and reduction in the LNG-price. 
However, Mr. Bergöö explains that the spot market never will be like oil or coal. The exploration and 
production of the Gorgong field in Australia has an estimated cost of 52 billion dollars. To finance 
such an investment, long-term contracts are required. They can easily accept a LNG-price of 12-13 
dollar on 10 year contracts, instead of selling it on a spot market. 
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As a marine fuel, Mr. Bergöö is more skeptical towards LNG. The cost of LNG is roughly 4 dollars on 
cooling, 1 dollar on transportation and 1 dollar on re-gasification, a total of 6 dollars. With a 
historical oil-gas differential on 2/3 in favor of LNG, the potential fleet saving is rather small, and the 
future price of LNG is quite important.  
Another significant problem highlighted by Mr. Bergöö is the investment cost of infrastructure, and 
that it is hard to see who will invest into distribution. No one in shipping makes money today, so 
who will invest into retail availability? He gives an example: Take a player like Maersk, a future-
oriented high-tech firm, and they do not even consider LNG. Nevertheless, Mr. Bergöö is more 
positive towards dual fuel because of the flexibility. 
To map which ship types 
that are relevant for LNG, 
Mr. Bergöö suggests 
looking into the cost 
structure of different ship 
segments. Within bulk 
freight, fuel is 2 % of the 
cost, and it is the 
customer that carries the 
bunkering expenses. 
Consequently, there is no 
incentive for the ship 
owner to take higher 
CAPEX when they cannot 
add the saving to their 
own bottom line, not in 
today’s market at least.   
When the rates are low and the market is tight, it is hard to get paid for better technology. Shipping, 
at least bulk, is a commodity industry with pure cost competition. Ship owners do not keep arbitrage 
from lower fuel costs. Moreover, it is hard to foresee any industry growth the next few years. The 
possibility of LNG will however arise by government subsidies like in Norway, but that is less likely in 
the Southeast Asian region. A global CO2-tax will also be beneficial, but again, that is not likely in a 
short-term perspective.  
International strategy 
DNB has established in Singapore primarily to follow customers abroad. Mr. Bergöö tells there is not 
much difference in how to do business in Singapore, since the tools within the financial industry are 
much the same. However, there are stronger effects of hierarchy in Asia, and cultural differences can 
be present. 
Mr. Bergöö has belief in the region, and especially Indonesia. They will have growth, but the country 
must sort out the comprehensive red tape. To succeed in this region, a firm must establish with an 
office to be considered as a potential business partner. 
Figure 36: Harbour view from DNB Markets Singapore 
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7.10 PSA Marine 
Name: Joseph Tay 
 
Position: Marine Consultancy, Safety & Compliance Manager 
Company: PSA Marine 
Industry: Ship owner 
The core businesses of PSA Marine are pilotage and towage in the Singapore harbor. They perform 
more than 200,000 jobs annually with around 49 harbor tugs. PSA Marine has also established 
towage presence in India, China, Hong Kong and other countries in Southeast Asia. The company is 
owned by PSA International, which is one of the leading global port groups. With its flagship 
operations in PSA Singapore Terminals and PSA Antwerp, PSA participates in 29 port projects in 17 
countries across Asia, Europe and America. Their towage business extends beyond Singapore through 
various subsidiaries and joint venture companies operating in India, China, Hong Kong and Southeast 
Asia. In the Marine Consultancy is a team of veteran marine professionals, capable of providing 
consultancy services on port planning, terminal expansion, and other marine-related offshore 
projects. 
 
Figure 37: A PSA tug in the Singapore port 
PSA Marine operates 49 tugs in Singapore. The most used engines are primarily Niigata medium 
speed and Caterpillar high-speed engines running on Marine Gas Oil. Mr. Tay can tell that the 
primary consideration is reliability and maintenance costs when engines are chosen. Off course, fuel 
cost and consumption are also important parameters. With the IMO Tier II and Tier III regulations 
entering into force, PSA is going green and is considering alternative fuel. A study of the green 
alternatives is carried out, and diesel electric propulsion and LNG is both possible solution for their 
tugs. The government in Singapore has signaled some increased focus on the environment in the 
recent years, but has yet to fund any green ships. A reason for this is that Singapore has very limited 
natural resources, and the fact that Singapore must stay competitive and to maintain its leading 
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position as favorable port in the future. On the other hand, the government has established Green 
Iniative that could support up to 50 % of the investment costs on ships with environmental friendly 
solutions.  
The main barrier towards implementation of LNG as a marine fuel is the lack of bunkering stations. 
Timing will much depend on when bunkering of LNG is possible. The tugs are rather small, space 
efficient boats and the increased volume of LNG-tanks or scrubbers could be a problem. For LNG to 
be a viable solution, they cannot lose significant operational time due to more frequent bunkering, 
and the localization of the bunkering tanks must be clarified. There is also a need to train their crew 
sufficiently to handle LNG. Since LNG is still an immature technology, the crew’s knowledge and 
experience are very limited. Consequently, too many potential problems could occur and PSA 
Marine will probably not be a first mover in the market for LNG powered tug.  
 
Figure 38: Interview with PSA Marine at Singapore Harbor 
Although the investment cost is higher, PSA Marine sees favorable financial benefits on the LNG-
price compared to MGO. The additional investment cost is therefore not the major concern, but the 
operational considerations are crucial. With support up to 50 % of the additional investment cost 
from MPA, LNG could definitely be an economic competitive solution. They have an open tender 
system, where PSA Marine set the required standards, the appropriate specifications and the 
propulsion system. This makes it possible and easy for PSA to choose the best suppliers. With a 
lifespan of a tug on approximately 17 years and a renewal programme of around 3 tugs each year, a 
rapid change of propulsion system is possible for their new builds. 
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7.11 Tian San Shipping Ltd 
Name: Ho Sow Wah 
 
Position: Director and General Manager 
Company: Tian San Shipping Ltd 
Industry: Ship owner 
Tian San Shipping is one of the largest harbor craft operators in Singapore and has been operating in 
the country for more than 40 years. Their fleet consists of passenger ferries, Ro-Ro carriers, 
passenger launches and flotsam services. The company has its main hub in Singapore, and has an 
own shipyard where they can dock the fleet, perform repairs, maintenance and bunkering.  
Tian San Shippings main business is to operate passenger and vehicle ferries. The company also 
operates boats on the behalf of the government and large multinational companies across a range of 
industries. Their entire fleet is running on high-speed engines using diesel as propulsion fuel. Tian 
San Shipping believes it will take time before we see conversion to LNG as a marine fuel. The use of 
LPG on vehicles has not been a success in the region. Tian San Shipping believes the same trend will 
be applicable concerning LNG as a marine fuel and therefore it will take some time before 
conversion to LNG.  
 
 
Mr. Wah means green initiatives are good, but the government must take the lead. Tian San 
Shipping has a strong focus on the environment and ensures that their vessels are catered for low 
emissions. Moreover, it is crucial to ensure supply and availability through distribution of LNG. This 
must be communicated, before Tian San Shipping could do any investment. Also, safety comes first, 
Figure 39: A Tian San Shipping ferry 
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and the use of LNG as a marine fuel must be safe and reliable. Tian San Shipping has always been 
focused on safety, and has received multiple safety and service awards. The company was the first 
local ferry operator to integrate safety and quality management systems in the region. Although Tian 
San Shipping continually upgrade their fleet to keep abreast of the latest maritime regulatory 
requirements and technological advances. As a consequence of the constraints, Tian San Shipping 
will not be a first mover. 
Tian San Shipping believes Singapore is too small to be viable for LNG. Safety is extremely important, 
and Singapore cannot have the risk of any explosions in the densely populated areas. Norway is 
much larger, and it is safer to use LNG over there. Another limitation of LNG is the pricing of the fuel. 
A success factor in the region is commercial prices and not any fixed long-term prices.  
Tian San Shipping strongly believes Indonesia and Japan are better markets for LNG as a marine fuel. 
Indonesia has a lot of gas production and reserves, and it is a large country consisting of many 
islands. Japan is also a suitable country for LNG as it has the size and already imports a lot of LNG for 
power supply.  
The increased CAPEX on the engine is not a huge problem, but for Tian San Shipping availability, no 
lost time due to more frequent bunkering or limited available bunker points is crucial. The company 
strongly emphasizes the vessel’s operations and costs, in addition to maintenance when choosing 
engines. If distribution comes in place in Southeast Asia, it is possible for Tian San Shipping to 
consider this LNG engines in the future.  
In conclusion, Tian San Shipping believes any vessel has the potential to use LNG as long as the retail 
availability and safety are put in place.  
 
Figure 40: The authors and the interviewees at the Tian San Shipping’s own dock 
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8 Discussion of theoretical propositions 
This section discusses the theoretical propositions outlined in Chapter 4. The basis for the discussion 
is the extensive data collection from expert interviews presented in Chapter 7 alongside with 
empirical data from the country risk assessment. In addition, news articles and conference 
proceedings have been used to gain valuable insight. The purpose of the analysis is to clarify 
appropriate strategic choices for the internationalization processes of LNG-technology. In the next 
chapter, we will use this analysis to compose a comprehensive export strategy for the Norwegian 
maritime industry towards Southeast Asia. Table 22 summarizes the interviewee’s attitudes on 
different issues relevant for this chapter. 
Table 22: Summary of interviewee’s opinions 
Interviewees LNG-propulsion 
Recommended 
Southeast Asian 
countries 
Preferred 
entry mode 
Business advise 
in Southeast 
Asia 
Rolls-Royce 
Marine Norway 
Positive Singapore Case specific Build personal 
relations 
Rolls-Royce 
Marine Singapore 
Neutral, worried 
about price 
Singapore, Indonesia Case specific Build personal 
relations 
Masterbulk Ltd Positive Singapore, Philippines Contractual Networking 
Tian San Shipping Negative Singapore, Malaysia Greenfield Trust 
Höegh LNG Negative Singapore, Indonesia Joint Ventures Be present in the 
region 
PSA Marine Neutral, worried 
about technical 
aspects 
Singapore, Thailand,  Greenfield Trust 
North Sea 
Container Lines 
Positive Singapore, Indonesia Case specific Learn how to avoid 
corruption 
DNV Positive All nations Greenfield Build personal 
relations 
Innovation 
Norway 
Positive Singapore, Indonesia Case specific Be present in the 
region 
Aibel -  Singapore Greenfield Build personal 
relations 
DNB Bank Negative - Greenfield No specific 
8.1 Proposition 1 
A critical success factor in the Southeast Asian markets is to identify institutional voids by mapping 
the country’s context, and make strategic choices based on this analysis. LNG-propulsion is an 
immature technology and a pure market analysis may ignore government initiatives. A MNC can 
adapt its own business strategy, it can try to change the operational context or it can stay away from 
the market.  
A critical success factor in emerging markets is to identify institutional voids by mapping the 
country’s context, and make strategic choices based on this analysis (Khanna, et al., 2005). We early 
addressed a study from London &Hart (2004) stating that Western-style strategies are unsuitable for 
undeveloped economies. Based upon the expert interviews and the country risk assessment, we will 
in the following section use the framework to Khanna et al. (2005) to discuss which countries in 
Southeast Asia Rolls-Royce should target, and the belonging appropriate strategic choices.  
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The LNG-propulsion market is immature, and this affects the strategic decisions (Løset & Tveten, 
2011). The thesis recommends to target the point of attack and to assemble the innovation force, 
which is an analogy for launching new technology in a niche market. Converted to the LNG-
propulsion market this means that supporters of LNG need to focus attention towards specific 
countries rather than the entire Southeast Asian region. We will therefore start this section by 
drawing attention to what countries Rolls-Royce Marine should target.       
Gas-producing Southeast Asian countries 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines have seen a strong economic growth the last 
decade and the growth is projected to last throughout 2016. With a total population of 466 millions, 
long coastlines and 55 % of the ships in the region, the market is huge. Indonesia and Malaysia are 
also the main contributors to the gas reserves in the region, with approximately 84 % of the region’s 
total proven reserves. Although the country risk assessment and the market analysis presented in 
Chapter 2 gave us valuable insight about the Southeast Asian market, quantitative data is not 
enough to get a comprehensive and sufficient view of a country. According to Khanna et al. (2005), 
political and social systems, openness, product markets, labor and capital markets are all factors that 
need to be assessed. The wide range of interviews enables us to carry through such an analysis to 
see how companies are affected by operating in different countries in the region.  
Framework for mapping a country’s context (Khanna, et al., 2005) 
Political and social systems Openness Product markets Labor markets Capital markets 
We primarily interviewed Norwegian firms established in Singapore. They all thought presence in the 
region is an absolute necessity to do business in Southeast Asia. In general, companies operating 
from Norway are not responsive enough and do not show enough commitment to succeed in the 
region (Rensvik & Skram, 2012). In the Asian business culture, personal relations, mutual trust and 
loyalty are vital elements in business. It is more time consuming and usually involves a lot of 
meetings and activity together with the customers to do business in Southeast Asian (Vigeland, 
2012). Therefore presence in the region is highly emphasized by all the interviewed firms. 
Singapore 
Singapore is a very attractive country to establish business in, not only because of its central 
strategic location, but mainly because of a good business environment. The government in 
Singapore is stable, but also effective and facilitates for international business with a beneficial tax 
regime and subsidies to new ventures. By being centrally located in Singapore you could easily serve 
the entire region as a hub (Steen, 2012) (Wisløff, 2012). Compared to Norway they have low labor 
costs combined with skilled engineering resources are available in the region, and work permits are 
easy to acquire (Vigeland, 2012). It will probably be vital to facilitate and provide LNG as a marine 
fuel in Singapore first, before entering other countries in the region. Only when the Singapore 
authorities are convinced, the development could boom (Preststulen, 2012).  
With the new import terminal on Jurong Island, Singapore will be the LNG-hub for the region. It is a 
huge investment, but LNG will play a vital role in the energy mix as they establish energy security for 
the future (Fuglerud, 2012). The terminal will also facilitate for LNG as a bunker fuel, but the 
development could only start when LNG is available (Rensvik & Skram, 2012). Khanna et al. (2005) 
consider that MNCs are powerful enough to affect the context in which they operate. MNC’s like 
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huge oil and gas companies, shipping operators, environmental organizations and engine 
manufacturers could change regulations, support schemes and initiatives towards green shipping.  
Not surprisingly, the interviewees confirmed the country risk assessment, which pointed out 
Singapore as the easiest country to operate within. The country is highly developed, has a stable 
political system and corruption is almost absent. We recommend LNG supporters to affect and 
change the context in Singapore. The government has initiated JIPs on technical and commercial 
aspects on LNG-fuelling where companies are invited to attend. This is an opportunity to form the 
standards and progress of LNG as a marine fuel. 
Indonesia 
The CEO of NCL, Tom Preststulen, states that Indonesia has the largest potential in the region for 
small-scale LNG-projects in power plants and as a bunker fuel. The country consists of a many islands 
with a limited gas pipeline infrastructure and the country has the largest gas reserves in the region. 
The underdeveloped infrastructure in Eastern Indonesia, lack of gas pipelines and roads, make small-
scale LNG suitable (Fuglerud, 2012). Huge stranded areas of gas are ready for extraction and 
production of LNG using new and available technology. There are now planned some small-scale 
LNG projects in Indonesia, and two re-gasification terminals are under construction. This will 
increase the development and the domestic consumption of the country’s huge gas reserves 
(Rensvik & Skram, 2012). Rensvik also emphasizes that some Norwegian companies have already 
established business in Indonesia, and Innovation Norway will establish an office in Jakarta in June 
2012. The environmental focus is also increasing, Indonesia has committed itself to cut greenhouse 
gas emissions by 26 % from the business as usual level by 2020 (Shirodkar & Kunal Rana, 2009).   
Extensive red tape and corruption is anyhow making huge investments more risky for a MNC. Since 
Rolls-Royce has strong focus on avoiding corruption, this can prevent investment and the 
development in potential huge markets. In Indonesia, foreign investors cannot have the largest post; 
however silent partnership can solve this issue (Rensvik & Skram, 2012). We consider Indonesia as a 
business opportunity, because corruption can be avoided by adapting your entry strategies and 
having strong focus on ethical guidelines. Tailored strategies could also reduce uncertainty, and the 
effects of economic and political shocks (Preststulen, 2012). 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam have huge potential (Preststulen, 2012), the 
countries are all in desperate need for energy. As presented in the country risk assessment, they 
have seen a strong economic growth. In other countries in the region, contractual disagreements 
can be very challenging for international ventures (Steen, 2012). The Philippines is a republic with a 
weak legal system. Property rights are poorly protected and they are ranked as 129th in the world on 
the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2012). Vietnam has a lot of shipping 
and ship yards, but business is time consuming.  Extensive red tape and corruption, makes the 
business environment demanding (Fuglerud, 2012).  
As for today, we recommend Rolls-Royce Marine to stay away from these countries. However, the 
potential is huge, and timing will be a crucial factor. Consequently, to enter Malaysia, The 
Philippines, Thailand or Vietnam with LNG-propulsion technology might be relevant in the future.  
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Table 23: A summary of mapping of relevant countries in the Southeast Asian region 
Country Key facts Recommended strategy for LNG-propulsion 
Indonesia Population: 247 
millions 
GDP: $1121 billion 
(PPP) 
Economic growth:  
6,40 % 
Adapt 
your 
strategies 
Indonesia is by most interviewees highlighted as the 
most promising market for LNG-technology, but it takes 
adaption of traditional strategy to enter the country due 
to red tape, poor property rights and corruption.  
Malaysia Population: 29 millions 
GDP: $447 billion (PPP) 
Economic growth:  
5,20 % 
Stay 
away 
Only one interviewee pointed at Malaysia as a potential 
market. Lack of government initiatives towards LNG as a 
marine fuel combined with limited shipping implies to 
stay away. 
Philippines Population: 102 
millions 
GDP: $393 billion (PPP) 
Economic growth:  
4,70 % 
Stay 
away 
The Philippines were not mentioned by any 
interviewees as the government takes few green 
initiatives, and the technological development is slow 
Singapore Population: 4,7 millions 
GDP: $315 billion (PPP) 
Economic growth:  
5,30 % 
Change 
the 
context 
Singapore is probably the first market to adapt LNG as a 
marine fuel. A LNG-terminal is finished in 2013; the 
government has taken a green initiative and initiated a 
JIP on LNG-propulsion, implying that a market will arise. 
There is an opportunity to define how this market will 
evolve through participation in government JIPs 
Thailand Population: 67 millions 
GDP: $610 billion (PPP) 
Economic growth:  
1,50 % 
Stay 
away 
Thailand were highlighted by only a few interviewees as 
the shipping market is relatively small, and the 
government has taken few green initiatives 
Vietnam Population: 91 millions 
GDP: $229 billion (PPP) 
Economic growth:  
5,80 % 
Stay 
away 
Vietnam has extensive red tape and corruption, and a 
demanding business environment. LNG might be a part 
of their energy mix in the near future, but for ethical 
reasons, this market is a challenge 
According to Hoskisson et al. (2000) the internationalization strategies are affected by the 
characteristics of the market context in which firms operates. It has been evident how institutions 
can facilitate for development of technology, by reducing uncertainty and enhance stability like 
authorities in Singapore. Consequently, Indonesia which has the largest market potential is not the 
most profitable market in a short-term perspective. This is because Singapore has a proactive and 
stable government, with reducing the transaction and information costs. 
Proposition 1 can be confirmed by our data analysis. A pure market potential analysis would ignore 
government initiatives in Singapore, which makes it a far more attractive market than any other 
country. Moreover, the three choices – adapt your strategies, change the context, and stay away – 
seem reasonable, however extremely simplified. In Section 8.3, we will clarify appropriate strategic 
choices for the internationalization of LNG technology. 
8.2 Proposition 2a 
In Southeast Asian markets firms are most likely to select the optimal entry mode by analyzing the 
country specific context. There is a risk that firms are overemphasizing the analysis of transaction 
costs associated with the foreign market entry, at the expense of analyzing institutional voids and the 
required resources needed to manage them.  
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The theory presented in Section 4.3, about entry strategies for emerging markets, indicated that 
institutional theory and the resource-based view are most relevant in finding the optimal entry 
strategy. Mayer et al. (2009) states that the entry strategy is largely affected by the host country, 
and that transaction cost economics are insufficient in accounting all the macro-level factors. This is 
even more evident for MNCs operating in emerging countries, where country risk is major factor. A 
challenge for the MNCs operating in several different markets could be to adjust and have different 
entry modes in different markets. By using the interviewed data we will in this section examine if 
Norwegian firms is overemphasizing the analysis of transaction costs associated with foreign market 
entry. 
Rolls-Royce considers the market potential for LNG in Southeast Asia to be huge. They have now 
invested heavily into marketing and sales of LNG solutions in Singapore. Rolls-Royce is targeting 
Singapore as the first country in the region, mainly because of the market opportunity. Specifically 
for LNG as a marine fuel, institutional voids are extremely important. Singapore has a strong 
institutional framework, Vietnam the opposite, while Indonesia has a medium degree. The 
authorities in the region must be willing to invest into new bunkering infrastructure to create the 
market opportunities for LNG (Stensaker, 2012). In Singapore the Maritime Port Authority (MPA) 
gives financial support to green shipping and environmental friendly technology. LNG infrastructure 
is being built and JIPs are working with bunkering standards. The government in Singapore has with 
these actions created favorable conditions for LNG in a long-term perspective.  
In Indonesia, Rolls-Royce has not yet invested in marketing of LNG technology, although the market 
potential is considered the largest in the region. Stensaker argues that a stable political regime is 
almost crucial. Rolls-Royce has high ethical standards for our business, and these could prevent 
investment and development (Chia, 2012). Nothing indicates that Rolls-Royce does overemphasize 
the micro level factors. In the many emerging countries in the region, they have not done any 
investment targeting the LNG market so far. Although these countries have huge market potential, 
there are major uncertainties with the institutional factors, the timing and the progress in these 
projects. An example is the planed small-scale LNG terminals in Indonesia, which one of our 
interviews doubted (Wisløff, 2012). Even if institutional voids might lead to extensive transaction 
costs, we consider the potential in Indonesia to be great. Several uncertainty factors are present, 
which demand tailored strategies.   
DNV emphasizes micro level factors higher, but still institutional theory and resourced-based view 
are highly evident. When DNV consider different countries, they first assess the market potential, 
than the business environment (Fuglerud, 2012).  DNV also considers Indonesia to have the largest 
market potential, but the degree of institutions and stability, inhabit the development. In Aibel’s 
case, the main reason for the entry in Southeast Asia was skilled resources. In Singapore and 
Thailand, Aibel employs high-skilled competence from all over the region to a reasonable price. The 
strategic location combined with macro levels factors, favored Singapore.       
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Figure 41: The theoretical focus of Rolls-Royce Marine in internationalization  
The proposition addresses the concern that firms are overemphasizing the country specific context 
and the analysis of transaction costs in emerging markets. Our assessment of Rolls-Royce Marine’s 
activity in Southeast Asia, demonstrates that their activity is balancing micro and macro factors well. 
The actions are consistent with the theory, both country specific, resource-based and institutional 
view are clearly evident in Rolls-Royce assessment when they consider entry modes.       
8.3 Proposition 2b 
Based on the theoretical framework by Meyer et al. (2009) and our country risk assessment, 
appropriate entry modes can be outlined. Companies requiring access to local resources and mature 
markets can only do acquisitions in Singapore, while joint venture is recommended for all other 
markets in Southeast Asia. Where local resources are redundant Greenfield entry is recommended in 
all markets. 
Meyer et al. (2009) have developed their framework by combining survey and archival data from 
four different emerging economies, India, Vietnam, South Africa and Egypt. There is different risk 
and different level of control associated by various entry modes. To determine the appropriate one, 
the framework suggests to first analyzing the strength of the country’s institutional framework 
which implies the extent of market failure. Secondly the need for local resources should be 
determined to map the firm’s sensitivity to market failure. By combining these variables the 
framework suggest Greenfield entry, Joint Venture or acquisition. This section tests the validity of 
the framework. 
To investigate Proposition 2b, the strength of the institutional frameworks for the different countries 
assessed, has been classified. Singapore has a strong institutional framework as argued in Section 
8.1. Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand have medium institutional frameworks, each of 
them with its particular challenges. Vietnam, as shown in the last section, has significant challenges 
related to corruption implying a weak institutional framework. To assess the validity of the model by 
Meyer et al. (2009), we have used the case company Rolls-Royce Marine and mapped their need for 
local resources. 
Rolls-Royce Marine has their Asian headquarter and hub for aftermarket services in Singapore. In 
this market they have a high need for local resources (Stensaker, 2012). In other countries where 
they primarily want to increase revenues through sales, Rolls-Royce Marine has enough competence 
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within its organization which implies a low need for local resources. The exception is Indonesia 
which is a large market where local personnel is required in order to get the license to operate 
(Rensvik & Skram, 2012). Accordingly, Rolls-Royce Marine has a medium resource need. This analysis 
is presented in Figure 42. 
  
Figure 42: A classification Rolls-Royce’s need for local resources combined with the region’s institutional framework 
By placing the Southeast Asian countries combined with the resources needed by Rolls-Royce in 
each market, in the framework by Meyer et al. (2009), we get appropriate entry modes for each 
market. According to the framework, the following entry modes are recommended: 
 Greenfield: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam 
 JV: Indonesia 
 Acquisition: Singapore 
Rolls-Royce varies the chosen entry mode across the entire enterprise (Stensaker, 2012). However, 
the Marine division that is our case has mainly applied acquisitions. In contrast, the framework by 
Meyer et al. (2009) focus on Greenfield entry in all markets with low resource needs. It does not 
necessarily have to be a contradiction as the Marine division strongly varies on the extent of 
internationalization through foreign market entries. Nevertheless, it is reason to believe that firm 
specific routines and experiences will deviate from the model, as it does with Rolls-Royce Marine. 
The model by Meyer et al. (2009) also recommends Greenfield entry and Joint Ventures when 
entering into Indonesia. According to Indonesian law, foreign companies are not allowed to do such 
entries as an Indonesian partner must be the majority share owner (Rensvik & Skram, 2012). This 
means only Joint Ventures can be applied when entering Indonesia. It might be the thesis author’s 
assessment of the Indonesian institutional framework that is wrong, but it is fair to say that Meyer et 
al.’s model will be invalid for some countries where specific laws determine the entry mode.  
Greenfield 
Joint Venture 
Acquisition 
Greenfield 
Greenfield 
Joint Venture 
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Data analysis of Proposition 2b can tell us primarily two things. Firstly Rolls-Royce Marine can 
without any significant risk consider using other entry modes than acquisitions in emerging markets. 
By mapping a country’s context as suggested by Khanna et al. (2005) other relevant entry modes can 
be identified assisted by the framework of Meyer et al. (2009). The second learning of this data 
analysis is a large uncertainty related to the accuracy of Meyer et al.’s model. Accordingly, the model 
should be used as an instructive tool, not a decisive one – unless it is extended and improved by new 
research.  
8.4 Proposition 3a 
In China, the choice of collaborative design of an alliance relies on the specific investment case, with 
variables such as level of government, scale of operation, cultural dimensions and the host country’s 
experience with foreign investments. The model is applicable for the Southeast Asian region. 
Tse et al. (1997) developed a model showing key decision variables that determines the choice of 
collaborative design when entering China, based on empirical data. It suggests that experience with 
attracting foreign investor, home country factors such as cultural dimensions and industry specific 
factors such as scale of operations, affects the choice of entry mode. In most cases, Western 
companies chose to enter China with a home country partner or with a Hong Kong-based partner, 
while Chinese partners often were avoided. In this section we will see if the model is applicable for 
Southeast Asia by using interviewee information on alliances. 
Alliances are established for many reasons, but always with an intension of mutual return from the 
collaboration. Most interviewees were familiar with alliances, but very few applied them. DNV is an 
enterprise based on intangible knowledge, and they enter most markets solely based on organic 
growth (Fuglerud, 2012). Rolls-Royce Marine has expanded either by acquisitions or organic growth 
in the region (Stensaker, 2012). Höegh LNG, Aibel and DNB entered the region by organic growth 
(Wisløff, 2012). Accordingly, there is obviously less fear in doing Foreign Direct Investments in 
Southeast Asia and rely on market transactions compared to China. 
Even though our sample firms entered Southeast Asia and specifically Singapore without an alliance 
partner, they have entered into alliances on a product level. Aibel cooperate with partners that 
extend their own product line either by adding other capabilities or capacity they does not possess 
(Vigeland, 2012). Strategic alliances are settled on a top management level, and many of the 
contractual agreements are Joint Ventures with local partners in relevant Southeast Asian countries. 
Rolls-Royce Marine has several Memorandum of Understandings with partners that similar to Aibel, 
complements their product line (Chia, 2012). Such collaborative designs are made irrespectively of 
country origin, as long as it is without corruption or any other ethical disruptions. Consequently, 
firms seem less risk adverse in contracting with partners in Southeast Asia than in China. 
Innovation Norway helps several Norwegian companies by finding appropriate partners in Southeast 
Asia (Rensvik & Skram, 2012). Local partners might be an easy way to access local knowledge and 
skilled resources, but they must be thoroughly assessed. Agents often have conflicting interests 
among clients, which can be a costly affair if a contract already is settled. According to Rensvik 
mergers and acquisitions are even more risky and costly, but are equivalently efficient in accessing 
the local market. The experience from Norwegian international business specialists indicates 
complicated partner selection processes, but at the same time partners are widely available. Again, 
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Southeast Asia seems to contrast China when it comes to number of available partners according to 
the model by Tse et al. (1997). 
All features of Proposition 3a can be rejected according to our data analysis. The mentioned factors 
for deciding collaborative agreements with alliance partners are applicable, but no suggested 
outcome is relevant to the Southeast Asian market. The missing applicability of Tse et al.’s (1997) 
model can be explained two ways. First, the business environment in Southeast Asia deviates from 
the Chinese. Alternatively, Tse et al.’s (1997) model is outdated and need updated empirical data to 
be valid. In any case, the ideal collaborative agreement in alliances need more research. 
8.5 Proposition 3b 
There is disagreement in the literature on which degree of internationalization that gives the highest 
return on assets. A weakness of the research is a missing link to timing of market entry. There is 
however agreement upon the positive effect between the ability to share knowledge with business 
partners and profitability. 
Multiple researchers have tried to identify correlations between Return on Assets (ROA) and 
different aspects regarding internationalization. Empirical data suggest there is highest ROA on low 
and high (DOI) degrees of internationalization (Ruigrok & Wagner, 2003). Other analytical findings 
indicate the highest ROA at low and high degree of (API) alliance portfolio internationalization (Lavie 
& Miller, 2008). More general findings imply that knowledge sharing is crucial for ROA in alliances 
and MNCs (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003). There is contradiction in some of this literature as high DOI 
and API often is correlated, as with Rolls-Royce that is collaborating with truly internationalized 
partners. It is the author’s hypothesis that timing of the foreign market entry is more crucial to 
companies than DOI and API. In this section we will use our interviewees’ experience and financial 
performance in order to test the claim. 
It is hard to challenge this claim solely based on qualitative interview data. Therefore the ROA has 
been estimated for the four Norwegian firms in our sample that has internationalized towards 
Southeast Asia. Since the absolute number of ROA may vary across industries we have estimated the 
profit margin of the same companies as well, in order to analyze any differences and learning from 
the sample.     
 
Figure 43: The ROA for Aibel, DNV, Höegh LNG and Rolls-Royce Marine the last five years (Proff, 2012)  
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Figure 43 shows that the ROA is deviating for Aibel, DNV and in particular, Höegh LNG. Höegh LNG is 
investing heavily into new assets as they are currently building a FSRU, which creates the strongly 
fluctuating curve (Wisløff, 2012). Aibel has expanded quickly the last years, but the ROA has been 
constantly falling from 2007 to 2010, which is corresponding to the curve outlined by Ruigrok & 
Wagner (2003). However, even though they expand in Singapore, 90 % of the sales are to the 
Norwegian market (Vigeland, 2012). Accordingly, the increased ROA during 2011 is probably 
explained by increased activity in the oil & gas market. 
DNV and Rolls-Royce Marine have the most stable ROAs. This can be explained in multiple ways. 
Both enterprises are bigger companies in terms of revenues, and with a longer history. In any case, 
the curves outlined from DNV and Rolls-Royce Marine, are fluctuating around equilibrium, which is 
incoherent with both the relation between ROA and respectively DOI and API. Regardless of ROA, in 
a short-term perspective investors want the highest possible profit margin in order to maximize 
dividends or reinvestments into the firm. Our sample firms combined with interview data do not 
strengthen the relation between ROA, and DOI and API. Therefore, we will take a look into the profit 
margin to seek further knowledge on profitability and internationalization.  
 
Figure 44: ROA for Aibel, DNV, Höegh LNG and Rolls-Royce Marine the last five years (Proff, 2012) 
Figure 44 demonstrates the profit margins of our sample firms. DNV has a relatively stable profit 
margin that can be explained by the ownership structure. They are owned by a foundation that 
reinvests a certain amount of money each year, which stabilizes the financial performance (Fuglerud, 
2012). Höegh LNG had a low and stable profit margin, but had a loss in 20011, which can be 
attributed to large investments (Wisløff, 2012). 
Aibel and Rolls-Royce Marine have experienced large profit margin growth from 2008 until 2011. In 
the same periods, both companies have expanded internationally. Aibel established in Singapore to 
meet shortage of engineering competence in Norway, as well as a strategic location (Vigeland, 
2012). 90 % of the Singapore office serves the Norwegian offshore market. Rolls-Royce Marine has 
increased sales into markets by expanding their organization into new countries. Knowledge sharing 
has been a key variable for Aibel and Rolls-Royce Marine in seeking internationalization success.    
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Proposition 3b can be confirmed based on our interview data combined with secondary data. 
Relations between DOI, API and ROA will deviate across industries and countries subject to the 
study. However, timing of foreign market entries and knowledge sharing tend to be very important 
for profitability in all cases. Consequently, the function of timing in internationalization processes 
should be further investigated.  
8.6 Proposition 3c 
Business networks and alliances will give the highest return on investment if they are managed by 
relational-based governance involving trust, instead of focus on contractual factors. Asian business 
culture emphasizes long-term relations more than the European culture.   
In all alliances and MNCs the management seeks to find the most efficient governance structure. A 
comprehensive empirical study combined with interviews has suggested that relational-based 
governance structure is far more efficient in most perspectives than contractual-based governance 
(Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). Although contractual agreements often are foundations of alliances and 
collaborative agreements, relational-based governance has several advantages over contractual-
oriented management: 
 Mutual trust reduce transactions- and negotiations costs 
 Overemphasizing contracts easily implies conflicts regarding interpreting them 
 Trust is a foundation for learning and knowledge sharing between business partners 
 In times of environmental turbulence, dependence on contracts alone is risky 
This section deals with the issue of governance style in alliances. The theory suggest to emphasize 
developing strong relations as they are more resistant to environmental turbulence and reduce 
transaction costs. The process of selecting partners is complicated and time consuming (Rensvik & 
Skram, 2012). Innovation Norway has described the dilemma of agents with conflicting customer 
relationships. Consequently, although juridical solid contracts are signed, there is no guarantee the 
business relationship will be profitable.  
Table 22 presented at the introduction of Chapter 8 summarizes key business advice specifically for 
Singapore and Southeast Asia. Physical presence in the region, building long-term relationships and 
trust, and attend networking events are the recurring message from all interviewees. It is a unison 
message that long-term relationship building, physical meetings and trust are more emphasized 
factors in the Asian business culture compared to the Norwegian. This indicates that Proposition 3c 
is valid, but we will analyze more data before we conclude.  
Masterbulk points at a very good business culture in Singapore with almost complete absence of 
corruption. Nevertheless, long-term relations are required in order to make good deals (Steen, 
2012). To enter into business deals are generally more time consuming in Asia (Vigeland, 2012). To 
succeed with business in the region, it is important to have access to appropriate, efficient and 
experienced networks and relationships in order to obtain the necessary licenses and approvals to 
operate (Preststulen, 2012). It becomes evident that business relations are crucial to get deals and to 
govern them, in Southeast Asia. 
Proposition 3c suggest that business alliances should have relational-based governance. Moreover, it 
propose that long-term relations involving trust is more important to get business in Asian culture 
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compared to the European. Based on our data analysis, both claims can be approved. Consequently, 
Norwegian firms should establish in Southeast Asia in order to build necessary business relations.    
8.7 Proposition 4 
The timing of market entry is significantly related to the return on assets. Early market entry is 
preferred when the expected returns offset the risk associated, and laggard entrant strategy is 
applicable when the expected returns are uncertain. Timing is more important for return on assets 
than degree of internationalization and alliance portfolio internationalization. 
The decision of entry time into new markets is a strategic, qualitative decision and a tactical, 
quantitative decision (Lilien & Yoon, 1990). Several firm-specific factors, industry and market factors 
and host country factors influence the timing decision. Moreover, the entry timing is correlated to 
financial performance (Gaba, et al., 2002). In this section, we seek to identify the awareness of 
timing among interviewees’ foreign market entry decisions and the link to financial performance.  
 
Figure 45 presents the market share in the Norwegian LNG-fueled fleet by DNV class. In terms of 
numbers, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) has the largest market share followed by respectively 
Rolls-Royce Marine and Wärtsila. An explanation could be the early launch of Mitsubishis High-
Pressure Direct Injection concept. The market really started to boom in 2006, but still MHI has most 
engines contracted. The experience from the Norwegian LNG-propulsion market clearly shows that it 
is important to be early in the market if the expected returns are high and the associated risk 
acceptable. 
In Section 8.6 we verified the importance of building long-term relationships if a firm wants to 
succeed in Southeast Asia. That is a first sign that if a market starts to evolve a firm must be 
established already, in order to keep up with its competitors. Several interviewees confirmed the 
importance of being settled with an office in Singapore when the market for LNG-propulsion starts 
to grow. If the LNG-market booms, the Norwegian companies must be established in the region with 
strong relationships built on trust to be preferred by local partners (Rensvik & Skram, 2012). One of 
the reasons is that the development will go very fast ones the market is settled (Steen, 2012). It 
becomes evident that Norwegian enterprises that want to capitalize on LNG-propulsion in Southeast 
Asia must establish before the market takes off.  
Figure 45: Number and share of total LNG fueled vessels in operations in Norway (DNV, 2010) 
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Rolls-Royce Marine has already invested resources in the Singaporean market for LNG-propulsion. 
However, the Indonesian market has been highlighted as a very promising as well. Indonesia has an 
ideal topography for LNG as well as the largest market potential (Fuglerud, 2012). This view is 
supported by NCL (Preststulen, 2012). Tian San Shipping headquartered in Singapore also believes 
Indonesia will be a stronger market (Wah, 2012). Rolls-Royce Singapore has already identified the 
Indonesia as the next potential market (Chia, 2012). Therefore Rolls-Royce Marine should launch an 
Indonesian campaign shortly. As discussed in Section 8.1, business in Indonesia is time consuming 
due to red tape, ownership rules and other bureaucracy. An early focus on Indonesia is 
recommended to ensure product availability in the market when LNG-propulsion becomes popular.   
Proposition 4 claims that timing is more important for profits than DOI and API. Figure 44 in Section 
8.5 showed a growing profit margin for Aibel and Rolls-Royce Marine from 2008 to 2011. As with the 
increased ROA showed in Figure 43, a boom in the oil & gas-industry has been beneficial to both 
companies. Rolls-Royce Marine has met increased demand from the OSV-segment due to flexible 
capacity. Aibel has grown in Singapore in times where access to sufficient competence and 
knowledge has been crucial (Vigeland, 2012). Although the interviews give qualitative indication that 
timing in a larger sense than internationalization ratios define profitability, we lack empirical data to 
support the claim. 
It is clear that firms should focus less on its degree of internationalization and alliance portfolio with 
respect the return of assets. Proposition 4 contains three claims. Firstly, timing of market entry is 
strongly related to ROA, which can be confirmed. Secondly, early market entry is preferred when the 
expected return offset the associated risk, which is a valid claim. Thirdly, the proposition claim 
timing to be more important than DOI and API. Our data indicates that this might be true, but this 
should be supported by empirical data. Consequently, the relation between timing of foreign entry 
and ROA and profit margin should be further investigated.  
8.8 Proposition 5  
A MNC must take differences in partner selection criterions between emerging and developed market 
contexts into account when choosing alliances abroad. Where emerging market firms demand 
financial, technical and intangible assets, developed market firms demand local market knowledge 
and unique competencies 
In general, firms seeking alliances and partners are focusing on complementary capabilities 
(Geiringer, 1991). Establishing business in emerging markets often require local knowledge, skills and 
special approval to operate. This could complicate business, and alliances and partners could be 
absolute crucial to overcome the obstacles. A study by Hitt et al. (2000) states that there are 
differences in partner selection between emerging- and developed market firms. Norwegian 
companies doing business in Southeast Asia should be aware this differences in order to optimize 
selections of partners. In this section we will test if Hitt et al.’s (2000) framework is valid in Southeast 
Asia, and test which factors that are important and apparent for partner selection in Southeast Asia.  
To succeed with business in the region, Preststulen highlights the importance of having access to 
appropriate, effective and experienced networks. All the interviewed firms considered partners and 
alliances to be vital in business in Southeast Asia. Such relationships and connections could be 
absolute necessary to get licenses and approvals to operate. Preststulen also states that acquisitions 
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and joint ventures will be essential when employing local labor and to bridge cultural differences. 
This could be a good solution to fast-track entries into booming markets in the region (Preststulen, 
2012).  
Aibel choose primarily partners that can expand their capabilities and expertise, and in addition give 
complementary synergies. In joint projects, relations and knowledge sharing are common. Delivering 
products with assistance of local partners could also lower the price of Aibel’s product, due to lower 
operating costs. In Southeast Asia the partner selection is usually more time consuming and involves 
a lot of meetings, compared to the European market (Vigeland, 2012).  Although Höegh does not 
have any formal alliances, local partners is very useful for them in accessing new markets (Wisløff, 
2012). 
Interviewees Emphasized/searching partner capability   
Preferred 
entry mode 
Rolls-Royce Marine Norway Complement capabilities, expand expertise Case specific 
Rolls-Royce Marine Singapore Knowledge sharing and business relations Case specific 
Masterbulk Ltd - Contractual 
Tian San Shipping Technical and intangible capabilities Greenfield 
Höegh LNG To access new markets Joint Ventures 
PSA Marine Technical and intangible capabilities Greenfield 
North Sea Container Lines Fast track entry, approval to operate Case specific 
DNV Influence and position Greenfield 
Innovation Norway - Case specific 
Aibel Expand capacity and expertise Greenfield 
DNB Markets - Greenfield 
DNV is the only firm we assessed that did not use partners or alliances directly, as they are an 
industry expert, classification and certification company (Fuglerud, 2012). DNV therefore need to 
have all expertise in house. Anyhow, DNV use JIP actively. By determine industry standards and 
procedure, they influence the development of LNG and achieve an attractive position in the market.  
Rolls-Royce has in the resent years used acquisitions mainly to expand expertise and access new 
market segments. In addition to this Rolls-Royce is a part in multiple JIP, and have used it actively to 
build business relations. Within the LNG-segment alliances are especially important, mainly because 
Rolls-Royce need to contribute to complete the LNG value chain. Through JIP, Rolls-Royce is also in 
the position to push technology development and influence decision makers directly (Stensaker, 
2012).    
Innovation Norway expresses how important the JIP will be for the supporters of LNG in the region. 
By sharing experiences from Norway with the Southeast Asia market, the development and 
understanding of LNG will increase. It is also necessary to establish relations and a strong position 
when the market starts to evolve. In some countries like Indonesia, partners are necessary to get 
license to operate (Rensvik & Skram, 2012).  
Both PSA and Tian San Shipping operates from Singapore, which is a highly developed market. Still, 
they have business and activities in emerging countries, in addition to cooperation and alliances with 
firms operating there. Our data about criteria for partner selection among emerging market firms 
are limited. Both Tian San Shipping and PSA have an open tender system, where technical 
capabilities are one of the success criteria when ordering ships. Intangible assets, like knowledge and 
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expertise will probably be an important criterion for selecting partners for firms with limited 
experience with LNG.   
Table 24: Differences and similarities in partner selection between emerging and developed markets 
 Partner selection criterions in emerging and developed market contexts 
Similarities in both 
markets contexts 
Differences between the market contexts 
Emerging market firms Developed market firms 
Firms in both markets 
equally emphasize 
managerial capabilities 
as a criterion 
Firms in both markets 
equally emphasize 
complementary 
capabilities as a 
criterion 
More strongly 
emphasize financial  
assets 
More strongly 
emphasize technical 
capabilities 
More strongly 
emphasize 
intangible assets 
Evident 
 
 
Evident 
 
 
Evident 
More strongly 
emphasize local 
market knowledge 
and market access 
More strongly 
emphasize the 
possession of unique 
competencies 
Confirmed 
 
 
 
Evident in some 
degree 
The interviewed firms indicated some variances between the markets and economies in the factors 
influencing partner selections. The Norwegian firms confirmed Hitt el al.’s factors, and strongly 
emphasize the importance of market access, local knowledge and expand expertise. Especially in 
emerging markets are alliances and partners vital for them to get special approval to operate and 
bridge cultural differences. In general, the Norwegian firms also seek complementary capabilities, 
and fast track entry with alliances and partners. For LNG supporters, alliances and partnership will be 
extra important to increase knowledge and understanding of LNG. Norwegian firms have years of 
experience, which will also favor local operator in Southeast Asia.  
8.9 Proposition 6a 
Countries tend to protect industries that are weak, on a decline and political important. Gathered 
data indicates that the LNG-market is strong and growing, but political important. Consequently, the 
LNG-market will not be protected, but still affected by government politics. 
By using data from trade flows, production and trade barriers for 41 countries, including several 
ASEAN-countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, The Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia, it is proven 
that countries tend to protect industries that are weak, on a decline and political important (Lee & 
Swagel, 1997). Data from Chapter 3 indicates that LNG is a strong industry. In this section we 
investigate the framework conditions for the LNG-market to validate or reject Proposition 6a. 
LNG has an inclining popularity in Southeast Asia (Bergöö, 2012). There is an endless demand for 
LNG, and the market is only restricted by supply of LNG. There are several reasons why the market 
of LNG is so attractive. Firstly the economic growth in the region is up to 10 % a year, whilst the 
energy consumption growth is up to 30 %. The economic progress is limited by the access to energy, 
which makes LNG an attractive alternative as it is a flexible, transportable energy source. Secondly 
LNG is contributing to energy diversification. As an example, Singapore is completely energy 
dependent, and hence energy security increases by introducing LNG to the energy mix. Thirdly, and 
least important, LNG is a green alternative compared to coal. In total, the LNG-market is very 
promising as it ensures energy security, it is both emerging and political important. 
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For the purpose of this thesis it is important to determine of the consequences of LNG’s political 
importance. LNG as a marine fuel is an immature technology in Southeast Asia with several 
important barriers towards implementation. There is no infrastructure to ensure distribution of LNG 
as bunker, and it is hard to see who is willing to take the cost of investment (Bergöö, 2012). 
Naturally, ship owners need assurance that retail availability will arise before investing into LNG-
propulsion. Ship owners operating in Singapore point at the government as a necessary first pioneer 
(Wah, 2012). The government has established a Green Initiative to support environmental measures 
within shipping, and this must be extended to include contracting of a LNG-vessel. Rolls-Royce 
Marine hopes they will take a first step during 2014 (Chia, 2012). If the government takes the first 
step, it will be easier because very few wants to be the first mover (Tay & Menge, 2012). 
Consequently, the future of LNG-propulsion heavily depends on political measures, especially from 
the Singaporean government. 
Other barriers concern safety, rules and regulations of bunkering and operations with LNG as a 
bunker fuel. There is a perception of LNG as explosive and dangerous (Wah, 2012). This fear is 
irrational as LNG has excellent operational record (Løset & Tveten, 2011). However, rules and 
regulations that ensure safety must be put in place before retail availability of LNG can be invested 
into. Rolls-Royce Marine is active within a government initiated JIP that addresses this issue, and 
that is an important channel (Stensaker, 2012). In total, the government has many different roles in 
the LNG-propulsion market as summarized in Table 25 and their actions are very important for the 
future market outlook.   
Table 25: Barriers for LNG as a marine fuel and relevant political measures 
Barrier towards implementation of LNG as a 
fuel 
Relevant political measure 
 Contracting of a pioneer ship applying LNG 
as a marine fuel 
The Singaporean government can contract a 
harbor tug through its harbor tug shipping 
companies 
 Establishing retail availability for LNG as a 
marine fuel 
By establishing standards for fuelling of LNG, 
investments into retail infrastructure can be 
performed, either by the government itself or 
private investors 
 Applicable standards and regulations for 
bunkering and operations with LNG as a 
marine fuel 
The Singaporean government has initiated Joint 
Industry Projects to suggest standards and 
regulations for fuelling and bunkering. By 
enforcing the JIP-findings, the bunker fuel 
market can develop 
The LNG-industry is strong and growing. It is also extremely political important due to the 
importance of LNG in questions of economic growth and energy security. Particularly for LNG as a 
marine fuel, political measures are crucial. The government, at least in Singapore, can determine the 
start of a commercial market by actions related to rules, regulations and investments. Proposition 6a 
can be confirmed and strengthened, LNG-propulsion market strongly relies on government policy.    
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8.10 Proposition 6b  
Norwegian government trade promotion programs in Southeast Asia rely on outdated models of 
internationalization. A MNC in the region will benefit from international business development 
specialists more than the available national export advisors. 
The Norwegian government has like most governments in developed countries trade promotion 
programs to help firms enter new markets. Political barriers can inhabit the development, implying 
that support schemes, tax agreements and political relation can be crucial. This section first 
highlights the effect Norwegian companies have of trade promotion programs in Southeast Asia, and 
second evaluate if they are appropriate for a booming LNG market. 
Trade promotion initiatives aim to help host country firms to internationalize. A study of Crick & 
Jones (2000) state that trade promotion programs rely on outdated models of internationalization. 
They argue that many firms are international from the start-up, and do not follow incremental step 
of internationalization. Consequently, government trade support has to adapt to this change (Crick & 
Jones, 2000).    
With a new office opening in Indonesia in May 2012, Innovation Norway could serve Norwegian 
companies establishing in a booming LNG and gas market. As of today, Innovation Norway has 
offices in Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam. In the previous years, Innovation Norway has 
arranged many workshops and written reports on how Norwegian firms could target specific 
markets in Southeast Asia. They are focusing on the knowledge transfer from Norway, and how 
Norwegian companies could use several years of experience with LNG to establish and influence in a 
possible booming market.  
Chia (2012) states that Norway as a frontrunner of LNG-technology has to proof for the Southeast 
Asia market that the solution is viable. Knowledge and expertise after years of experience has to be 
spread to Southeast Asia. Chia suggests an independent information campaign and an information 
brochure to communicate the safety aspect to the market. PSA also emphasizes that their 
knowledge and experience with LNG is very limited, and due to uncertainties and absent guidelines 
from the government they are still very reluctant. To do any investments, the same measures are 
also critical for Tian San Shipping. Wah (2012) stated that green initiatives are good, but the 
government must take the lead.      
In Southeast Asia, Höegh LNG experienced that officials from the government can be very helpful in 
establishing relations and meetings on a high political level. In many of the emerging countries in the 
region diplomacy could be absolute necessary, and definitely more important in Southeast-Asia than 
in Western markets (Wisløff, 2012). Höegh LNG considers the help from the Royal Norwegian 
Embassy, Innovation Norway and INTSOK beneficial in the startup phase. Also, Masterbulk points out 
Innovation Norway could be a door opener for new entrants in the region. To get the licenses and 
approval to operate, Preststulen points out the importance of relationships and connections. This 
can partly be built through the assistance of Norwegian Embassies and Consulates, including support 
from Innovation Norway.  
Innovation Norway’s major attention on LNG as fuel in power plants and as bunker fuel indicates 
that they have a forward looking and emphasis a growing segment. Their actions are certainly 
contributing and stimulate growth of the LNG and the gas industry. The Royal Norwegian Embassy 
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and Innovation Norway are contributing with vital relations, which the Norwegian companies need 
to get the right licenses to operate in the emerging countries in Southeast Asia. There are indications 
that Innovation Norway use appropriate tools tailored to new models on internationalization. The 
model seems also reasonable and valid for emerging technologies like LNG as a marine fuel. 
Anyhow, a necessary next step is to increase the understanding and get rid of the unreasonable 
skepticism towards LNG in the region. Innovation Norway and the Royal Norwegian Embassy could 
affect this, since Norway is a pioneer and have experience with the LNG technology. In Section 9.3 
we will address inviting a delegation from the governments and authorities of Singapore to Norway 
for sharing experiences and knowledge. Although the potential and opportunities for LNG in the 
region are huge, it could only be realized with governments and authorities convinced. This action 
from the Royal Norwegian Embassy could influence and speed up the development of LNG as a 
marine fuel in Southeast Asia.   
By inviting a delegation consisting of officials from the Government of Singapore and Port 
Authorities to Norway, the understanding of LNG as a fuel will increase and the potential of this 
technology can be visualized. Investors and ship owners will not undertake the investment until 
governments in the Southeast Asian region are convinced. With the suggested method, the 
Singapore government will also signal increased focus on the environment. The action will not 
inhabit Singapore’s competiveness, and could contribute to maintain its leading position as a marine 
superpower in the future. If the invitation to the Singaporean authorities is accepted and the official 
delegation has positive effects, other nations in the region should be invited as well. According to 
Section 8.1, it is Indonesia that is most relevant to invite after Singapore. 
In the next chapter we will discuss the implications of findings throughout Chapter 8. We will group 
findings relevant to respectively managers, policy makers and further research. At the end of 
Chapter 9 conclusions are presented and final remarks given.  
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9 Implications of findings 
Chapter 8 presented a pattern matching of our data collection compared to the presented 
theoretical propositions. This chapter raises the horizon from the strategy of analyzing the 
propositions by doing pattern matching, and classifies and compares findings across the 
propositions. The purpose of this exercise is to identify appropriate strategic choices for the 
Norwegian maritime sector that will lead to successful exporting of LNG-technology to Southeast 
Asian market. The analysis of findings will focus on both product specific characteristics and the 
internationalization processes. The export strategy has been made with Rolls-Royce Marine as a 
single case, but the results can be generalized and applicable for other Norwegian companies that 
are targeting the LNG-market in Southeast Asia. 
Table 26: A summary of findings in the analysis of theoretical propositions 
Proposition Result 
1 MNCs should enter Singapore and try to change the context, and thereupon enter Indonesia 
by adapting its strategies. We have focused on the ASEAN-six + Vietnam countries, meaning 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam 
2a By analyzing the interviewed firms, with a particular focus on Rolls-Royce and DNV, it appears 
that large MNCs balance the focus on institutional framework and transaction costs well. 
2b Meyer et al.’s (2009) model for deciding entry mode into emerging markets are too simplified 
and not applicable for foreign market entries in ASEAN-countries. Institutional voids need 
increased focus when deciding entry mode. 
3a The choice of collaborative agreement in alliances are case specific, and Tse et al.’s (1997) 
model is not valid for the ASEAN-markets 
3b Knowledge sharing is crucial in business alliances and MNCs. We find no causal link between 
the firm’s degree of internationalization and alliance portfolio internationalization and return 
on assets. More research is needed to measure the effect of timing on return on assets. 
3c Relational-based governance structure is better than contractual-based governance in 
managing alliances. Relations and trust are crucial in the Southeast Asian business. 
4 We have qualitative indication that timing is more important to return on assets than other 
measures related to internationalization.  
5 Partner selection is a crucial task when selecting alliances in Southeast Asia and cultural 
differences must be taken into account in this process. 
6a The LNG-market relies on government politics in the ASEAN-countries, such as rules and 
regulations for bunkering and operations. 
6b Government trade initiatives have a positive effect for Norwegian companies in ASEAN 
countries. Innovation Norway has a crucial role as door openers and relational-builders. 
9.1 Price will determine the future of LNG-propulsion in Southeast Asia 
LNG as a marine fuel is a technology with an enormous potential. The bunker fuel market is large 
with a daily supply of four million barrels (mbd). A transition from Heavy Fuel Oil or Marine 
Diesel/Gas Oil to LNG will have spin-off effects for multiple suppliers; engine manufacturers, ship 
designers, marine equipment producers and tank manufacturers, as well as ship owners, producers 
and distributors of LNG. Consequently, if the market for LNG as bunker fuel takes off, many 
companies must be positioned to meet the demand. This section presents the key variables that will 
determine the technological development in the bunker fuel market. 
Løset & Tveten (2011) outlined a model that described the two most important determinants that 
will shape the future potential of LNG as a bunker fuel. The data collection was primarily built on 
97 
 
European sources of evidence, which implies a need for revision in this thesis. From the model 
outlined by Løset & Tveten, the following two variables were the most important: 
 Enforcement of environmental regulations: The uncertainty and at what degree IMO will 
enforce the new regulations or not is determining the expansion 
 Degree of standard agreements in LNG-technology: There is a need for standards for 
bunkering, design and operations in order to achieve a well-functioning market  
As several interviewees underlined, Singapore will not become an ECA in any near future (Rensvik & 
Skram, 2012). Therefore, the variable enforcement of environmental regulations is irrelevant. Degree 
of standard agreements however, is a major issue in Southeast Asia. The market for LNG-technology 
will not take off before rules, regulations and classes for bunkering and operations of LNG as a fuel 
are outlined (Stensaker, 2012). Several ship owners also await procedures regarding application of 
LNG (Tay & Menge, 2012; Wah, 2012; Steen, 2012). In total, Degree of standard agreements is still 
valid as a key decision variable.  
There are many relevant key decisions variables that can be applicable in the model. Nevertheless, 
price of LNG is an important factor, which is highlighted by multiple interviewees. As for today, the 
price of LNG compared to oil in Asia can possible kill the business case of LNG-propulsion (Chia, 
2012). Historically, there has been an oil-gas differential in favor of LNG (Bergöö, 2012). In Asia, it is 
smaller than in USA and Europe, but it is present. There are a number of uncertainty factors that will 
determine the evolution of the oil & gas price relation. If USA starts to export gas, the global price 
will be equalized and Asia will get cheaper gas. Likewise, if China exploits their shale gas reserves for 
production, the price will be reduced. And the limited crude oil reserves in the world will probably 
upheld the HFO-price. In total, the oil-gas differential will be a key determinant in affecting the 
market for LNG as a marine fuel. 
 
Figure 46: Future scenarios for the bunker fuel market in Southeast Asia 
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Figure 46 shows an updated version of Løset & Tveten’s (2011) model for the future scenarios of the 
bunker fuel market, with a particular focus on the Southeast Asian region. It is the thesis’ authors 
understanding that the oil-gas differential and degree of standard agreements will be the two most 
important determinants of the bunker fuel market. In contrast to the European market where 
environmental regulations will be enforced, smoke scrubbers are not a relevant alternative as there 
is no profit motive with this technology. Accordingly, HFO and MDO/MGO is the relevant 
alternatives to LNG as a bunker fuel. 
Southeast Asia is a profit-oriented region (Stensaker, 2012). Therefore, it is useful to analyze the 
economic considerations regarding LNG-propulsion. Given the fact that LNG is cheaper than HFO, 
ship owners should have been very positive towards the new fuel. However, the capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) is 20-30 % with LNG-propulsion than traditional engines. Moreover, the tank requires three 
times the space compared to conventional fuel (Løset & Tveten, 2011). Accordingly, the economic 
case of LNG is a tradeoff between increased CAPEX and decreased operational expenditures (OPEX) 
such as fuel costs, operational reliability and maintenance costs.  
Løset & Tveten (2011) presented a comprehensive framework with the purpose to indicate payback 
time on the investment into LNG-propulsion (Appendix II). Fuel cost is the most important 
component in determining the time it takes to offset the additional CAPEX. To PSA Marine, the 
increased CAPEX is not that important due to the extremely high demands attributed to operational 
reliability and maintenance costs on tugs (Tay & Menge, 2012). In this thesis, we have updated the 
framework by Løset & Tveten (2011) that was targeted towards OSVs, and incorporated 
maintenance costs. The payback-time for LNG-propulsion in harbor tugs operating in Singapore can 
be seen in Figure 47.     
 
Figure 47: Economic analysis of payback-time by investing into LNG-propulsion with different oil-gas differential (See 
Appendix 2) 
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Figure 47 shows that LNG-propulsion will be profitable if the oil-gas differential increase, if we 
assume maintenance costs savings and excellent operational reliability. The oil-gas differential is 
bases on estimates of bunker fuel prices in Singapore. If the oil-gas differential stays at the level of 
today, LNG-propulsion will be profitable in a 12 years period. In the best case scenario, LNG will be 
profitable after only 4 years. This indicates how sensitive the calculation is concerning the future oil-
gas differential. Experience from Norway indicates a high probability of increased operational 
reliability, and reduced maintenance costs and lubricant consumption. The evolvement in the oil-gas 
differential is somehow more uncertain, which might explain why ship owners await pioneers to 
contract ships with LNG-propulsion. Nevertheless, the business case of LNG is likely to be profitable 
within a reasonable time horizon.  
9.2 Recommendations for managers 
Chapter 8 revealed several optimal strategic choices for entering Southeast Asia, as well as 
recommendations for which countries that should be targeted and how. This section addresses the 
implications and recommendations for managers, by summarizing and grouping appropriate 
strategic choices for the internationalization processes of LNG-technology. In Chapter 8, we 
discussed the most important strategic factors regarding LNG-technology and the business 
environment in Southeast Asia. Appropriate entry mode, timing, alliances and partner selection was 
identified based on extensive data collection. In the following, the implications for managers are 
accounted for, and a comprehensive export strategy for the Norwegian maritime industry towards 
Southeast Asia is composed.  
9.2.1 Enter Singapore and Indonesia 
Section 8.1 clearly recommended targeting Singapore and Indonesia as the first markets to launch 
LNG-propulsion in Southeast Asia. The other markets in the region can be relevant in a long-term 
perspective, but it is important to narrow the focus in marketing of immature technologies (Løset & 
Tveten, 2011). Singapore works as a reference country concerning technology, and it is important to 
ensure successful launching of LNG-propulsion in the reference market before expanding into other 
markets. Indonesia is the largest market, which makes it an important country in terms of profits. 
This section reviews the strategic choices regarding targeted markets. 
Singapore is the smallest country in the Southeast Asian region in terms of area, second smallest in 
terms of population and third smallest in terms of GDP. Nevertheless, it is the most important 
market to enter and to succeed in, with respect to LNG-propulsion. Singapore is a naval for the 
entire region and a premise provider when it comes to technological development within shipping. 
The most important factor with Singapore is that it is one of the busiest ports in the world with 20 % 
of the global bunkering volume. Accordingly, if retail availability of LNG is established and applied in 
some key segments, it is likely to diffuse into other ship types and ports in the region. The 
government has taken some initiatives through The Maritime Port Authority and established a 
technical and a commercial Joint Industry Projects to work on standards and regulations for 
bunkering and operations (Rensvik & Skram, 2012). It is a great opportunity for the industry to affect 
the government policy and change the context. Among ship owners and the population there is 
skepticism towards gas and LNG, and it takes government leadership to change this perception 
(Wah, 2012). Early entry into Singapore is an important strategic decision if a firm wants to 
capitalize on LNG-propulsion, and such firms should work actively in order to change regulations 
so LNG as a bunker fuel becomes feasible.     
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Indonesia does not share many geographical similarities with Singapore. It is the largest country in 
the region with an extreme landscape, and it is the largest in terms of population and GDP. The 
landscape consists of an endless number of islands, especially the east region, which makes it an 
ideal case for small-scale LNG (Rensvik & Skram, 2012). Several interviewees predict Indonesia to be 
the largest potential market for LNG-propulsion (Preststulen, 2012). However, there are challenges 
related to corruption and the fact that foreigners cannot have the majority share post in local 
companies. Accordingly, to succeed in Indonesia you must adapt your strategies. Corruption can be 
avoided if you learn how to do business in the country (Preststulen, 2012). Höegh LNG has recently 
signed a large contract for a FSRU by managing the business environment properly (Wisløff, 2012). It 
is possible to succeed in Indonesia, but it takes adaption of traditional Western-style strategy to 
get market shares.    
Singapore and Indonesia are the key markets to target in order to succeed. The other gas consuming 
ASEAN-countries, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, have the potential of becoming 
markets for LNG-propulsion. But it is our assessment that the time horizon of LNG as a bunker fuel in 
these countries is significant longer than in Singapore and Indonesia. It is important to focus 
resources for immature technologies, and two countries are enough before the market booms. 
Table 27: Market overview of Singapore and Indonesia 
 Singapore Indonesia 
Market 
characteristics 
Singapore has one of the busiest ports in the 
world with 20 % of the world’s bunkering. It 
is naval in the Southeast Asian region and a 
technological frontrunner 
Indonesia is the 4
th
 most populated 
country in the world and the 16
th
 largest 
economy, and the most important 
country in Southeast Asia.  
Strategy to 
succeed 
Singapore has one of the best business 
environments in the world. However, the 
government is very important and has a key 
role in determining the development of LNG-
propulsion. Accordingly, firms should try to 
change the context 
Indonesia has challenges with corruption 
and local rules stating that foreigners 
cannot have a majority share post. 
Nevertheless, this can be avoided by 
learning the business environment and 
adapt your strategies 
Risk and 
uncertainty 
Gas has a negative perception in Singapore, 
and the price of LNG is a little too high to 
offset the additional CAPEX within a 
reasonable time 
The weak legal framework increase the 
risk of investment and increase the cost of 
doing business in the country 
In the next subsection, we will describe more thoroughly the strategic choices to undertake. Timing, 
entry mode, alliances and partner selection are all factors that firms must consider. Section 9.2.2 
describes appropriate strategic decisions under different circumstances. 
9.2.2 Enter by acquisition or a joint venture within two years  
Singapore and Indonesia are the recommended countries to first target in the region. We used the 
framework by Meyer et al. (2009) to assess proper entry modes in the countries. By analyzing the 
institutional framework and the local resources needed by the case firm, Rolls-Royce Marine, proper 
entry modes were identified. The results could probably be generalized and applicable for other 
Norwegian companies that will establish in the region.   
As confirmed by the interviewed firms, presence in the region is absolute necessary to do business 
in the region. For Norwegian firms that has not established yet, Singapore is a natural place to first 
target with LNG-technology. With acquisitions companies could fast and smoothly establish business 
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in Singapore, with relatively little country risk involved. By operating from Singapore as a hub, 
companies could work with development and establishment of LNG technology in the entire region.  
In Indonesia, Meyer et al. (2009) framework suggested joint venture or Greenfield entry. But 
according to Indonesian law, Greenfield entry is not possible. To get the license to operate an 
Indonesian partner with the majority share post is required. A well-established cooperation with 
local firms secures local market knowledge, overcome cultural differences and could be a proper 
strategy to prevent corruption (Preststulen, 2012). 
We consider presence in the region to be vital for business success, but other entry modes than the 
proposed could be suitable. The most important consideration is that the entry mode fits the 
company that establish and their required needs. But as suggested, a proper way to target the LNG 
market in Southeast Asia is by doing acquisition in Singapore. You get a fast entry, access to skilled 
local resources, and could serve the entire region. 
Timing  
As stated in Løset & Tveten (2011) knowledge about gas safety is a crucial factor for the future of 
LNG as a bunker fuel. The skepticism towars the safety aspect by LNG-techology in Southeast Asia is 
a barrier as for today, and prevent the development. During the last ten years, LNG has been a well-
tested technology in Norway. Years of experience and application on different ships has created a 
reliable and good reputation. While the understanding of LNG has increased, the skepticism has 
decreased; the relationship is described by the graph in Figure 48.  
In 
Singapore and Indonesia the market for LNG has to be considered as immature (Løset & Tveten, 
2011). There is still no LNG bunkering terminals in the region and the knowledge is limited. Anyhow, 
as discussed we assessed the future potential for the technology to be huge. With the new LNG 
import terminal on Jurong Island, the understanding of LNG technology will increase in Singapore. If 
the development follows the same steps as in Norway, it is reason to believe that 2013 will be a 
good timing for entering the market. In Asia relationships are considered to be more important and 
the business more time consuming than in Europe. You should therefore be established in the 
region, before the LNG-market in the region booms. Many different companies are already looking 
at LNG as a future solution, and the development will get increased momentum with LNG available. 
As pointed out in Proposition 3b, there is a positive effect between the ability to share knowledge 
with business partners and profitability. The focus the first years should be mainly on expectation 
Figure 48: A curve showing the relation between skepticism towards LNG and lack of knowledge  
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management and establishment of relationships. Also joint industry projects will be an appropriate 
way to reduce risk, influence market agreements and build relations.    
In Indonesia where the uncertainty is higher than in Singapore, we consider that the development 
and establishment of infrastructure will take more time. Singapore has usually been a first-mover 
into new technologies in the region, while the other countries use some time to adapt (Rensvik & 
Skram, 2012). Everything indicates that the same development will happen again. The uncertainty by 
entering into Indonesia, without knowing that LNG is a success in Singapore is probably too high and 
the entering barrier to costly. Accordingly, 2015 is a proper entry time into Indonesia. 
Only by ‘Crossing the chasm’ in Singapore, investors will be able target Indonesia (Moore, 1999). It 
will be essential to be established in Singapore with relations, local market knowledge and presence 
to succeed in the region. For Norwegian companies, an early establishment will provide huge 
opportunities to influence the market and the standards that need to be settled to accelerate the 
development in all countries adopting LNG as a marine fuel. 
Alliances 
Relations and trust are crucial to succeed in the Southeast Asian business environment. Alliances are 
widely used in foreign market entries to reduce uncertainty and risk, to acquire local market 
knowledge and to get market access. Regardless of collaborative agreement, long-term relations 
are a key ingredient in well-functioning alliances in the Southeast Asian market. Accordingly, the 
building of alliances with partners or customers is an important issue to address.  
Within the market for LNG-propulsion, alliances and relations have a particular importance. In Løset 
and Tveten 2011, one important finding was the need for strategic alliances in order to speed up the 
development of LNG as a bunker fuel. Cooperation in the value chain is the preferred solution to 
solve the Chicken & Egg-problem, the problem with a lack of infrastructure and lack of users. The 
need for partners and allies is higher when the product is complex or multidisciplinary (Moore, 
1999). We addressed the joint cooperation between Shell and Wärtsila as an important 
breakthrough on accelerating the LNG-technology in USA. Shell will offer retail infrastructure in 
certain parts of the American coast line, while Wärtsila will offer LNG-propelled engines. By working 
together, they share the risk of investing into expensive infrastructure and bunkering facilities.  
In Southeast Asia, where still no LNG bunkering infrastructure is established, several of the 
interviewed firms pointed at the lack of infrastructure as a problem. To ensure the required 
investments to be carried out, alliances and network projects along the value chain will be essential. 
The LNG-sponsors need to establish and make market agreements on specifications for LNG as a 
bunker fuel (Løset & Tveten, 2011). Establishment of standards and cooperation in the value chain 
will reduce uncertainty and risk for investments made by both LNG-distributors and ship owners.  
Partner selection and governance 
In Section 8.6 we highlighted the importance of having access to appropriate, effective and 
experienced networks. All the interviewed firms considered partners and alliances to be vital when 
doing business in Southeast Asia. Relationships and connections could be absolute necessary to get 
licenses and approvals to operate.  
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A critical task in establishing collaboration in emerging markets is partner selection. Many 
companies chose to cooperate with agents to perform marketing and sales of their products. As 
described, this can be a viable solution for companies without a brand reputation. Nevertheless, 
agents may have several clients with competing products and services which create interest 
conflicts. Such conflicts are costly and time consuming and must be avoided by careful partner 
selection. Partner selection is a stepwise process where the internationalizing firm first must clarify 
its expectations and needs. Secondly, potential partners must be identified, assessed and 
interviewed before a selection is carried out. It is resource-demanding to perform this process on 
distant market, but Innovation Norway has extensive experience with assisting in partner selection 
processes. It is our recommendation to engage international business specialists in Innovation 
Norway when doing partner selection. 
Concerning the management of alliances, business networks and alliances should be managed by 
relational-based governance involving trust, to give highest return on investment. Trust reduces 
negotiation and transaction costs, increase knowledge sharing and make it easier to handle conflicts. 
Relational-based governance strengthens alliances in economic turbulence, and should be preferred 
over contractual-based governance in all cases except those where only a simple market transaction 
is carried out. 
9.2.3 Appropriate strategy a key to success in Southeast Asia 
Two countries in Southeast Asia seem most promising. Singapore has one of the busiest ports in the 
world, and it is a technological frontrunner in the shipping industry and it functions as a reference 
market to other countries in the region. Moreover, Singapore has one of the best business 
environments in the world which helps Western companies to establish without worrying about 
corruption. Indonesia has the region’s largest GDP and it has a geography ideal to LNG-technology. 
However, it is a demanding business environment which takes time to learn. A common feature 
between Singapore and Indonesia is a need to be present in the Southeast Asian region to be 
considered as a potential business partner. We recommend establishing presence, alliances and 
relationships early in Singapore, before the LNG-technologies booms in the region. When the market 
for LNG-propulsion arises in Singapore, a foreign market entry into Indonesia can be executed. 
Profit is the most common motivation for internationalization. Specifically for emerging markets, 
MNCs might have additional motives such as counter-expansion as emerging economy’s firms are 
expanding towards Western markets. Regardless of strategic rationale, profit is a necessity in a long-
term perspective. Multiple researchers have tried to do empirical studies with the purpose to find 
correlation between profit and firms specific variables. Our study does not indicate that any firm 
specific factors are causal linked to profits, although they maybe correlated. However, we suggest 
that timing of market entry is an important decision that will determine level of profits. Timing is a 
decision where expected profits must offset the associated risk. In the case of LNG-propulsion, firms 
who wants to make profits in Southeast Asia should enter fast to be established before the market 
booms. Table 28 summarizes both strategic and timing-related issues covered in Section 9.2.  
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Table 28: Summary of strategic choices 
Strategic choice Singapore Indonesia 
Entry Mode Acquisition Joint Venture 
Timing 2013 2015 
Alliances Joint Industry projects Local partners required 
Partner selection and governance Relation-based governance Relation-based governance 
Recommended strategy for LNG-propulsion Change the context Adapt your strategies 
The shipping industry in Southeast Asia is huge and 20 % of the world’s marine bunkering takes 
places in Singapore. If a market for LNG-propulsion emerges there is a great potential to make 
profits from selling relevant technology to this market. However, it is not straightforward to succeed 
by internationalizing to this region. Accordingly, our recommendations concerning entry mode, 
timing, alliances and partner selection should be considered in order to maximize profits from 
exporting LNG-technology. 
9.3 Recommendations for policy makers  
The diplomacy has a particular importance in the Southeast Asian business environment. The Royal 
Norwegian Embassies, Innovation Norway and INTSOK are crucial institutions for Norwegian 
companies that want to establish in the region. This section suggests how government trade 
initiatives should be organized to help its country’s businesses to succeed abroad, and specifically 
what the Norwegian diplomacy should do to stimulate the development of LNG as a marine fuel. 
A general finding throughout our thesis is that the Norwegian diplomacy has a greater impact in 
Southeast Asia compared to Western countries. This is probably viable to other Western diplomacies 
as well. Innovation Norway, Royal Norwegian Embassies and other government initiatives have a 
crucial impact as door openers and relational-builders. Business and politics are more closely 
intertwined in Southeast Asia than in Western countries, which make policy makers very important 
to ensure business success in Southeast Asia. Specifically in the case of LNG-propulsion, there is a lot 
of effort the diplomacy can undertake to accelerate the prospects of the business case.  
We have already described in Section 9.2.2 how Innovation Norway can assist with partner selection. 
This is a crucial task for companies seeking partners in Southeast Asia. Innovation Norway has 
extensive knowledge and experience with local firms and they are able to guide firms to select an 
appropriate partner without conflicting interests. Partner selection services should be strengthened 
and offered to future firms seeking to establish in the ASEAN-countries. 
Section 8.8 verifies that the LNG-propulsion market strongly relies on government policies. The 
section also points out specific and relevant political measures the government in Singapore has 
undertaken to accelerate the development of the LNG technology. Examples of political measures 
are establishing Joint Industry Projects working on standards for bunkering and operations with LNG. 
But before this work is completed, a crucial next step will be to increase the knowledge about the 
fundamentals of the LNG-technology. Many decision makers still believe LNG is dangerous and 
therefore not feasible (Wah, 2012). Only with increased understanding among the decision makers, 
LNG can reach its potential as a marine bunker fuel in the region. Consequently, Norwegian 
governmental trade initiatives should contribute to increased understanding of LNG as a marine fuel.  
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9.3.1 Invite official delegations to Norway to observe LNG-propulsion 
The Royal Norwegian embassies, innovation Norway and INTSOK should take initiative to share 
knowledge concerning the application of LNG as a marine fuel in Norway. A delegation from the 
government of Singapore and port authorities should be invited to Norway to increase the 
understanding of LNG. The first seminar should be targeted towards Singaporean decision makers, 
before other authorities in Southeast Asia are invited, preferably the Indonesian as the second. By 
inviting delegations to Norway, important knowledge and years of experience can be shared. This 
measure has several key objectives:  
 LNG and natural gas are met with skepticism among many stakeholders in Singapore. By 
observing the LNG-solutions in Norway knowledge will be shared and the perception of LNG 
will face a favorable change 
 An official delegation creates opportunities for Norwegian companies to build relations with 
stakeholders from Southeast Asia 
 General diplomatic ties are strengthened   
Singapore should be the first country to receive an official invitation to Norway as they are a 
technological frontrunner, and Indonesia the next. In a long-term perspective other ASEAN-countries 
can be invited. Such delegations could also stimulate development of similar standards across the 
ASEAN-countries. Besides organizing official delegations, several measures can be undertaken by 
Innovation Norway. They must continue and consider strengthening international business advising 
as more Norwegian companies establish in Singapore and the Southeast Asian region. Innovation 
Norway is important, and their crucial role must be acknowledged.  
9.4 Recommendations for further research  
Internationalization processes are thoroughly studied from many perspectives with the field of 
strategic management as a main contributor. We have focused on emerging markets which are 
rapidly changing politically, economically and socially. Consequently, research, maybe in particular 
empirical research, fast becomes outdated. During our thesis we have identified several issues which 
need further research. 
A generic model built on an empirical study has been developed to suggest appropriate entry modes 
in foreign markets (Meyer et al., 2009). The model builds on data from foreign entries into four 
emerging economies whereas two are in the Southeast Asian region, which makes it very relevant to 
this thesis’ research question. Nevertheless, collected data indicates that the model cannot be 
generalized to all emerging markets. Indonesia does not allow Greenfield entries because foreigners 
cannot have the majority share post in an investment. Accordingly, Joint Ventures are the only 
alternative. This indicates that the model can only be instructive, not decisive. Further research is 
required to develop more advanced and precise decision support models for foreign entries into 
emerging markets.  
Tse et al. (1997) developed a complex model to describe which factors that decided the choice of 
alliance form by using export data to China. Our proposition stated that the model was applicable for 
Southeast Asia, but that was not the case. The rationale for choosing different collaborative 
agreements outlined in the model deviated from our data collection. This fact can be explained 
multiple ways: The data used by Tse et al. (1997) could be outdated, or it cannot be applicable 
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outside China. Anyhow, further research is needed to develop generic models for choosing different 
forms of alliances so that it may be applicable also in the Southeast Asian region. 
Ruigrok & Wagner (2003) and Lavie & Miller (2008) have investigated respectively correlation 
between return on assets (ROA) and degree of internationalization (DOI) and alliance portfolio 
internationalization (API). Ruigrok & Wagner (2003) found the highest ROA at low and high levels of 
DOI, whilst Lavie & Miller (2008) found the lowest ROA at low and high levels of API. Our thesis 
suggests that these findings are contradicting as highly internationalized firms often have alliances 
with similar firms. Accordingly, there should be further research on which key variables that has 
causal links to ROA. Also, there should be more research on the role of timing in determining 
profitability for firms. 
One of our propositions claimed that timing of foreign market entries had more significance on ROA 
than ROI and API. The analysis of data clearly states the great importance of timing, especially in 
foreign markets such as in Southeast Asia. We found qualitative evidence that timing was the most 
crucial determinant in deciding ROA. However, this study does not have quantitative data to support 
the claim in the proposition. Accordingly, we request further research on the impact from foreign 
market entry timing on financial performance in emerging markets in particular.      
In Section 8.1 we have updated Løset & Tveten’s (2011) 2x2-matrix and economic analysis for the 
business case for how LNG-propulsion will evolve in Southeast Asia. This model is subject to 
generalization, but it will deviate between regions and over time as prices change. We recommend 
other researchers who will use the model as a foundation for analyzing new markets to update the 
model based on a country risk assessment and price strategy analysis. 
Internationalization processes are thoroughly studied. However, the world is constantly changing 
and research can quickly be outdated. Consequently, it is important to identify phenomenons that 
can be subject to further research. The next section will summarize the implications of findings and 
offer conclusions, as the strategy to succeed with export of LNG-technology from Norway to 
Southeast Asia is presented.  
9.5 Conclusions 
An increasing role of LNG in the Southeast Asian energy mix creates an opportunity of LNG as a 
marine fuel. As for today, Norway has the largest LNG-propelled fleet and several manufacturers of 
marine equipment serving this ship segment. Accordingly, it is interesting to do a market analysis of 
the future potential of LNG as a bunker fuel in Southeast Asia and how Norwegian sub suppliers can 
succeed in exporting relevant technology. Our research question for this thesis is:  
 How can the Norwegian maritime sector succeed in internationalizing LNG-technology to 
South-East Asia?  
The market for LNG as a bunker fuel is far more immature in Southeast Asia than in Norway and 
Europe. Coastlines of ASEAN-countries are not ECA-areas and the upcoming regulations from IMO 
setting a maximum sulphur emission level at 0.1 % from 2015 is not relevant in these markets. The 
most important determinant is profitability and reliable standards for bunkering and operations of 
LNG-fueled vessels. Consequently, the probability of a growing market for LNG-propulsion depends 
on an increase in the oil-gas differential increase in favor of gas, and if a class for LNG-vessels is 
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established. Throughout our thesis we have identified the most promising markets, strategies for 
how to succeed in them and how government trade initiatives can contribute to develop the LNG-
market. We have also identified a need for future research. Our case company has been Rolls-Royce 
Marine, but our findings are subject to generalization for the entire Norwegian maritime industry, 
and probably other Western firms as well.  
Chapter 8 has analyzed the pattern matching of data towards theoretical propositions. The analysis 
given clear indications of which countries Norwegian exporters of LNG-technology should target, 
what strategy they should pursue, what the government can conduce to, and what research needs 
this study have revealed. Figure 49 summarizes the findings for how the internationalization strategy 
towards Southeast Asia can be executed.  
Countries to target Strategic decisions 
Singapore: Has one of the busiest ports in the world 
and a technological frontrunner. 20 % of all bunkering 
in the world takes place in the Port of 
Singapore, and success in this market is 
crucial to succeed in the region as well 
as in the global market 
 
Indonesia: The region’s largest economy with an ideal 
geography for LNG. It is the 4
th
 most 
populated country in the world, and 
16
th
 largest economy. By success, 
enormous profits await. 
Entry mode: Acquisitions and Greenfield Entry are 
recommended in Singapore, while a Joint Venture is a 
requirement in Indonesia  
Alliance: There is no indication that one collaborative 
agreement is better than another, it is rather case 
specific. However, JIP is widely used. 
Timing: It takes time to do business in Southeast Asia, 
and it is crucial to build long-term relations. An early 
entry, from 2013, is important to capitalize on LNG-
propulsion 
Partner selection: Careful partner selection is 
required to reveal potential conflicts with other 
partners, and to ensure that the partner is 
appropriate 
Trade initiatives Product analysis 
Innovation Norway: The diplomacy is more 
important in Southeast Asia than in Western 
countries. Presence from international trade 
specialists are crucial to act as door openers and 
relational builders with local partners 
Delegations to Norway: To build trust as well as 
marketing LNG-propulsion, delegations from the 
different targeted markets should be invited to 
Norway to experience a functional LNG-market 
Strategic determinants: The future of LNG as a 
bunker fuel will decided by: 
 Degree of standard agreements for 
bunkering and operations with LNG as a fuel 
 The oil and gas differential 
Economic analysis: With an LNG-price at 90 % of HFO, 
LNG give a payback time of 5 years to offset the 
additional CAPEX 
Figure 49: A summary of findings from theoretical propositions  
9.5.1 Final remarks 
The market for LNG-propulsion in Southeast Asia is very promising. With a new import terminal for 
LNG coming up on Jurong Island in Singapore during 2013, the region’s energy mix will contain more 
gas. This is a business opportunity for LNG-propulsion as the government wants more areas of 
application through distribution of small-scale LNG. With the right strategic decisions it is possible 
for Norwegian companies to make good profits from marketing and sales of LNG-propulsion 
technology to Southeast Asia.  
First of all, to do business in the region is time consuming and demands careful attention to 
relational building and brand reputation. Accordingly, it is advantageous to narrow the focus of 
internationalization to a limited number of markets. We recommend starting with Singapore. 
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Singapore has 20 % of the world’s bunkering and is a technological frontrunner in the region. Also, 
they have a lot of short sea shipping which is ideal as a first segment to adapt LNG-propulsion. Four 
tugs are built annually to cover the port needs, and such vessels are very suitable as they do not 
need LNG-bunkering outside Singapore. 
A second market to target is Indonesia. It is the world’s 16th largest economy and geographically 
ideal for small-scale LNG. However, it is a country struggling with corruption and rules preventing 
foreigners to hold share post majority. Therefore we recommend keeping focus on Singapore and 
Indonesia the next few years. It is too much risk associated by entering more than two countries 
with LNG-propulsion technology, that it cannot be offset by profit outlooks. A strict focus on 
Singapore and Indonesia will maximize the probability of success and hence profits.  
Two distinct strategies must be outlined for Singapore and Indonesia. In Singapore, firms can try to 
change the context by contributing to create new guidelines for bunkering and operations for LNG 
through government initiated Joint Industry Projects that is working on this topic. Moreover, the 
open business environment makes the choice of entry mode and alliance agreements flexible. In 
Indonesia, firms must engage into Joint Ventures. If this is unfamiliar, firms must adapt their 
strategies. Corruption can be avoided, but it requires long-term relations to enter low-risk functional 
alliances.  
A final remark is the significance of Innovation Norway in accelerating the technology of LNG-
propulsion in the region. By organizing official delegations to Norway, knowledge can be shared, 
relations can be built, and the LNG as a marine fuel can become a reality faster than expected. A 
market for LNG as a bunker fuel will arise in Southeast Asia, and Norwegian stakeholders can speed 
up the technological development by first targeting Singapore and Indonesia, build long-term 
relations and chose tailored strategies. 
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Appendix I – Interview guide 
Questions regarding LNG: 
1. We want to find out how the Norwegian maritime industry, and specifically, Rolls-Royce, the 
success of exporting LNG technology to Southeast Asia. But first, what is their assessment of 
potential markets for LNG technology in the region? 
2. What is the potential of LNG as a marine fuel? 
a. Ships types 
b. Time aspect 
3. What are the barriers towards implementation? 
4. How are the financial considerations among alternative technologies? CAPEX and OPEX 
a. LNG vs HFO 
b. LNG vs scrubbers and SCR 
c. LNG vs MDO 
5. How could help from the Norwegian government be useful? 
a. Innovation Norway 
b. NHD 
c.  Maritim21 
6. In Norway, the stringent environmental requirements and the ECA Area LNG technology in 
shipping. Which drivers will focus on LNG technology in Southeast Asia? 
7. You are part of many joint Industry Projects. What is the effect of them and how much is 
invested in them? 
Questions regarding international strategy of the company: 
8. What are the synergies between the Southeast Asian offices? 
9. What considerations apply before you decide to invest in a new market (country)? 
10. Based on what he has told so far: why you invested in Singapore and Malaysia in the first 
place? 
11. What type of investment are you willing to do in different countries?  
12. What formal structures do you have on the alliance? 
13. A partner may have many different properties that are useful. Local experience and 
presence, international experience in a market, etc. How voters you partners? 
14. How do you manage alliances as you are part of? How to share your knowledge and get it to 
give effect to the company? 
15. Is it relevant with new alliances and partners to succeed in Southeast Asia? 
16. What factors are most important when you consider investments in new countries? 
17. What is the importance of a stable political regime? 
18. What is the significance of the country's experience in international business? 
19. What is the importance of good labor market? 
20. What is the importance of well-functioning financial markets? 
21. How much time and resources do you use to identify conditions in the country you go into, 
and how much emphasis on them? Political system, legal system. 
22. Challenges of emerging markets specifically?  
23. Knowledge Sharing  
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Appendix II – Economic Analysis 
This appendix shows how we have made our economic analysis of LNG versus smoke scrubbers. We 
also present some alternative scenarios to the one presented in Section 8.1.  
Step 1: Firstly the relationship between the CAPEX for LNG and HFO are estimated. We have 
estimated LNG-CAPEX to be 1.2 times higher than smoke scrubbers as a mean between different 
estimates presented. 
  CAPEX (Saga, et.al, 2010; Stenersen, 2011) 
HFO 1 
 LNG 1,2 
  
Step 2: Secondly we have estimated the cost components in OPEX for an OSV based on Stopford 
(2008). We have also used other sources to estimate these, but we must underline that they will 
vary largely based on vessel type. 
  OPEX (Stopford, 2008; Stenersen, 2011) 
Fuel 45 % 
 Staffing 10 % 
 Port fees 17 % 
 General costs 28 % 
 Total OPEX 100 % 
  
Step 3: Thirdly the oil-gas differential between LNG-price and HFO are estimated. As for today, it is 
0.5, but we have tested both 0.75 and 0.25. The oil and gas differential is currently high based on 
historical prices, but it is no signs of any factors that could bring them closer in the short run. The 
global supply of LNG is currently great with huge available reserves and is expected to grow 
substantially in the future, while oil reserves are scarce resources (Nysæter & Aadland, 2011). 
  January 2012 Worst case Best case (Japan prices, 2011) 
LNG-price / HFO-price  0,9 0,95 0,75 [$/kWh] 
 
Step 4: The last step has been to estimate the relation between OPEX and CAPEX, set a discount rate 
and estimate the cost accumulation. The formulas are shown.  
 
 
OPEX/CAPEX 40 % (HIS Cera, 2011) 
 
 
Discount rate 10 % 
   Time   LNG 1 LNG 2 LNG 3 HFO 
0 CAPEX 1,2 1,2 1,2 1 
1 OPEX 0,34 0,36 0,30 0,36 
2 OPEX 0,31 0,32 0,27 0,33 
3 OPEX 0,28 0,29 0,25 0,30 
4 OPEX 0,25 0,27 0,23 0,27 
5 OPEX 0,23 0,24 0,21 0,25 
6 OPEX 0,21 0,22 0,19 0,23 
7 OPEX 0,19 0,20 0,17 0,21 
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8 OPEX 0,17 0,18 0,16 0,19 
9 OPEX 0,16 0,17 0,14 0,17 
10 OPEX 0,14 0,15 0,13 0,15 
11 OPEX 0,13 0,14 0,12 0,14 
12 OPEX 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,13 
13 OPEX 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,12 
14 OPEX 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,11 
15 OPEX 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,10 
16 OPEX 0,08 0,09 0,07 0,09 
17 OPEX 0,07 0,08 0,07 0,08 
18 OPEX 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,07 
19 OPEX 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,07 
20 OPEX 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,06 
Finally, the cost accumulation is estimated by adding the total costs for all the forgoing years: 
 
Time LNG most likely  LNG worst case LNG best case Smoke scrubbers 
0 1,2 1,2 1,2 1 
1 1,38 1,40 1,35 1,23 
2 1,54 1,59 1,49 1,43 
3 1,68 1,75 1,61 1,62 
4 1,81 1,90 1,73 1,79 
5 1,93 2,04 1,83 1,95 
6 2,04 2,17 1,92 2,09 
7 2,14 2,28 2,01 2,22 
8 2,23 2,38 2,08 2,33 
9 2,32 2,48 2,15 2,44 
10 2,39 2,56 2,22 2,54 
11 2,46 2,64 2,28 2,62 
12 2,52 2,71 2,33 2,70 
13 2,58 2,78 2,38 2,78 
14 2,63 2,83 2,42 2,84 
15 2,67 2,89 2,46 2,90 
16 2,72 2,94 2,50 2,96 
17 2,75 2,98 2,53 3,01 
18 2,79 3,02 2,56 3,05 
19 2,82 3,06 2,59 3,09 
20 2,85 3,09 2,61 3,13 
 
